

ZIMBABWE TRANSITION IN A PRISONER'S DILEMMA



**PERCEPTIONS ON CORRUPTION REDUCTION AND SERVICE DELIVERY IN
THE MNANGAGWA DISPENSATION**



ZIMBABWE DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE REPORT, DECEMBER 2018

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Zimbabwe Democracy Institute
66 Jason Moyo Avenue
2nd Floor
Bothwell House
Harare
Zimbabwe

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FOREWORD

The demise of former President Robert Mugabe through a 'coup' or a 'military assisted transition' placed Zimbabwe on an unprecedented political trajectory. The incoming administration headed by President Mnangagwa termed this new trajectory 'a new dispensation.' However, questions have arisen from many Zimbabweans, development partners and other stakeholders- in and outside Zimbabwe -on how to classify this 'new dispensation' in terms of its genuineness and capacity to 'break with past.' Using government's position on fighting corruption and provision of services as a basis for comparison, this research provides a systematic and empirical analysis of the new administration's performance and competence to address these societal challenges.

This report comes at a time when there is a lot of debate on whether or not government is genuine and has capacity to eradicate corruption and improve service delivery, attract investment and place Zimbabwe on a sustainable path to economic prosperity. The deliberate choice of using corruption and service delivery as measurement tools is predicated on the fact that the two factors define the quality of government and can best describe whether or not Zimbabwe has broken with the past.

The research specifically analysed corruption reduction in key public institutions in Zimbabwe since November 2017; the integrity of the new government in fighting corruption; the genuineness of government in fighting corruption since November 2017; and, the extent of corruption and any changes thereof in selected public institutions since November 2017. Institutions that came under

review include the Vehicle Inspectorate Department (VID); Registrar's Office (issuance of births, passports and deaths certificates); the Zimbabwe Republic Police's Traffic Section; the agriculture input scheme; the judiciary; the military; local government; traditional leaders; the education sector and the health sector. These institutions were selected on the basis of their day-to-day interaction with citizens and the importance of the services they offer. The report used the changes in quality of service delivery in institutions listed above by paying particular attention to processing time and customer care (user-friendliness).

The research employed both qualitative and quantitative methods of enquiry. The juxtaposition of these two strengthens research as questions of 'what is' and 'what ought to be' are both addressed. The report is divided into four chapters. Chapter one introduces the subject, provides the justification and the objectives of the study and outlines the research design. Chapter two provides the theoretical framework, literature review, the definition of key terms such as corruption and transition. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a comparative analysis of transitions and locate the Zimbabwean form of transition.

Chapter three links the literature review and the findings from 274 interviews drawn from across Zimbabwe. The chapter presents the research findings by analysing patronage networks, weak political institutions and transition dilemma by linking theory to practice. Chapter four provides the conclusion and recommendations. The research concludes that there has been a reduction in 'petty corruption' and an improvement in some sections of service delivery. This reduction is attributed to fear from duty bearers and a perception that

government wants to fight corruption in public institutions. However, the report also notes that grand-scale corruption, mainly linked to patronage and clientelism has not abated. Consequently, there is scepticism that government has the capacity and political will to fight grand corruption as it created this system and the same people that are mandated to institute anti-corruption

measures are beneficiaries of the system. Thus the system can only fight corruption at its own peril. The report provides recommendations to addressing the issue of corruption to a broad spectrum of stakeholders which includes government, civil society, the opposition and the international community.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CBOs	Community Based Organisations
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
MDC-A	Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance
SONA	State of the Nation Address
TSP	Transitional Stabilisation Plan
USD	United States Dollar
VID	Vehicle Inspectorate Department
WEF	World Economic Forum
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front
ZIMRA	Zimbabwe Revenue Authority
ZDI	Zimbabwe Democracy Institute

KEY HIGHLIGHTS OF THE STUDY

This study interrogated two fundamental indicators of transition in the 'quality of government' (service delivery and corruption reduction) in Zimbabwe since November 2017. Undergirding the study was the objective to monitor and hold government accountable for the promises it made to transition Zimbabwe to a democratic and prosperous dispensation. Such accountability cannot be exerted without a clear picture of results so far. Such results can only be 'perceived' by those at the receiving end of government service delivery. Thus a team of Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (ZDI) researchers collected data from a sample of 506 key informants who were purposively sampled from among consumers of services delivered by sampled public institutions, leaders of community-based organisations, civic society organisations and activists in across the country. Key public institutions that were selected for examination were: VID, Health Sector (public hospitals), education sector (public universities, schools, colleges); traffic police, registrar's office (issuance of births and deaths certificates and passports), the military, the government agriculture input scheme, traditional leaders, judiciary (courts) and local authorities (town and district councils). Data collection was done from September to November 2018 through 274 in-depth interviews with key informants and seven focus group discussions with 232 key informants purposively sampled from Lupane, Gwanda, Plumtree, Tsholotsho, Bulawayo, Umguza, Masvingo, Harare, Kwekwe, Gokwe, Chegutu, Kadoma and Chitungwiza.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

PERCEPTION OF PETTY-CORRUPTION REDUCTION IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA

- Findings revealed that “minute” petty-corruption reduction seems to be happening in public institutions generally as 38% of all respondents perceived 'no corruption reduction' in sampled public institutions against 61% who perceived evidence of 'corruption reduction' which ranges from 'satisfactory reduction' (24%), 'fair reduction' (17%) and 'partial reduction' (20%).
- The above generalisation came as a result of higher proportions of 'no corruption reduction' perceptions about public institutions such as the VID, government agriculture input scheme and the judiciary as 63% of sampled VID clients perceived 'no reduction' in petty-corruption at VID, 62% of sampled beneficiaries of government agriculture input scheme perceived 'no reduction' in petty-corruption in the scheme and 54% of sampled judiciary service consumers perceived 'no reduction' in petty-corruption in the judiciary system.
- The traffic police, Registrar General's Office, local authorities, health sector, education sector and traditional leadership were perceived to be partially changing or fairly reducing petty-corruption from what used to be the culture during the Mugabe administration.
- The military was the only institution with a promising petty-corruption reduction perception as 64% of sampled consumers of its services deemed its corruption reduction as having improved to satisfactory, fair and partial against 34% who perceived 'no petty-corruption reduction'.

- Respondents seemed very uncomfortable with commenting on military affairs.

PERCEPTION OF 'BRIBE DEMAND/PAYMENT' IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS SINCE NOVEMBER 2017

- Only the VID had an above average 'bribe' perception score as 57% of sampled consumers of its services attested that they have been made to pay bribes to get services done whereas, the military had the least 'bribe-demand' perception score as only 7% of sampled consumers of its services attested that they have been made to pay bribes to get services done.
- This data entails that most government institutions have seen a 'limited' culture of taking 'facilitation fees' from service consumers and explanations were that:
 - the level of fear of the current political leadership has made employees in public institutions to trade with caution in their corrupt culture thus the increase in number of service consumers who pay bribes for services
- Zimbabweans have gotten so terrified by the system to the extent that they even fear telling anyone (including the researcher) that they pay bribes for public services to protect their 'contact persons' inside public institutions and themselves
- There was a general observation across interviews and FDGs that patronage and nepotism have continued to increase in public institutions.
- Explanatory data given by respondents indicate that traffic police officers were intimidated by the army and current government during the power transition period and no longer trust civilians on the road and they are no longer safe when they collect bribes on the road.

PERCEPTION OF EXTENT OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

- Findings revealed a very gloomy picture of corruption in public institutions in general as only 37% of sampled service consumers perceived them 'not corrupt' against 62% who perceived sampled public institutions as either 'corrupt', 'very corrupt' or 'extremely corrupt.'
- These findings entail that:
 - service consumers generally perceive sampled public institutions as corrupt save for the education sector (55% not corrupt) and the military (57% not corrupt) and that
 - Corruption is still high in these institutions and the Mnangagwa dispensation has not done anything to foster transition in this respect.
 - Only 7% of public service consumers viewed the VID as 'not corrupt' resonating with the 'no corruption reduction' and 'more bribe demands' revealed in perceived about this institution.
- These findings reveal that:
 - petty-corruption might have entered a period of decrease due to the fear factor associated with the Mnangagwa administration;
 - grand-corruption and/or political corruption continues unabated and;
 - transition in quality of government has not been initiated since patronage networks sustaining political corruption still continue despite signs of decreases in 'some' bureaucratic corruption indicators.
- The Mnangagwa dispensation will not legitimately claim transition until it addresses these decays perceived by the people since it is the people and them alone who can give a legitimate feedback regarding this transition.

PERCEPTION OF GOVERNMENT GENUINENESS IN FIGHTING POLITICAL-CORRUPTION IN THE POST-MUGABE ERA

- Political corruption and grand-corruption' have been empirically confirmed as key causes of political decay and poor human development indicators in many developing countries (Robinson and Acemoglu, 2012).
- Findings indicate that political corruption is very hard to handle for the Mnangagwa government.
- Save For The Military, Sampled Respondents Perceived That The Government Of President Mnangagwa Is Not Genuine In Dealing With Political Corruption Witnessed In Sampled Institutions As Less Than Less Than 45% Of Sampled Service Consumers For All Reviewed Public Institutions Perceived Some Genuineness In Government Anti-corruption Efforts.
- 51% of all sampled service consumers from all reviewed institutions perceived 'no sign of genuineness' in government efforts to fight political corruption.
- Findings were that government seems to be more committed in consolidating its grip on power and fighting political rivals than addressing political corruption in a manner that leaves no sacred cows.

