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OUR PARTNER

Open Society for Southern Africa (OSISA)

Zimbabwe Transition in a Muddy Terrain:
Political Economy under Military Capture:

This report was prepared as part of ZDI research into contemporary dynamics in Zimbabwean politico-economic transition. It was done in partial fulfilment of the project funded by OSISA and ZDI’s desire to promote cutting-edge research and public policy analysis for sustainable democracy in Zimbabwe. The security sector was identified as an inexorable player in the transition process of Zimbabwe, understanding its role therein will be necessary to the creation of effective mechanisms to continue the transition waves. The project was coordinated by ZDI team of researchers with the assistance of its country-wide networks.
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## Area of Study — Zimbabwean Provinces by Political Party Dominance

### Midlands

- **Presidential (% share):**
  - Mugabe: 48.8% / 63.6%
  - Tsvangirai: 44.8% / 32.7%
- **Other candidates:** 6.4% / 3.6%
- **House of Assembly (no. of seats):**
  - MDC-T: 7 / 3
  - ZANU-PF: 20 / 25
  - (1 by-election held later)

### Mashonaland West

- **Presidential (% share):**
  - Mugabe: 52.8% / 71.8%
  - Tsvangirai: 42.1% / 26.0%
- **Other candidates:** 5.1% / 2.2%
- **House of Assembly (no. of seats):**
  - MDC-T: 6 / 1
  - ZANU-PF: 16 / 21

### Mashonaland Central

- **Presidential (% share):**
  - Mugabe: 65.3% / 86.1%
  - Tsvangirai: 31.4% / 12.2%
- **Other candidates:** 3.3% / 1.7%
- **House of Assembly (no. of seats):**
  - MDC-T: 2 / 0
  - ZANU-PF: 16 / 18

### Harare

- **Presidential (% share):**
  - Mugabe: 19.5% / 38.9%
  - Tsvangirai: 72.3% / 59.1%
- **Other candidates:** 8.2% / 2.0%
- **House of Assembly (no. of seats):**
  - MDC-T: 28 / 23
  - ZANU-PF: 1 / 6

### Mashonaland East

- **Presidential (% share):**
  - Mugabe: 55.0% / 76.3%
  - Tsvangirai: 40.9% / 21.5%
- **Other candidates:** 4.1% / 2.2%
- **House of Assembly (no. of seats):**
  - MDC-T: 4 / 0
  - ZANU-PF: 19 / 22
  - Independent: 0 / 1

### Matebeleland North

- **Presidential (% share):**
  - Mugabe: 28.3% / 41.2%
  - Tsvangirai: 46.7% / 50.0%
- **Other candidates:** 24.9% / 8.8%
- **House of Assembly (no. of seats):**
  - MDC-M: 3 / –
  - MDC-T: 5 / 6
  - ZANU-PF: 4 / 7
  - Independent: 1 / 0

### Matebeleland South

- **Presidential (% share):**
  - Mugabe: 38.7% / 51.9%
  - Tsvangirai: 29.3% / 37.5%
- **Other candidates:** 32.0% / 10.7%
- **House of Assembly (no. of seats):**
  - MDC-M: 7 / –
  - MDC-T: 2 / 0
  - ZANU-PF: 3 / 13
  - (1 by-election held later)

### Bulawayo

- **Presidential (% share):**
  - Mugabe: 11.5% / 24.0%
  - Tsvangirai: 51.4% / 67.4%
- **Other candidates:** 37.1% / 8.6%
- **House of Assembly (no. of seats):**
  - MDC-T: 11 / 12
  - (1 by-election held later)

### Masvingo

- **Presidential (% share):**
  - Mugabe: 49.5% / 70.4%
  - Tsvangirai: 45.9% / 25.8%
- **Other candidates:** 4.5% / 3.8%
- **House of Assembly (no. of seats):**
  - MDC-T: 14 / 0
  - ZANU-PF: 12 / 26

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Sources: Zimbabwe Electoral Commission; Zimbabwe Election Support Network
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS

SUMMATION OF THE ESSENCE OF THE STUDY

This report was done in partial fulfilment of Zimbabwe Democracy Institute’s (ZDI) project on politico-economic transition in Zimbabwe. It is an interrogation of the role of the security sector in political and economic affairs of the nation-state of Zimbabwe from a political economy theoretical lens. Its key areas of analysis were: the origins of security sector involvement in politico-economic affairs, the nature and role of this involvement, locating benefits and beneficiaries of this politicization of the military and/or militarization of the political economy and, challenges to and implications for the future of transition in Zimbabwe. And lastly, it sought to recommend possible solutions to the problems related to the current militarization of the political economy landscape in Zimbabwe. Key informants were purposively sampled from serving and retired contents of the security services—the defence forces, intelligence services, police services and war veterans. These respondents were chosen for their in-depth knowledge and peculiar historical background in the security sector. Key informant interviews were then used as a primary data collection technique whereas, desktop research was used to fill those gaps left unanswered through interviews. Two thematically codified research guides were prepared for the purpose of guiding researchers during investigations. After data was collected, thematic and content analyses were carried out leading to the production of this report.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS OF PREVIOUS STUDIES

