BVR Analysis Highlights

Team Pachedu

1. Inauthentic ID Numbers

Our analysis found strong evidence to indicate that there may be as many as **15,000** ID numbers which various Registrar General Offices have not yet issued, that are appearing on the voters roll (Section 8 of the Main Report - Perplexing ID Numbers). Since the first 8 or 9 digits of every Zimbabwean ID must be unique, further analysis shows that **3,799** ID numbers appearing on the Voters Roll are not unique and therefore duplicates. (Section 7 of the Main Report - Inauthentic ID Numbers).

2. Changes to IDs; Deceased Voters Copied From 2013 Roll

We found strong evidence to suggest that over **100,000** potentially deceased voters were copied from the 2013 voters roll to the 2018 voters roll and that their ID numbers and in some cases their other details were purposely changed. (Section 15 of the Main Report - 2013 vs. 2018 Comparison) New evidence since publishing our reports suggests this figure may be closer to **900,000.**

3. Unclear; Inconsistent Addresses & Non-Existent Addresses

Many addresses are unclear or inconsistently recorded. This raises difficulties for ZEC and other auditors to verify the data. There are significant numbers of instances where voters within the same residence are assigned different wards and constituencies. This throws into question whether many voters are assigned the correct electoral district, when their physical location cannot be determined. Our analysis also highlighted a number of fictitious or ghost addresses - addresses which do not exist, but at which multiple voters are registered. (Section 13 of the Main Report - Address Anomalies)

4. Changes to Polling Stations

Where polling stations have been split or merged and voters relocated, some voters appear to have 'disappeared'. The newly released lists of polling stations,

and the number of voters registered at them, omit at least **5,082** voters who had previously been allocated to polling stations. It is not clear if they have been moved to a different station but not informed of this or omitted entirely. (Section 14 of the Main Report - Relocated Voters)

5. Duplicated ID Numbers

We found **81** exact duplicate ID numbers on the voters roll, raising questions about the deduplication process and why it missed these duplicate ID Numbers. These are not people from the exclusion list - they are people from the voters roll as released by ZEC on the 15th July 2018. (Section 6 of the Main Report - Duplicate ID Numbers)

6. Statistically Improbable Surname & ID Combination

Only 61 people can have the same National Number (with different prefixes) because each Registrar General Office issues National Numbers in sequential order. The likelihood that each of these 61 people share the same surname also is extremely low. We found **122,788** records on the voters roll where people who share the same national number also shared the same surname. For example, Peter Antonio's ID is given as 70-128273-H70, while Meggie Antonio's ID is 32-128273-K32. The surname is very uncommon and the likelihood that they have the same national number (from different Registrar General Offices) is even more unlikely. The number of records we found is definitely impossible. (Section 11 of the Main Report - Same Surname and Middle ID Numbers)

7. Technical Analysis

Our technical analysis document provides more in depth analysis. It included the methods to reproduce our findings and also provides an in depth analysis into various other aspects of the voters roll which are not included in the Main Report. These include population comparisons, age comparisons, and comparisons between the 2008, 2013 and 2018 voters rolls.

Our reports, including supporting files with lists of flagged records can be found on the Team Pachedu Website: www.teampachedu.org.

Addendum - Understanding Zimbabwean ID Numbers

In order to properly understand our report, it's important to understand how ID numbers in Zimbabwe are generated.

The Registration Office code is unique to every Registrar General's Office. The Example above (63) is the Code for the Harare Registrar's Office. A list of Registrar General Office codes and District codes appear in Appendix 1 of the Main Report.

The National Number is sequential in each Registrar General office. Different Registrar Offices can issue the same National Number, but the same Registrar cannot issue a National Number more than once. Some ID Numbers have 6 digits before the check, while others have 7 digits before the check letter. This combination of Registrar office codes and sequential National Numbers makes the first 8 (or 9) digits of every ID number unique.

The check letter is generated based on a specific formula, known as the Modulus23 Calculation, which is applied to the Registration Office Code and the National Number. The formula for this calculation is explained in Appendix 2 of the Main Report.

The last two digits represent a District Code. District Codes are the same as Registrar General Office codes. District Codes are inherited from your father and enable a person to trace their ancestry.

Our Recommendations:

Our analysis, as detailed in the Main Report and Technical Analysis leads us to conclude that the Voters Roll to be used in Zimbabwe on 30th July, 2018 is not fit for purpose.

Based on that, it is our recommendation that the election scheduled to be held on 30th July 2018 be postponed pending resolution of the issues identified in our report, and others that may be identified elsewhere.

If the election goes forward, we urge all political parties, observers, ZEC and other stakeholders to ensure the following:

1. Biometric data is immediately released to ALL political parties for auditing, to include the report generated by AFIS.

2. Observers and political party representatives are posted at EVERY polling station country wide.

3. Observer or political party representatives are set up outside every polling station to count the amount of people who enter the polling station to vote. A count of physical people who vote can be used to compare against the election results which are announced by ZEC.

4. People take pictures of results posted outside all polling stations and distribute the pictures on social media so that independent verification of results can be undertaken.

5. A full and thorough investigation into the duplicate, invalid, and inauthentic ID numbers appearing on the voters' roll is immediately launched.

6. A legal assistance program is put in place to both explore legal measures to preempt the disenfranchisement of voters on Election Day, and to prepare a strategy for rapid response to voters' rights issues on Election Day itself.

7. A post election audit of the systems used to collect and store biometric data including access to application and system metadata.