CITIZENS' CONFIDENCE IN THE MNANGAGWA ADMINISTRATION'S ABILITY TO FIGHT POLITICAL CORRUPTION

- Findings indicate that the Mnangagwa administration is perceived 'not fit' to deal with political corruption decaying public institutions as 52% of all sampled service consumers for all reviewed public institutions perceived the Mnangagwa

administration as 'not able' to fight political corruption while 47% were divided into 'partly able' and 'able' perceptions.

- Reasons for this perception were that:
- the current administration has inherited and benefits from ZANU-PF patronage networks in public institutions and it will be detrimental for President Mnangagwa to completely get rid of it given his perceived desire for state power
- the current leadership has 'dirty-hands' as far as the creation of a corrupt authoritarian state and it's impossible to expect the government to devour itself in the name of fighting political corruption it has worked so hard to create and maintain
- there are no effective institutions to exert accountability and rule of law measures capable of curbing political corruption, they have been captured and emasculated.
- These findings highlighted that Zimbabwe transition is going nowhere anytime soon. It is in a prisoner's dilemma; the necessary political leadership to initiate and sustain transition and reform is missing.

PERCEPTION OF CHANGES IN SERVICE DELIVERY IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS IN THE MNANGAGWA ADMINISTRATION

- Corruption generally has been empirically confirmed to have 'saboteur' effects on the quantity and quality of service delivered by public institutions and transition from one political dispensation to another is mostly felt in the manner with which service delivered by public institutions differ in the two dispensations.
- Findings indicate mixed feelings across sectors, feelings of 'fair changes' or slight changes (30%) and 'not changed, still dismal (36%)' being the most popular.
- The military was again given promising indicators of transition; 57% of consumers of

its services perceived that service delivery 'has changed, now satisfactory' although it was also the only one with the highest percentage (followed by the judiciary) of perception of 'becoming worse' compared to others.

- The most sticking institutions have been the VID (53% of its clients perceived its service delivery as 'not changed, still dismal'), judiciary (54% of its clients perceived its service delivery as 'not changed, still dismal'), and health sector (54% of its clients perceived its service delivery as 'not changed still dismal').
- Service delivery by the traffic police, National registry, government agriculture input scheme, local authorities, traditional leadership and the education sector have been perceived to have 'changed, now fair'.

PERCEPTION OF PROCESSING TIME TAKEN TO DELIVER SERVICE IN POST - MUGABE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

- To fully appreciate the level of change in service delivery, it has been a general practice to measure it using 'processing time' taken to get services from government or hours taken queuing for services.
- Findings indicated that more institutions still take more than one hour to process services save for the traffic police (59% of its service consumers said they wait for 'less than 1hrs' for services), education sector (57% of its service consumers said they wait for 'less than 1hrs' for services) and the military (64% of its service consumers said they wait for 'less than 1hrs' for services).
- The worst institutions perceived to be keeping people waiting in queues for service for 1 hours to 6 or more in their

descending order were: judiciary (92%), government agriculture input scheme (85%), Registrar General's office (85%).

- What these findings entail is that there is still a lot of stagnation in improving service delivery in those institutions that interact with the public most frequently in delivering basic services such as health, citizenship documents and licences.
- This is a very bad indicator that is detrimental to the efforts of attracting foreign investment. There is need for improvement in this regard.

Perception of Customer-care in Public Institutions

- A change in perceived customer-care and/or user-friendliness is a good indicator of improved quality of service delivery.
- Findings revealed that the nature of customer care in many of the sampled institutions 'has changed, now satisfactory' or 'has changed, now fair' save for the VID (60% of its sampled clients perceived its service delivery as “-not changed, still unfriendly”), health sector (54% of its sampled clients perceived its service delivery as '-not changed, still unfriendly'), and the judiciary (62% of its sampled clients perceived its service delivery as '-not changed, still unfriendly').
- What these findings (fig 3.8) mean is that citizens feel 'some' transition in key public institutions in terms of how they are treated when they visit for various services.
- This can partly be explained by the fear factor associated with the entry of the Mnangagwa administration in power. “People were so terrified to the extent that they no longer trust visitors here.”

MAIN CONCLUSION: ZIMBABWE TRANSITION IN A PRISONER'S DILEMMA

In light of the collected findings, the study concluded that Zimbabwe transition to a democratic and economic recovery dispensation is very shadowy. The political economy experiences what is called a 'prisoner's dilemma' in Game Theory. The theory states that there are two options out of two prisoners' situation; they can choose to either 'cooperate' or 'defect.' Each prisoner

gains when both cooperate, but if only one of them cooperates, the other one, who defects, will gain more. If both defect, both lose but not as much as the 'cheated' co-operator whose cooperation is not returned. Thus, as Zimbabwe transition is in a prisoner's situation, absence of strong institutions and willing political leadership to support political reforms and transition to a democratic and economic recovery dispensation is the 'defecting' party making the 'cheated' Zimbabwean transition dream more and more 'illusive'.

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN

Good governance based on ... Accountability, Transparency, Responsiveness, Equity and Inclusiveness, Efficiency and Full Participation of the people in socio-economic development, is the bed-rock of a new democratic and developmental Zimbabwe (Government of Zimbabwe Vision 2030 presentation, 2018:10)...

It is with this objective that Government is implementing a number of measures on fighting corruption, one of the sources of increased cost of doing business, rent-seeking behaviour and inefficiency on service delivery in both public and private sectors (Government of Zimbabwe Vision 2030 presentation, 2018:46).

INTRODUCTION

This study is predicated on government claims that Zimbabwe transitioned into a 'new dispensation' after the overthrow of former President Robert Mugabe in November 2017. A question that many have been grappling with is: how genuine is the claim that Zimbabwe has indeed transitioned to a new dispensation? Those at the receiving end of services delivered by public institutions can give a very vital input in legitimating the claim¹. The administration must be seen to be 'walking the talk' for its claims of a new dispensation to be legitimate. Due to the chronic legitimacy question that has engulfed Zimbabwe for many years, this verification is vital for the population to have

confidence in the administration, for re-engagement with the international community and for prospective investors to consider Zimbabwe as their investment destination. Thus, this study examined the perceptions of Zimbabweans on two key indicators of political transition: (i) transition in corruption perception in public institutions; and (ii) transition in service delivery in public institutions following the military overthrow of former President Robert Mugabe in November 2017. It inferred how and/or what citizens (consumers of public services) perceive and chat as the 'actual' transition narrative particularly in the 'quality of government'² in key public institutions that have the most frequent interaction with the public. The main thesis therefore is that, decisions taken at a political level have increasingly exposed the risk of shoving the political economy of the state into the worst-case scenario than before. Thus, the proposition that Zimbabwe transition is in a prisoner's dilemma.

Zimbabwe Democracy Institute has done many studies where it conceptualized the Zimbabwean political system as a 'competitive authoritarian' regime (ZDI, 2017a,b; 2018). This kind of political system is characterised by presence of institutions of democracy such as the rule of law, democratic constitution, independent elections, judiciary and anti-

¹ It should be noted that service delivery and corruption perception are 'some' of the indicators that can be used to gauge political transition. Other indicators such as media freedom, freedom of protest, rule of law etc can be utilized too. This study however delimited its test of transition to these two indicators.

² "Quality of government" is a crucial political science term associated with the Quality of Government Institute (QoG) which refers to the measure of good-government through indicators such as corruption perception in key public institutions, accountability, quality of service delivery, respect of the rule of law among others. See a detailed conceptualization of this term available online at: <https://qog.pol.gu.se/data>.

corruption commissions, separation of powers, holding competitive elections and so on yet such institutions are deliberately incapacitated by the executive who uses them to secure and retain power (Levytsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2009). This situation has been described as a 'democracy in retreat' and/or a situation where 'elections without democracy' are held as a ritual. Thus, the question of transitioning to a 'legitimate democratic' dispensation and economic prosperity has seized the nation of Zimbabwe for many years. It has earned various conceptualizations in the academia as 'an elusive Zimbabwean dream', a 'political imbroglio' and/or 'transition in a muddy terrain'.³ The vital thrust in all these conceptions has been that: politico-economic transition in Zimbabwe is and has been a hard, long and convoluted struggle. The events of November 2017 saw Zimbabweans for once uniting across political divides to aid the overthrow of former President Robert Mugabe. Hopes were high across the country that 'consociational democracy' was nigh.⁴ These hopes for a consociational government to succeed Mugabe were however disappointed as the ruling party went on to govern alone.⁵

It is in this context that the post-November 2017 government has reiterated its commitment to deliver the 'illusive dream' to transition Zimbabwe to a "new dispensation" anchored on good governance, rule of law, improved service delivery and fighting corruption at all levels⁶. This was put clear by President Mnangagwa's State of the Nation Address (SONA) presented in 2017 soon after assuming power stating:

Corruption remains the major source of some of the problems we face as a country and its retarding impact on national development cannot be overemphasized... On individual cases of corruption, every case must be investigated and punished in accordance with the dictates of our laws. There should be no sacred cows. My government will have zero tolerance towards corruption and this has already begun⁷.