From reviewed literature, it emerged that the phenomenon of militarizing the public sphere is neither a new phenomenon in Africa nor world over; it is actually typical in poor countries with poor or decayed political institutions that lack accountability mechanisms such as rule of law, constitutional democracy, a functioning parliament, state craft and an independent judiciary. Previous studies also revealed that involvement of the security sector in the public affairs can be direct—through coups or indirect through capture of a political party and recasting it in a new form overpopulated by security sector agents, conduits and interest brokers (Diamond, 2008; Acemoglu et al, 2010; GiZC, 2012; Omilusi, 2015; Mandaza, 2016). Previous studies also revealed that the security sector will always be counted in transition strategies because it is a pivotal guarantor of success or failure in many transition efforts in the world. Despotic leaders were observed to be main architects of military capture of the political economy in many nation-states. Such leaders need military support to remain in power; thus use many carrots to win the hearts of security sector leaders in order to connive with them in defying democratic electoral choices.

SUMMATION OF KEY FINDINGS

A. Origins of security sector involvement in politico-economic affairs

This study found that security sector involvement in politics and related economics is rooted in the nature of the political terrain that underpinned the independence of Zimbabwe, the brand of politicians who entered the political scene thereafter and their ideologies, histories and fears. The security sector of the Smith regime that preceded the first black government in Zimbabwe had decision making powers in the political system of that day. Generals in particular were involved in the steering of the political economy. In addition, the fact that the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) had a military section—Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU) had its Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) speaks to the point that political parties that dominated the independent Zimbabwe were actually a group of military politicians and their compradors. Military capture of ZANU in 1975 through strategies such as the Mgangos Declaration was the first move to institutionalise and entrench security sector involvement in the political economy of Zimbabwe. After reconstituting themselves into a post-1975 ZANU led by Robert Mugabe, the securocrats got into government with their bush mentalities, values, structures and fears and it is that bush legacy which has been jealously preserved and prolonged.

Findings indicated that a bush-to-office modus operandi ran deep in the bloodstream of all liberation movements and it has metamorphosed into what is
today seen as state capture by military interests. A vice that works contrary to the basic ideals of the fathers of Zimbabwe, those of a democratic society where the 'one man one vote' rule determines the distribution of leadership positions. The subsequent capture of PF-ZAPU in 1987 was part of the ZANU-PF/military strategy of capturing the nation-state from Zambezi to Limpopo and to maintain one centre of power—the military control of the state. The move to capture, sabotage and weaken MDC in the 2009 GNU was not separate from the dominant trend of capture of the political economy of the state by military interests.

B. Nature and role of Security sector involvement in Politics and Economy
This study found that the involvement of the security sector in politico-economic affairs of Zimbabwe is institutionalised through complex patronage networks and webs built around ZANU-PF liberation struggle ideologies. This network has been webbed across key national institutions rendering them short of independence from military influence. Recruitment into key bodies of the state has been based and/or supplied by this patronage network to the extent that liberation struggle and/or military background has been seen to prevail over qualifications and competency wherever there are two contenders with each of these. This network has been buttressed by the ruling regime's security sector training policy that has seen many members of the security sector acquiring university degrees and appointed to most top decision making bodies. Members of intelligence services have been the most used as civilian personnel and it has become very rare to find general (unconnected) civilians appointed by the president. This has strengthened the patronage network because these appointees who continue the recruitment of military related personnel throughout the corners of the society.

C. Key Zones of Military State Capture
This study identified four major state institutions that have been targeted and captured by military interests and utilised to institutionalise, disperse military patronage networks and buttress long-lasting control of the state by securocrats. These are: state controlled media, the electoral process, the judiciary and the legislature. These institutions have been consistently populated with security sector recruits and Trojan horses. These have maintained the continued dominance of the security sector in politico-economic affairs in Zimbabwe.

D. Seizure of the state economy by ZANU-PF/Military Marriage
Findings of the study revealed that the state economy was captured through capture of the political terrain that determines distribution of economic goods. It was found that the fact that key positions of authority in the body politic are captured by military interests, the same interests have seen individuals associated with the military by history, descent or caste benefiting from key economic zones like agriculture, mining and government employment opportunities. The economic sector has been managed through political patronage network structures and this has been used to make opponents poor and entice prospective supporters. This is how the regime has been thriving. An audit of employees in government agencies, commissions, universities, parastatals and boards shows that military connectedness is a strategic determinant in recruitment.