The government has also articulated to the international community what it means and/or dream as the 'new dispensation'.⁸ It was clarified in its Vision 2030 presented by the then Minister of Finance and Economic

³ See for instance, Mutambara, A. G. O. 2017. In Search of the Elusive Zimbabwean Dream: An Autobiography of Thought Leadership. See also, ZDI. 2017. Zimbabwe Political Transition in A Muddy Terrain: Political Economy Under Military Capture. Accessible online at: <http://kubatana.net/2017/12/14/zimbabwe-transition-muddy-terrain-political-economy-military-capture/>.

⁴ "Consociational democracy" is a political science term associated to the writings of a Netherlands political scientist Arend Lijphart which refers to "inclusive" governance. It entails a form of government that includes all key political forces in a given country the aim being to strengthen government stability, deepen representative democracy and end intra-state violence. See for instance, Lijphart, A. 2004. Constitutional design for divided societies. *Journal of Democracy*, 15 (2): 96-109.

⁵ This disappointment has been publicly pronounced by the current leader of the main opposition party, Nelson Chamisa in his testimony given to the Commission of Inquiry in to the August 1 2018 post-election violence. Accessible online at: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5z0sAdjSjAo&t=2039s>.

⁶ President Mnangagwa has repeatedly problematised corruption as a major barrier to business and economic transition in Zimbabwe and made a fight against corruption as one of the main objectives of his government in his two State of the Nation Addresses. Even the newly-appointed Registrar- General Mr Clement Masango has vowed to end perennial queues for various documents, fight corruption and instil a new work ethic to ramp up service delivery in his assumption of office. See <https://www.chronicle.co.zw/new-rg-vows-to-clear-queues-end-corruption/>. This was also reiterated in the 2019 National Budget Statement and the Transitional Stabilization Programme (October 2018-December 2020).

⁷ Zimbabwean President Emerson Mnangagwa. State of the Nation Address (SONA) in Harare, Zimbabwe, December 20, 2017.

⁸ See, Government Of Zimbabwe. 2018. Towards An Upper-Middle Income Economy by 2030. Accessible online at: <http://www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/index.php/treasury-updates?download=127:zimbabwe-main-message-to-international-community>.

Development Patrick Chinamasa in Washington DC on the 21st of April 2018 that:

Good governance based on Rule of Law, Human rights and Freedoms, Accountability, Transparency, Responsiveness, Equity and Inclusiveness, Efficiency and Full Participation of the people in socio-economic development, is the bed-rock of a new democratic and developmental Zimbabwe (2018: 10) ... It is with this objective that Government is implementing a number of measures on fighting corruption, one of the sources of increased cost of doing business, rent-seeking behaviour and inefficiency on service delivery in both public and private sectors (2018: 46).

In other words, the new dispensation should be construed to mean commitment to reducing corruption and improving service delivery which together prop up the quality of government⁹.

This commitment to improving the quality of government through corruption reduction and better service delivery was reiterated in the government policy blueprint named the Transitional Stabilisation Plan (TSP) 2018-2020.¹⁰ It was cemented in the Zimbabwe 2019 budget statement¹¹. The government's proclamations and/or efforts on anti-corruption and improvement of service

delivery, although being among the requisite 'first-aid' efforts in transitioning to sustainable democracy and economic recovery in Zimbabwe, they require continuous assessments and evaluations. This will enable citizens, civic society, politicians, government and investors to evaluate progress, identify gaps, re-strategise and choose strategic corrective or preventive measures. This, according to ZDI, will ensure that Zimbabwe is given a correctly guided and sustained transition. Therefore, of great interest in this study is the government's goal and commitment to fight corruption and improve service delivery in public institutions as an indicator of genuineness of government claims that Zimbabwe has indeed entered a new dispensation.

The negative correlation between corruption and service delivery has indeed been established by many empirical studies (Shao et al, 2007: 157; Podobnik et al, 2008: 547). An increase in corruption levels is among key factors that decrease quality and quantity of service delivery whereas poor service delivery in public institutions is yet another indicator of poor quality of government which has been established by recent studies to have negative impacts on socio-economic development (Fukuyama, 2014; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2012; Quality of Government Institute, 2017).

⁹. Corruption, exclusionary politics, extractive public institutions that are not controlled by accountability and rule of law safeguards key characteristics in states with dismal performance in the quality of government indicators and/or human development indices. See empirical correlations in Robinson, J and Acemoglu, D. 2012. *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty* (Online). Available at: <http://www.norayr.am...pdf>.

¹⁰. For detailed data on this, see the Government of Zimbabwe Transitional Stabilization Programme (October 2018-December 2020) Policy Document Available online at: <http://kubatana.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Transitional-Stabilisation-Programme-Final.pdf>.

¹¹. See for instance, the Zimbabwe 2018 National Budget Statement. Accessible online at: <http://www.zimtreasury.gov.zw/index.php/budget-policy-statements?download=106:2018-national-budget-statement>.

Corruption was rampant during the Mugabe administration and key members of the current government participated in that administration at the top level of decision making. For instance, in 1995 Mugabe's government tolerated theft of money from the National Housing Fund by senior government officials who used it to buy their real estates and no prosecution was done (Barker 251-252). In 2012, the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority (ZIMRA) reported that USD 2 billion was lost due to corruption in 2012¹² whereas in 2016, former President Robert Mugabe stated that USD 15 billion was lost under corrupt circumstances in the diamond mining sector¹³. The Transparency International corruption perception index report (2017) shows a corruption perception index score of 22 out of 100 for Zimbabwe indicating high level of corruption¹⁴.

Additionally, the ease of doing business in Zimbabwe is inhibited by many factors which make investment very difficult. For instance, the 2017-2018 Global Competitiveness Report by the World Economic Forum (WEF), lists the following factors that prohibit doing business in Zimbabwe (in order of their importance): policy instability (19.3%); foreign currency regulations (15.9%); inefficient government bureaucracy (13.6%); access to finance (10.5%); corruption (9.2%); government instability (8.8%); inadequate supply of infrastructure (8.3%); tax rates (4.6%); restrictive labour regulations (4.4%) and tax regulations (4.1%) among others.

Commitments to improve service delivery and reduce corruption in public institutions are therefore very vital given the deficits in addressing these ills during the Mugabe administration. However, an expression of interest to fight corruption and improve service delivery is one thing whereas being seen to be reducing corruption and improving service delivery is another. It is the latter which matters the most as far as entrenching legitimacy improving the ease of doing business indicators and earning citizens' trust and confidence are concerned. An improvement in these will mark a break with the past and a confirmation that Zimbabwe has indeed entered a new dispensation.

It is our considered assertion that the consumers of services delivered by public institutions can give a clear and accurate picture of the improvements and gauge government's performance in this regard. Hence this study sought to follow up government anti-corruption mantra with an empirical investigation on the post-Mugabe corruption and service delivery perception in selected public institutions. Targeted institutions were: Zimbabwe Republic Police's traffic section, the Vehicle Inspectorate Department, the registrar's office, the government agriculture input scheme and the judiciary among others. In this study, perceptions of consumers and/or beneficiaries of public services delivered by above public institutions were examined. The aim was to test and determine the public's perception of corruption and service delivery in the new administration used by this study as indicators of transition.

¹² See Chawafambira, Kudzai. "Zim Loses \$2bn to Corruption." Daily News. Associated Newspapers of Zimbabwe (Pvt.) Ltd. 23 Oct 2013.

¹³ See, Global Witness Report, 11/09/2027. An Inside Job. Available at: <https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-diamonds/zimbabwe/inside-job/>.

¹⁴ A score of 100 in the corruption perception index shows lowest levels of corruption perception whereas score 1 shows highest levels of corruption. Report available online at: <http://www.transparency.org/country/ZWE>.

OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This study interrogated the extent and performance of the post November 2017 government of Zimbabwe in fighting corruption and improving service delivery in the post-Mugabe era. The broad objective was to ascertain the legitimacy of the government's claim that Zimbabwe has entered a new dispensation by interrogating any changes in key indicators of quality of government - public service delivery and corruption reduction. In pursuit of this objective, the study interrogated perceptions of consumers of services delivered by key public institutions on:

1. corruption reduction in key public institutions in Zimbabwe since November 2017;
2. the integrity of the new government in fighting corruption;
3. the genuineness of government in fighting corruption since November 2017;
4. the extent of corruption and any changes thereof in the following selected public institutions since November 2017:
 - i. Vehicle Inspectorate Department (VID)
 - ii. Registrar's Office (issuance of births, passports and deaths certificates)
 - iii. Traffic Police
 - iv. Agriculture input scheme
 - v. Judiciary
 - vi. The military
 - vii. Local government
 - viii. Traditional Leaders
 - ix. Education Sector
 - x. Health Sector
5. Changes in quality of service delivery in institutions listed in 4 above paying

particular attention to:

- i. Processing time
- ii. Customer care (user-friendliness)

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The study was guided by following questions:

1. Has there been any reduction in corruption in key public institutions since November 2017?
2. What is the general belief on government's integrity in fighting corruption?
3. Do you believe that government is genuine in its efforts to combat corruption since November 2017?
4. What do you think is the current state of corruption in the following institutions and are there any changes since November 2017:
 - i. VID?
 - ii. Registrar's Office?
 - iii. Traffic Police?
 - iv. Agriculture input scheme?
 - v. Judiciary?
 - vi. The military?
 - vii. Local government?
 - viii. Traditional Leaders?
 - ix. Education Sector?
 - x. Health Sector?
5. What is the nature and quality of service delivery in government institutions particularly:
 - i. Processing time?
 - ii. Customer care (user-friendliness)?

RESEARCH DESIGN

This study adopted a mixed methods research design that used semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and desktop research to collect data from purposively sampled

respondents and public institutions. The rationale for purposively sampling respondents and public institutions was based on three practical reasons. First, the study sought to avoid seeking information on this sensitive issue where it is apparent that that none can be given. Secondly, these institutions have a daily interaction with citizens apart from delivering vital services on a daily basis. It was our considered view that hearing from consumers and/or beneficiaries of services provided by the public institutions under the Mnangagwa administration is the best way to validate or invalidate government's assertion that Zimbabwe is currently in a transition to a new dispensation. Thirdly, the study sampled representatives of community-based organizations to form its focus group discussions on the basis that these respondents interact with the sampled institutions most frequently in their watchdog and accountability exerting activities.

SAMPLING PROCEDURE

The sampling procedure adopted in this study was qualitative. It was a purposive sampling of knowledgeable insiders in Zimbabwe. Respondents comprised those who consume and pressure government to deliver services to the public. This was done to ensure that only respondents with first-hand and reliable knowledge of service delivery and corruption were sampled. Sampling was done for the two main data collection procedures – focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews. Thus, the sampling procedure for focus group discussions was done in the following manner: (i) 60 members who participated in 'two rounds' of focus group discussions were sampled from members of CBOs and community leaders in the Midlands

province; (ii) 72 members who participated in two rounds of focus group discussions held in Bulawayo were sampled from members of CBOs, community leaders, and consumers of services delivered by sampled public institutions in Lupane, Gwanda, Plumtree, Tsholotsho, Bulawayo, Umguza; (iii) 70 members of focus group discussions who participated in two rounds of FGDs held in Masvingo were sampled from members of CBOs, CSOs and community leaders in Masvingo province and (iv) 30 members of CSOs, CBOs, and pressure groups participated in FGDs held in Harare.

Respondents for semi-structured interviews were sampled from eight towns of Zimbabwe that are Harare, Bulawayo, Lupane, Gweru, Gwanda, Tsholotsho, Masvingo, and Mutare as shown in table 1.1 below. These research areas were chosen for being areas where interaction between service providers and consumers is frequent, higher and observable. This increased: (i) chances of sampling 'knowledgeable' beneficiaries of services and (ii) convenience. Respondents for interviews were purposively sampled from among consumers of services delivered by the following public institutions: Vehicle Inspectorate Department, Health Sector (hospitals), education sector (universities, schools, colleges); traffic police, registrar's office (issuance of births and deaths certificates and passports), the military, the government agriculture input scheme, traditional leaders, judiciary (courts) and local authorities (town and district councils).

Table 1.1: Key Informant Interviews

Research Area	Number of Interviews
Bulawayo	40
Masvingo	17
Lupane	39
Tsholotsho	23
Gwanda	42
Gweru	26
Mutare	34
Harare	53
Total	274

DATA COLLECTION

A focus group discussion guide was used to collect data which was consolidated to the group of data collected through document studies before analysis. Semi-structured interview questionnaires and document studies were relied upon as data collection techniques. Interviews with 274 purposively sampled key informants were done. A semi-structured interview guide was used to collect data from all interviews conducted.

DATA ANALYSIS

Data collected was subjected to a series of thematic and content analysis procedures to decipher key emerging trends, themes and supportive evidence. This study did not seek to document perceptions on the quality of government in Zimbabwe per se; it sought to shed light on what really is the perception of transition in corruption and service delivery in the eyes of the affected citizens. Thus, thematic analysis and content analysis techniques were employed to give a picture of the veracity, extent and nature of governance post-Mugabe.

SUMMARY

This chapter presented the justification compelling the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (ZDI) to conduct this study and how this study was done. The study sought to give community explanations of what those who work in communities and those at the receiving end of service delivery by sampled public institutions see, think, feel and perceive regarding corruption and service delivery in the Mnangagwa administration. The aim was to ascertain if there is really a transition to a new dispensation in Zimbabwe and the quality of government therein. The following chapter presents reviewed literature on the conceptual understanding of transition to a democratic dispensation, corruption and its link to service delivery.

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW AND CONCEPTUALISATION

Transitology literature depicts 'transition' as an overarching process which involves composite revisions in the political economy (status quo) of a society that emerges from a crisis ... the transformation of an authoritarian regime to a democratic dispensation which the Mnangagwa administration claims to front has three phases. The state should firstly undergo a transition phase which involves transfer of power through relatively free and fair elections that usually follow a period of negotiated political settlements between the democrats and reformist autocrats in a state.

Studies by Huntington (1996) concluded that there are three forms of transitions that a state can find itself involved in: (i) trans-placement, (ii) replacement and (iii) transformation. The transformation form closely resembles the Mnangagwa dispensation.

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a review of key literature conceptualising 'transitioning to a democratic dispensation'. It also outlines the conceptual framework used as a yardstick for ascertaining the nature and extent of transitioning as far as 'transitioning to a democratic dispensation' is concerned. Transformation in the level corruption and subsequent service delivery by public institutions that have a direct interaction with citizens is identified as the most practicable measure required in completing this task. This literature is reviewed to give background knowledge with which to understand and unpack the legitimacy of government claims that Zimbabwe has transitioned to a new dispensation. The literature gives clarity to what ought to be in Zimbabwe if the country had indeed

transitioned to a new dispensation premised on anti-corruption and good governance (quality of government) as claimed by the Mnangagwa administration.

TRANSITOLOGY: A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

For a clear understanding of the legitimacy of government claims that Zimbabwe has transitioned into a new dispensation, it is vital to first understand what is meant by 'transition'. Transitology literature depicts 'transition' as an overarching process which involves 'composite revisions' in the political economy (status quo) of a society that emerges from a crisis (Linz and Stephen, 1996; Huntington, 1996; Bratton and De Walle, 1997)¹⁵. "Status quo revision" comes out very clear as an indicator of transitioning in a nation-state. According to Miriam Webster (online) dictionary definition, revision entails: "alteration, modification, redoing, refashioning, remaking, revamping, reworking..."¹⁶ In short, it involves changing the original status quo which in most cases aims at giving it betterment.

Revisions in the status quo referred to above are not limited to the domestic political front (legal, policy, leadership) but it stretches to the economy, the society and international relations. The status quo referred to here is typified by conflicts and opposition between the ruling authoritarian governments and (internal and external) opposition forces over the former's policy fissures held responsible for perpetual decay of the political economy of the nation-state (Steyn-Kotze, 2010). At the centre of transition is the ruling despot that seeks to regain lost domestic and

¹⁵ "Transitology" is a term used by Steyn-Kotze (2010) to describe theoretical and empirical studies dealing with politico economic transition. In this study, it simply means transition studies.

¹⁶ Accessible online at: <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/revision>.

international legitimacy after military defeat or outright failure to govern and failed exclusion tactics (Casper and Taylor, 1996:1). A new dispensation in politics and economics of the country is thus born following a transition. In relation to the current Zimbabwean situation, transition ought to see revisions in the composition and conduct of government, policies, institutions and foreign relations to satisfy the test for transition to a new dispensation.

As observed in Steyn-Kotze (2010:28), the transformation of an authoritarian regime to a democratic dispensation, which the Mnangagwa administration claims to have embarked on, has three phases. The state should firstly undergo a transition phase which involves transfer of power through relatively free and fair elections that usually follow a period of negotiated political settlements between the democrats and reformist autocrats in a state. By analyzing the coup d'état that paved the way for President Emerson Mnangagwa's ascension to the presidency one can argue that it does not meet the criteria described in the first phase. This is because no negotiations were done between democrats and reformist autocrats; it was a transfer of power between factions of the authoritarian system. It has not been established in transitology literature that 'reformist' autocrats or autocrats can initiate transition to a democratic dispensation alone without assistance from democrats. What is known is that, the field of democratization is not an area of competence for authoritarian regimes. What usually happens is that this form of transition usually gives birth to a new form of authoritarian political system.

The second phase is the democratization phase. The third is democratic consolidation phase which involves sustained institutionalization of democracy and deepening democratic values across the nation-state. However, this report focuses on the first phase of the development of democracy because Zimbabwe still staggers to cross this stage. Given that the current crop of politicians has been part of the establishment since 1980, it is very critical to scrutinize how they genuinely facilitate transition to a democratic dispensation in line with their claim.

The above contention arises from the fact that, for transition to be correctly conceived, three fundamental reforms should be instituted and these are: (i) restructuring of state/society relations in a manner that deepens state responsiveness to demands of the society, increased civil society role as the voice of the people and presence of an enabling environment for civic society to work; (ii) creation of strong institutions and means of power transfer that ensure smooth, fair and nonviolent transition and; (iii) entry into office of a new democratic administration following the 'founding elections' (Linz and Stephen, 1996; Huntington, 1996; Ethier, 1990). Although the constitutional reform in Zimbabwe can, on paper, be associated to the first reform¹⁷, the successive two other reforms were not done in Zimbabwe and this makes a valid point according to transitology theory – that the transition was either sabotaged, hijacked or abandoned.

¹⁷ The genuineness of constitutional reforms is contested; the Zanu PF government has been hesitant to amend and/or repeal despotic legislation such as AIPPA, POSA, BSA and ICA that legalise acts that are inconsistent with the constitution.

Continued use of these laws despite the new constitution attests that the constitution has changed on paper but the political culture and legal framework is largely the same.

What kind of transition can the Mnangagwa administration be identified with? The answer to this question can be found in a study done by Huntington (1996) which concluded that there are three forms of transitions that a state can find itself involved in: (i) trans- placement, (ii) replacement and (iii) transformation. Trans-placement transition entails succession of the authoritarian regime by a consociational government between reformists from the system and democratic opposition forces after a negotiated settlement. This becomes possible after realization by the ruling elite that their status quo is no longer sustainable, and they see more gain in a negotiated settlement than not. This form of transition is praised as the most effective in consolidating a democratic dispensation as the other three (Huntington, 1996; Ethier 1990; Diamond, 1999). The Zimbabwean experience does not fit in this form of transition because there were neither negotiations nor consociational government formed but a replacement of Robert Mugabe by those who used to make most important decisions with him if not for him.

A replacement transition describes what is popularly known as a regime change, where opposition forces defeat the authoritarian system and create a new government composed exclusively of opposition forces (Steyn-Kotze, 2010). This kind of transition is criticized for leading to a re-birth of another group of authoritarians as liberators become oppressors. The Zimbabwean post-November transition cannot fit in this form too. The government that succeeded was not an opposition movement.

The last form of transition is the transformation. It emanates from the

realization by enforcers of the authoritarian system that the status quo is no longer viable under their secured rule and they thus initiate reforms to liberalize the political and economic sphere (Huntington, 1996). This form of transition can be identified with the Mnangagwa administration because there is no involvement of a new force in government and revisions are aimed at making the status quo enjoyable to the ruling elite. However, it is not yet clear if there is indeed a transformation. This study contends that if the Mnangagwa administration has indeed initiated a transformation form of transition, it should be discernable, felt and seen by consumers of the public services offered by its institutions since November 2017. It must be perceivable through transformation in levels of corruption and quality of services delivered by key public institutions to citizens.

PREVIOUS STUDIES ON CORRUPTION AND TRANSITION

The Mnangagwa administration has been very clear in talking and writing about the question: transitioning to what and/or where? It has emphasized its commitment to transitioning Zimbabwe to 'a democratic and prosperous dispensation by 2030'. This is attested in the following extract from its Vision 2030 presentation given in Washington DC by former Minister of Finance and Economic Development on April 2018 when he pinpointed that the new dispensation is committed to:

Good governance based on ...
Accountability, Transparency,
Responsiveness, Equity and
Inclusiveness, Efficiency and Full
Participation of the people in socio-
economic development, is the bed-

rock of a new democratic and developmental Zimbabwe (Government of Zimbabwe Vision 2030 presentation, 2018:10)...

It is with this objective that Government is implementing a number of measures on fighting corruption, one of the sources of increased cost of doing business, rent-seeking behaviour and inefficiency on service delivery in both public and private sectors (Government of Zimbabwe Vision 2030 presentation, 2018:46).

This is an unbridled commitment to transformation in the quality of government. The Quality of Government Institute (2017)¹⁸ notes that, reductions in levels of corruption perception, improvement in quality and quality of service delivery and human development are among key indicators of improvement in quality of government. Thus, this study zeroes in 'corruption reduction and improvements in service delivery' as key milestones with which to ascertain the extent to which the Mnangagwa administration has walked the talk about transitioning to a democratic dispensation.

Corruption, as a key variable of this study refers to "abuse of entrusted power for

private gain... [categorised] ... as grand, petty and political, depending on the amounts of money lost and the sector where it occurs" (Transparency International, 2018). Where there is 'grand corruption', high-level political leaders in government create policies and/or abuse state resources to enrich themselves at the expense of the public good. In 'petty corruption' low- and mid-level public officials abuse their offices to extort or demand bribes from ordinary citizens in exchange for public service delivery (Ibid). 'Political corruption' refers to manipulation of public institutions and policies by decision makers to create a patronage network through which to protect and defend their power and status¹⁹.

There are many categories and/or strategies through which public officials engage in corruption in the course of their service delivery mandate. Table 2.1 below presents a summarised overview of those activities that make up corruption. This study looks into experiences of consumers of services provided by sampled public institutions paying particular attention to activities listed in the table.

¹⁸. See online at: <https://qog.pol.gu.se/data>.

¹⁹. <https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#costs-of-corruption>.

Categories of corruption	Description
Bribery	The act of dishonestly persuading someone to act in one's favour by a payment or other inducement. Inducements can take the form of gifts, loans, fees, rewards or other advantages (taxes, services, donations, etc.). The use of bribes can lead to collusion (e.g. inspectors under-reporting offences in exchange for bribes) and/or extortion (e.g. bribes extracted against the threat of over-reporting).
Embezzlement	To steal, misdirect or misappropriate funds or assets placed in one's trust or under one's control. From a legal point of view, embezzlement need not necessarily be or involve corruption.
Facilitation payment	A small payment, also called a "speed" or "grease" payment, made to secure or expedite the performance of a routine or necessary action to which the payer has legal or other entitlement.
Fraud	The act of intentionally and dishonestly deceiving someone in order to gain an unfair or illegal advantage (financial, political or otherwise).
Collusion	An arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve an improper purpose, including influencing improperly the actions of another party.
Extortion	The act of impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the other property of the party to influence improperly the actions of a party
Patronage, clientelism and nepotism	Patronage at its core means the support given by a patron. In government, it refers to the practice of appointing people directly

Sources: Johnson (2014[P;OBS, case studies]); World Bank (2011a [P;OBS, qualitative and quantitative case study data]).

Thus, the genuineness of the government's commitment to fighting corruption should be confirmed by reductions in perception of acts of corruption listed above in the post-November 2017 era in Zimbabwe.

Cain (2014: 3) contends that "corruption, whether grand, petty or any form leads to economic insecurity as the security of investments becomes increasingly uncertain." This has a grave impetus on economic recovery as it scares investors from injecting their moneys and properties into a corruption-ridden economy. The negative correlation between corruption and economic development has indeed been established by many empirical studies (Shao et al, 2007: 157; Podobnik et al, 2008: 547). Reductions in corruption levels result in improvements in economic growth indicators. Empirical studies have confirmed that: (i) countries with consistent high Corruption Perception Indicators (CPI) tend to enjoy higher long-term economic growth

(Shao et al, 2007: 157) and; (ii) every unit increase in a country's CPI scores has been accompanied by approximately 1.7% increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth (Podobnik et al, 2008: 547). For Zimbabwe to be really "open for business", it must lower corruption levels to attract investment and business confidence. Transparency international adds that:

Corruption corrodes the fabric of society. It undermines people's trust in political and economic systems, institutions and leaders. It can cost people their freedom, health, money – and sometimes their lives ... The cost of corruption can be divided into four main categories: political, economic, social and environmental.

Political institutions lose legitimacy and trust, human development is undermined, unfair market competitions flourish and uncontrolled environment degradation is rampant in corrupt political systems²⁰. This

²⁰. <https://www.transparency.org/what-is-corruption#costs-of-corruption>

militates against political and economic transition envisioned by President Emerson Mnangagwa's administration.

What really increases corruption in public institutions and how can it be contained? Many studies have been done to tackle this question. Correctly answering this question helps in transitioning in the quality of government and creating a business-friendly environment. Low wages or salaries in public institutions have been empirically found to correlate with high levels of corruption. For instance, a study by Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) to ascertain the association between wage levels and corruption concluded that low wages associated with high levels of corruption. Similarly, case studies on the same issue conducted by the World Bank (2007) confirmed that “low pay can contribute to corruption within a public administration, particularly when total remuneration fails to pay a living wage, as often is the case in many African countries.” This simply entails that, for any administration to reduce corruption levels in public institutions, it should adequately remunerate employees. This is a very critical challenge for the Mnangagwa administration given the fact that since November 2017, basic commodities have gotten more expensive and salaries are being eroded by inflation and the devaluation of the Bond Note against the United States Dollar (USD). What follows is that, corruption is prone to have intensified now than before.

To further explore the origins of corruption and resolution thereof, Evans and Rauch (2000) investigated the impacts of merit-based recruitment on corruption across 35

developing countries and found that high scores on the merit-based recruitment index were associated with low levels of corruption. This meant that, corruption is increased by neglect of meritocracy in public institutions. When employees are recruited through nepotism or any other favoritism, beneficiaries are prone to reciprocate and perpetrate this culture. Kiselev (2012) also found other forms of corruption such as “facilitation payment” are caused by bureaucratic red tapes and lots strenuous regulations and procedures involved in obtaining services such as legal documentation. Simplification of these procedures has been found to be associated with reduction in opportunities for corruption (Kiselev, 2012).

Weak institutions of accountability and corruption monitoring also have been found to be associated with high levels of corruption (Fukuyama, 2014). Robinson and Acemoglu (2012) add that extractive political institutions that thrive on taxing citizens for personal gain are the main reason why other nations failed to develop. Thus, one would expect a clear-cut reformation of key public institutions, restructuring their salaries, adopting meritocracy as the code for recruitment and strengthening of accountability and rule of law institutions before even talking about a new dispensation in Zimbabwe.

SUMMARY

This chapter presented that corruption reduction and improvement in service delivery by public institutions are key indicators of transition towards a new dispensation. It also showed that this reduction must be felt and perceivable in the eyes of those consuming services given by public institutions and it is those consumers who can give a correct narrative about whether there is indeed transition or not in the post-November 2017 dispensation. It was also presented in literature that transition must be shown by revisions in the status quo and that there are many forms of transition

such as transplacement, transformation and replacement. The chapter also indicated that corruption is increased and sustained by the manner with which institutions are run and many forms of corruption do exist in public institutions. Weak accountability and rule of law institutions, poor remuneration of employees in public institutions, red tapes and difficult procedures followed in acquiring public services were identified by reviewed literature as associated with high corruption levels. The following chapter presents findings and discussions of the study.

CHAPTER THREE PATRONAGE NETWORKS, WEAK POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE TRANSITION DILEMMA

Findings of the study indicate that there is indeed some perceived 'minute' changes in the culture of corruption in service delivery in some public institutions although the longevity and/or sustainability of this change is shadowy.

Although findings confirmed that there is an increase in the talk about fighting corruption, they however reflected much on the presence of a serious policy gap in the institutionalisation of strong accountability, anti-corruption and rule of law enabling environment.

*This has resulted in government failure to transition Zimbabwe as far as limiting corruption and poor service delivery is concerned. Generally, findings indicated that Zimbabwe is still in a transition dilemma;
it is not going anywhere anytime soon.*

INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents research findings that tease the legitimacy of the claim that Zimbabwe has transitioned into a new democratic dispensation since the overthrow of Mugabe and/or it is on the course of that transition. It presents the nature and extent of transition in the Mnangagwa dispensation as corroborated by empirical evidence. In particular, findings of the study indicate that there is indeed some perceived minute changes in petty-corruption in service delivery in some public institution although the longevity and/or sustainability of this change is doubted. Key findings indicated five main factors standing on the way of transition in Zimbabwe. These are: (i) ZANU-PF's 'winner-take-all' transition deficiency syndrome that has made it impossible to build public confidence in the system given its unceremonious history as a trustee in charge of people's investments, transition, freedoms

and economics; (ii) ZANU-PF government's stance poised to keep its patronage networks in most public institutions despite the pressing need for institutional reforms; (iii) the superiority of ZANU-PF/Military apex over national interest in transitioning which has made it very blurred to foresee any transition that shakes-off the military-ZANUPF-state conflation and corollary corruption/rent-seeking; (iv) most corruption networks lead up to political/securocrats bosses who can hardly be pummelled by the current ZANU-PF leadership; (v) proliferation of weak and/or emasculated political institutions that have made rule of law, accountability and anti-corruption so hard to implement.

Although findings confirmed that there is an increase in the talk about fighting corruption, they however reflected much on the presence of a serious policy gap in the institutionalisation of strong accountability, anti-corruption and rule of law enabling environment. This has resulted in government failure to transition Zimbabwe as far as limiting corruption and poor service delivery is concerned. Generally, findings indicated that Zimbabwe is still in a transition dilemma; it is not going anywhere fast.


PERCEPTION OF PETTY - CORRUPTION: SOME REDUCTION OWING TO THE FEAR FACTOR

As discussed before, the study sought to ascertain whether consumers of services provided by public institutions feel or perceive the transition to a new dispensation. Corruption and service delivery perception was used as a yardstick for testing the legitimacy of this claim by government and understanding possible

causes of persisting economic woes despite the acclaimed changes. On the nature of transition in the culture of corruption in public institutions, findings (Figure 3.1) revealed that “minute” corruption reduction seems to be happening generally (i.e. 38% of all respondents perceived 'no corruption reduction' against 61% who perceived evidence of 'corruption reduction' which ranges from 'satisfactory reduction (24%)', 'fair reduction (17%)' and 'partial reduction (20%)'. It should be noted however that this “minute” corruption reduction generalisation came as a result of higher proportions of the 'no corruption reduction' perceptions regarding the VID, Agriculture input scheme and the judiciary. As shown below, 63% of sampled VID clients perceived 'no reduction' in petty-corruption at VID, 62% of sampled beneficiaries of government agriculture input scheme perceived 'no reduction' in petty-corruption in the scheme and 54% of sampled judiciary

service consumers perceived 'no reduction' in petty-corruption in the judiciary system. An institution-by-institution examination indicated that the Vehicle Inspectorate Department, Government Agriculture Input Scheme and the Judiciary were perceived to be as corrupt as during the Mugabe era. The traffic police, Registrar General's Office, local authorities, health sector, education sector and traditional leadership were perceived to be partially changing or fairly reducing petty-corruption from what used to be the culture during the Mugabe administration. The military was the only institution with a promising petty-corruption reduction perception as 64% of sampled consumers of its services deemed its corruption reduction as having improved to satisfactory, fair and partial against 34% who perceived 'no petty-corruption reduction'.

Figure 3:1 Perception of Petty-corruption Reduction in the Post-Mugabe era



Respondents were asked – Question A1: How would you rate reduction of corruption in this institution since November 2017?


It should be noted however that the military rarely interacts with the public in its discharge of its national security mandate. This might explain people's failure to perceive corruption therein and/or its limited visibility to the eyes of the people. Fear of the soldier was also identified during the study. Respondents seemed very uncomfortable with commenting on military affairs. For instance, one respondent in Gweru noted that:

There is little we can say about them (soldiers). We rarely interact with them. Even if we do, we cannot put our lives and that of our loved ones in danger. We cannot even talk about them freely with people we do not know because these days these people are very powerful and dangerous²¹.

These fears were uniform across sampled provinces. The Mnangagwa dispensation has made it impossible for Zimbabweans to do citizen journalism when it comes to monitoring the military let alone trying to hold it accountable when its 'not-so-long-gone' general is the second most powerful person in the presidium²².

Consumers of public services from sampled institutions were interrogated further to give more clarity to the corruption perception dynamics revealed above. Figure 3.2 below gives a summary of the findings.

Figure 3.2: Perception of Bribe Demand/payment in Public Institutions since November 2017



Respondents were asked – Question A2: Have you been made to pay a bribe for certain services in this institution since November 2017?

²¹ Interview, Gweru, 09/2018. Translated.

²² FDGs, Bulawayo, 09/2018.

As indicated above, only the VID had an above average 'bribe' perception score as 57% of sampled consumers of its services attested that they have been made to pay bribes to get services done whereas, the military had the least 'bribe-demand' perception score as only 7% of sampled consumers of its services attested that they have been made to pay bribes to get services done. This data entails that most government institutions have seen a 'limited' culture of taking 'facilitation fees' from service consumers. A mind boggling question is: how can one reconcile the 'no reduction in corruption' indicated in Figure 3.1 above and the largely 'bribes are decreasing' shown in figure 3.2 above? Three explanatory reasons were brought forward in the findings and categorised from the least likely, likely to the most likely: (i) the level of fear of the current political leadership has made employees in public institutions to trade with caution in their corrupt culture thus the increase in number of service consumers who pay bribes for services or; (ii) bribes have always been a limitedly practiced form of corruption in Zimbabwe even in the Mugabe era since we do not have a precise baseline survey with which to argue with certainty that there is now a decrease in bribes for services in public institutions or; (iii) Zimbabweans have gotten so terrified by the system to the extent that they even fear telling anyone (including the researcher) that they pay bribes for public services to protect their 'contact persons' inside public institutions and themselves.²³ This however does not rule out the practice of other forms of corruption such as 'nepotism, clientelism

and use of patronage networks to run public institutions. There was a general observation across interviews and FDGs that patronage and nepotism have continued to increase in public institutions. For instance, it was revealed that:

Political connectedness and kinship have become the two most important tickets to get best services from public institutions. Being related to a ZANU-PF official, being that official and being related to some workers in public institutions ensures that you will be always given preferential treatment in service delivery²⁴.

For the traffic police, explanatory data given by respondents indicate that police officers were intimidated during the overthrow of their former patron and boss former President Robert Mugabe and former police Commissioner-General Augustine Chihuri respectively.²⁵ "They no longer trust civilians on the road and they are no longer safe when they collect bribes on the road. The current government is not friendly to them."²⁶

Despite the changing levels of corruption shown in figure 3.2 and mixed feelings regarding 'bribe demands' in general, findings revealed a very gloomy picture of corruption in public institutions in general as only 37% of sampled service consumers perceived them 'not corrupt' against 62% who perceived sampled public institutions as either 'corrupt', 'very corrupt' or 'extremely corrupt'. Figure 3.3 gives a detailed analysis of these perceptions.


²³ Analysis of data from FDGs and Interviews, 08-10/2018.

²⁴ FDGs, 09-10/2018.

²⁵ Interviews & FDGs 09-10 /2018.

²⁶ Interviews, Harare, 09/2018. This view was reiterated across sampled respondents in various districts that police have decreased their appetite for bribes on the road.

Figure 3.3: Perception of Extent of Corruption in Public Institutions



Respondents were asked – Question B1: How corrupt do you think the following public service providers are?

These findings entail that service consumers generally perceive sampled public institutions as corrupt save for the education sector (55% not corrupt) and the military (57% not corrupt). The rest of the sampled public institutions were viewed as 'extremely corrupt', 'very corrupt' or 'corrupt' and corruption is still high in these institutions and the Mnangagwa dispensation has not done anything to foster transition in this respect. It should be noted that, the perception of corruption in these institutions as shown in Figure 3.3 above was based on presence of not only 'bribes for service' form of corruption but all other perceivable forms of corrupt practices such as political corruption, nepotism, clientelism, and patronage as conceptualised in chapter two above. This explains the divergences in findings in figure 3.2 and figure 3.3; the former measured only one form of corruption whilst the other gave a general perception of corruption. However, as revealed in the analysis above (Fig 3.3), only 7% of public service consumers viewed the VID as 'not corrupt'. This resonates with the

'no corruption reduction' and 'more bribe demands' revealed in figs 3.1 and 3.2 respectively. These findings reveal that: (i) petty-corruption might have entered a period of decrease due to the fear factor associated with the Mnangagwa administration; (ii) grand-corruption and/or political corruption continues unabated and; (iii) transition in quality of government has not been initiated since patronage networks sustaining political corruption still continue despite signs of decreases in 'some' bureaucratic corruption indicators. There is indeed human factor decay in public institutions although the extent of this decay varies across public institutions. The Mnangagwa dispensation will not legitimately claim transition until it addresses these decays perceived by the people since it is the people and them alone who can give a legitimate feedback regarding this transition.

IS THE MNANGAGWA ADMINISTRATION REALLY A TAKE-OFF TO DENMARK?


Many people have been worried about the extent to which the post-Mugabe government is really a transitional government, a break with the past, and not a continuation of Mugabe's government by other means. Findings reveal 'some' few reforms in terms of the country's foreign policy stance towards the West, the reform of the indigenisation and investment laws, some few arrests and (unclear) prosecution of politicians who were associated with the Generation 40 (G40) faction of ZANU-PF over allegations of corruption and an attempt to put new ministers in charge and relieve old ones of their duties²⁷. In addition to that, it has been revealed already that some corruption indicators show some limited improvement especially those corrupt activities that are not directly connected with the political and/or party-state conflation. The main finding in answer to the above topic question is that; political corruption continues as it was if not worse in public institutions. Zimbabwe is not transitioning to Denmark anytime soon as long as political corruption remains a sacred cow in the Mnangagwa dispensation²⁸.

Bureaucratic corruption has shown some signs of limited reductions in cases that do not involve the patronage networks of the ruling party ZANU-PF. However, it should be noted that bureaucratic corruption (petty-corruption) has been found by some studies as not that problematic to economic transition but political and grand-corruption are (Fukuyama, 2014; Robinson and Acemoglu, 2012). Thus, even if bureaucratic corruption is dealt with completely, no economic or service delivery impact will be felt if political corruption is not dealt with too. Petty-corruption indicators presented above showed a half-picture of the 'corruption' which the government has vowed to fight as part of its transition package. To give a full picture of this, the study interrogated citizens' perceptions on government genuineness in dealing with 'political corruption and grand-corruption' which have been empirically confirmed as key causes of political decay and poor human development indicators in many developing countries (Robinson and Acemoglu, 2012). Figure 3.4 below gives a glimpse into citizens' perception of the Mnangagwa dispensation's genuineness in creating what Fukuyama (2014) terms 'going to Denmark'.

²⁷ FDGs 09-10/2018.

²⁸ Going to 'Denmark' is a conceptual term used by Fukuyama (2014) to depict political institutional reforms aimed at setting up requisite infrastructure for curbing political and grand corruption and promoting quality of government. See for instance, Fukuyama, F. 2014. Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalisation of Democracy. (Online). Available at: <http://www.files.ethz...pdf>.

Figure 3.4: Perception of Government Genuineness in fighting Political-corruption in the Post-Mugabe Era



Respondents were asked –Question A3: Do you think there is any sign of government genuineness in fighting political-corruption practiced in this institution since November 2017?

Figure 3.4 indicates that political corruption is very hard to handle for the Mnangagwa government. Save for the military, sampled respondents perceived that the government of President Mnangagwa is not genuine in dealing with political corruption witnessed in sampled institutions as less than less than 45% of sampled service consumers for each institution perceived saw some genuineness. To be precise, 51% of all sampled service consumers from all reviewed institutions perceived 'no sign of genuineness' in government efforts to fight political corruption. It was argued that government seems to be more committed in consolidating its grip on power and fighting political rivals than addressing political corruption in a manner that leaves no sacred cows.²⁹ One respondent noted that:

What we see is the humiliation of ZANU-PF politicians who opposed President Mnangagwa's succession plan through shadowy allegations and political prosecutions. No one aligned to the president has been subjected to the same. Does that mean all those people are saints or sacred cows?³⁰

Given the above revelations (fig 3.4), the study went further to interrogated whether consumers of services of sampled public institutions have any confidence and hope in the Mnangagwa administration as a possible solution to political decay in public institutions³¹.


²⁹ Interviews & FGDs 09-10/2018.

³⁰ Interviews, Harare, 09/2018.

³¹ 'Political decay' is a technical concept used by Fukuyama (2014) to describe a raft of institutional inadequacies in government such as political corruption, politically condoned violation of the rule of law and accountability measures.

Findings collected were as analysed in figure 3.5 below.

Figure 3.5: Citizens' Confidence in the Mnangagwa administration's ability to fight Political Corruption



Respondents were asked – Question A4: Do you have confidence in the Mnangagwa administration as a team equal to the task of fighting political corruption in this institution?

Findings above (fig 3.5) indicate that the Mnangagwa administration is perceived 'not fit' to deal with political corruption decaying public institutions as 52% of all sampled service consumers for all reviewed public institutions perceived the Mnangagwa administration as 'not able' to fight political corruption while 47% were divided into 'partly able' and 'able'. Reasons for this perception were grouped into three:

- (i) that the current administration has inherited and benefits from ZANU-PF patronage networks in public institutions and it will be detrimental

- for President Mnangagwa to completely get rid of it given his perceived desire for state power;³²
- (ii) that the current leadership has 'dirty-hands' as far as the creation of a corrupt authoritarian state and it is impossible to expect the government to devour itself in the name of fighting political corruption it has worked so hard to create and maintain;³³
- (iii) that there are no effective institutions to exert accountability and rule of law measures capable of

³² FGDs 09-10/2018.

³³ Interviews – 09-10/2018.

curbing political corruption, they have been captured and emasculated³⁴.


These findings informed the conclusion that Zimbabwe transition is going nowhere anytime soon. It is in a prisoner's dilemma; the necessary political leadership to initiate and sustain transition and reform is missing.

by public institutions to the people. In addition, transition from one political dispensation to another is mostly felt in the manner with which service delivered by public institutions differ in the two dispensations, mainly by improving. This study interrogated how service delivery in the Mnangagwa dispensation has been compared to the preceding dispensation and findings were analysed as presented in figure 3.6 below.

THE STATE OF TRANSITION IN SERVICE DELIVERY BY PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

As argued above, corruption generally affects the quantity and quality of service delivered

Figure 3.6: Perception of Changes in Service delivery in Public institutions in the Mnangagwa Administration



Respondents were asked – Question C1: How would you rate service delivery performance by this institution since November 2017?


³⁴ FGDs & Interviews September-November 2018.

These findings indicate mixed feelings across sectors, feelings of 'fair changes' or slight changes (30%) and 'not changed, still dismal (36%)' being the most popular. The military was again given promising indicators of transition; 57% of consumers of its services perceived that service delivery 'has changed, now satisfactory' although it was also the only one with the highest percentage (followed by the judiciary) of perception of 'becoming worse' compared to others. The most sticking institutions have been the VID (53% of its clients perceived its service delivery as 'not changed, still dismal'), judiciary (54% of its clients perceived its service delivery as 'not changed, still dismal'), and health sector (54% of its clients perceived its service delivery as 'not changed still dismal') However, service delivery by the traffic police, National registry, government agriculture input scheme, local authorities, traditional leadership and the

education sector have been perceived to have 'changed, now fair'. The general conclusion is that there are 'some' perceived changes from bad to better in these six public institutions since November 2017. One respondent commented that, “these days' employees in public institutions are afraid of surprise visits by their superiors as was done to those nurses at Mpilo Hospital in 2017 by Auxillia Mnangagwa, the First Lady. This has forced them out of their traditional poor service delivery habit”³⁵

To fully appreciate the level of change in service delivery, it has been a general practice to measure it using 'processing time' taken to get services from government or hours taken queuing for services. Figure 3.7 below presents what this study found as the extent of change in service delivery which has been perceived above.

Figure 3.7: Perception of processing time taken to deliver service in post-Mugabe public institutions




Respondents were asked – Question C2: How would you rate processing time taken to deliver service here?

³⁵ Interviews, Bulawayo- September – November 2018. The same was reiterated in FGDs conducted.

for services) and the military (64% of its service consumers said they wait for 'less than 1hrs' for services). The worst institutions perceived to be keeping people waiting in queues for service for 1 hours to 6 or more in their descending order were: judiciary (92%), government agriculture input scheme (85%), Registrar General's office (85%). What these findings entail is that there is still a lot of stagnation in improving service delivery in those institutions that interact with the public most frequently in delivering basic services such as health, citizenship documents and licences.³⁶ This is a very bad indicator that is detrimental to the efforts of attracting foreign investment. There is need for improvement in this regard.

Apart from processing time, the study examined the manner with which public institutions treat recipients of their services to ascertain if there is any change in customer-care. A change in this aspect is a good indicator of improved quality of service delivery. Findings revealed that the nature of customer care in many of the sampled institutions 'have changed, now satisfactory' or 'have changed, now fair' save for the VID (60% of its sampled clients perceived its service delivery as “-not changed, still unfriendly”), health sector (54% of its sampled clients perceived its service delivery as '-not changed, still unfriendly'), and the judiciary (62% of its sampled clients perceived its service delivery as '-not changed, still unfriendly') as presented in figure 3.8 below.

Figure 3.8: Perception of Customer-care in Public Institutions



Respondents were asked – Question C2: How would you rank the user-friendliness of this service provider?

³⁶ FGDs September –November 2018.

What these findings (fig 3.8) mean is that citizens feel 'some' transition in key public institutions in terms of how they are treated when they visit for various services. This can partly be explained by the fear factor associated with the entry of the Mnangagwa administration in power. "People were so terrified to the extent that they no longer trust visitors here. So you have to do your best to everyone lest you lose your job by being unfriendly to clients not knowing it's your boss from somewhere."³⁷

SUMMARY

This chapter presented findings of the study. Key among them was that, there is perceived reduction of petty-corruption levels whereas, political corruption seems to be going ahead unabated. It was also revealed that there is lack of necessary leadership to initiate political reforms and this has left Zimbabwe transition in a prisoner's dilemma. On service delivery, findings of the study revealed that it has changed to better in terms of customer care and processing times taken to deliver services.

³⁷. Interviews, Harare November 2018.

CHAPTER FOUR CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

SUMMARY

The study examined the extent of transition in corruption perception and service delivery in key public institutions in the Mnangagwa dispensation. This was done through focus group discussions, interviews and document studies. The main objective was to evaluate the government's integrity in fighting corruption as evidenced in a number of policy blueprints and paint the actual picture of the problem at hand to the benefit of transition stakeholders such as civic society, media, development partners, the business sector and the general citizenry. Transition was interpreted to mean a revision in key political institutions to enable betterment in service delivery and quality of government. Reviewed literature indicated that corruption reduction and improvement in service delivery are amongst the key indicators of real transition in the political system. Previous studies have confirmed that corruption creates unfavourable conditions for socio-economic prosperity and quality service delivery. Findings of the study reflected that corruption reduction is perceived to be in the lower levels of government (petty-corruption) whereas political corruption through patronage networks of ZANU-PF continues unabated. It was also shown that service delivery has been improving in terms

of reducing delays, red tapes and customer-care. It was also observed that these changes may not last as long as there is continuity of the observed weak institutions responsible for safeguarding accountability and rule of law.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the study revealed that Zimbabwe political transition, as measured by corruption and service delivery perception is trapped by weak institutional moderation of patronage networks in public institution. It is at a prisoner's dilemma. The current ZANU-PF government has shown no intentions of instituting real institutional reforms necessary for putting the country in a development take-off. Patronage networks have not been destroyed and it is through such networks that political corruption thrives. President Emerson Mnangagwa's team has been perceived as very 'unfit' to deliver the transition mandate and/or promise because it has 'dirty-hands' by association or commission. Although findings showed some signs of transition in corruption and service delivery, it can be concluded that since such changes pertain to petty-corruption and bureaucratic conduct at the lower level of government, it will not last until there are supportive political reforms and institutions from the top leadership. Unfortunately neither the reforms nor institutions are foreseeable.

RECOMMENDATIONS

GOVERNMENT

- Terminate patronage networks in public institutions and the party-state collusion to ensure bureaucratic impartiality and accountability.
- Adopt meritocracy-based recruitment reforms to deal with political corruption and nepotism.
- Institute sweeping reforms that leave no sacred cows right from the top political leadership. This can be done through consociationalism and/or partnership with opposition movements and civil society to ensure that there is always a third power capable of punishing corruption despite political affiliation.
- Strengthen institutional measures that promote accountability, rule of law and anti-corruption and give them real powers to monitor arrest and prosecute violations regardless of political rank, affiliation and power. Institutions of interest include, the police, the Auditor General's Office and the Anti-Corruption Commission.
- Conduct a commission of inquiry into the state of corruption and service delivery in key public institution to get a clear picture of what needs to be done. This must be done to transition service delivery and improve corruption reduction.
- Set up monthly indices to measure performance and corruption in public institutions, incentivise good conduct or performance and punish misconduct.

CIVIC SOCIETY

- Pressure government to start multi-stakeholder transition dialogues and partnerships to resolve the current

transition dilemma.

- Conduct activism to pressure government to institute real reforms at all levels of government particularly targeting use of patronage networks in public institutions.
- Perform the transition watchdog role and expose corruption and poor service delivery at all levels of government.
- Conduct a national wide corruption and service delivery watch trainings to enable citizens to exert accountability and transparency at all levels of government.
- Increase citizen and/or activist journalism activities aimed at exposing corruption and poor service delivery.

RULING PARTY (ZANU-PF)

- Terminate patronage networks that perpetrate corruption in public institutions.
- Utilise its parliamentary majority to legislate stiff penalties on corruption and poor service delivery in public institutions
- Utilise its party structures to raise citizen corruption and poor service delivery awareness and monitoring.
- Pressure government to deliver the transition it promised regarding service delivery and clampdown on corruption in public institutions.

Pressure its leadership to consider dialogue with and incorporating its political rivals in the efforts to transition Zimbabwe.

OPPOSITION PARTIES

- Continue to lobby regional and international players to assist in pressuring government to initiate multi-stakeholder dialogues to resolve the

transition dilemma and set the country back to transition.

- Spearhead a nation-wide campaign against poor quality of government and current socio-economic hardships and pressure government to initiate reforms.

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

- SADC, EU and other international players to pressure government to initiate real reforms to resolve the current transition dilemma and its corollary socio-economic challenges affecting the people of Zimbabwe.

- SADC, EU and other international players to pressure government to initiate negotiations with its rival political parties towards consociational governance because problems attacked in unity are resolved faster.
- SADC, EU and other international players to assist local pressure groups, civic society and other stakeholders in their efforts to push government to initiate dialogue in transition.

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ABOUT THE ZIMBABWE DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE

The Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (ZDI) is a politically independent and not for profit public policy think-tank based in Zimbabwe. Founded and registered as a trust in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe in November 2012 (Deed of Trust Registration Number MA1223/2012), ZDI serves to generate and disseminate innovative ideas, cutting-edge research and policy analysis to advance democracy, development, good governance and human rights in Zimbabwe. The Institute also aims to promote open, informed and evidence-based debate by bringing together pro-democracy experts to platforms for debate. The idea is to offer new ideas to policy makers with a view to entrenching democratic practices in Zimbabwe. The ZDI researches, publishes and conducts national policy debates and conferences in democratization, good governance, public finance and economic governance, public policy, human rights and transitional justice, media and democracy relations, electoral politics and international affairs.

ZDI was born out of a realization that there is an absence of credible policy and research analysis by Zimbabwean organizations. A careful assessment of most publications on Zimbabwe's political economy shows that a majority of them are generated from outside Zimbabwe. The vision, mission and Objectives of the organization are as listed below:

Vision

A democratic Zimbabwe in which citizens fully participate in all matters of governance, realize and assert social economic and political rights.

Mission

To promote cutting-edge research and public policy analysis institute for sustainable democracy
To be the leading cutting-edge research and public policy analysis institute for sustainable democracy

Organizational Objectives

1. To strengthen policy formulation and implementation through public policy debate in Zimbabwe.
2. To inculcate a culture of critical debate on public affairs among Zimbabwean citizens.
3. To ensure that Zimbabwe's development trajectory is shaped by locally generated information and knowledge.
4. To stimulate citizen participation by strengthening the capacity of state and non-state actors in undertaking research and analysis of public policy.
5. To ensure the direct participation of women in public policy formulation and implementation.
6. To ensure direct participation of youths in public policy formulation and implementation.



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