E. Divergences within the Security Sector Regarding Militarization of Politics and Transition
The findings of the study reflected a 70% agreement in our sample that the current involvement of the security sector in politics should be abolished and an apolitical stance in line with the Constitution of Zimbabwe should be maintained. However, differences across generations in the security sector were: (i) although dissatisfied with the status quo, (53%) of the first generation (age group 51 + years) of Zimbabwe is more agreeable to the current status quo of giving political opportunities to the security sector compared to other age groups; (ii) the middle generation (31-50 yrs) is generally (62%) against politicization of the security sector and/or militarizing politics; (iii) a small section (38%) in the middle generation seems satisfied with the status quo; (iv) the last generation (18-30 yrs) is dissatisfied (92%) and/or against the tendency to militarise politics and/or politicize the military against 8% who prefer continual of the status quo and; (v) a great majority in the sampled security sector personnel (70%) most of whom are aged 18—50 years support the idea that the security sector must be depolitized to avoid discord in the sector based on political fictionalisation.

Save for Mashonaland Central, sampled respondents in all regions supported the reform of the current politicisation of the security sector (55% to 92%
support by respondents per province) citing fears of defections and infightings if the sector continues under politicisation. Since ZANU-PF is as the ruling party was captured by securocrats and used to capture the state, it has became reasonable to opine that transition in ZANU-PF leadership automatically effects transition in the state. Thus in order to determine how decisive military credentials are to securocrats (who wield the veto power) in the allocation of power and possibilities and/or challenges to transition in Zimbabwe, respondents were asked to indicate their preferred successor among the two contenders VP ED Mnangagwa – a key liberation veteran securocrat and Dr Grace Mugabe—wife of the incumbent president with neither security sector nor liberation struggle histories. Grace Mugabe emerged as the least preferred candidate to succeed Mugabe with 26% of respondents preferring her against the 43% and 31% preferring VP Mnangagwa and “none of the two” respectively. What this meant is that, the most important 'stockholders' in power transition prefer Mnangagwa to succeed Robert Mugabe so that power rotates within a securocrats' inner-circle and its most trusted conduits.

On the source of politico-economic transition, the majority of sampled respondents (51%) preferred a ZANU-PF driven change in the political economy of the state compared to a 27% preferring change driven by forces outside ZANU-PF and 22% who preferred change from anywhere in Zimbabwe. The young generation and middle generation were among the largest content (86%) of the respondents who showed no preference of the source of democratic transition in the country whilst, many (76%) among the elderly generation (51+ years age group) preferred a ZANU-PF democratization that will start from within and spread across the country via the existing patronage networks.
SECTION 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND LITERATURE

"As Zimbabwe struggles for socio-economic and political transition, the security sector is an indispensable focal point and an irrefutable game changer to be taken very seriously and cautiously."

INTRODUCTION

This report presents the findings of a three months study conducted by the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (ZDI) across ten provinces of Zimbabwe to capture and ascertain an up-to-date map of the current state of security sector involvement in political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe and implications thereof. The study therefore entailed a cutting-edge investigation of reasons, interests and implications of the involvement of various branches of the security sector in state, party politics and economy and how this impacts on transition in the named dimensions. As Zimbabwe struggles for socio-economic and political transition, the security sector is an indispensable focal point and an irrefutable game changer to be taken very seriously and cautiously. It is an undergirding hope of this study that this sector could be understood and composite strategies are devised to handle it without derailing the transition waves. In this regard, a critical examination of the role of this powerful institution cannot be overemphasized, interrogation and understanding the political and economic interests of the military is paramount in any transitology.

The report is organized into six sections. Section one presents the introduction, objectives of the study and background literature review; section 2 - methodology and theoretical framework adopted in the study; section 3 - examines the origins of the security sector involvement in the political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe. Section 4 presents the nature and extent to which the military has played a decisive power bloc in maintaining the political hegemony of the ruling party in Zimbabwe, how it is shaped and/or is shaping political and economic transition and the role of the security sector in succession politics by interrogating their interests, fears and preferred transitional direction and the kind of leader they prefer within the feuding factions in ZANU-PF. Section 5 presents the nature of security sector involvement in the economy of the nation-

state. The last section concludes the study by pinpointing the implications of the security sector infusion in political and economic affairs on the future transition of these sectors in Zimbabwe and recommends possible solutions and intervention strategies for the civic society, social movements, government, political parties and interested international players which were derived from the findings of the study.

THE SECURITY SECTOR IN ZIMBABWE

By 'security sector', this report refers to a collective of the members (serving and retired) of the Defence Forces, Intelligence services, Police services, the Prisons and correctional Services and the Zimbabwe Liberation War veterans as clearly recognised by applicable law in Zimbabwe. In law, the term used in place of the ‘security sector’ as stipulated in section 207(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe is ‘security services’ and it comprises all the security services listed above save for the liberation war veterans which this study for reasons pertinent to this report, deliberately incorporated in the same fold.

Section 208 expressly commands members of the security sector to be subservient to the constitution and uphold the constitution in their actions. Specifically, it stresses that:

(2) Neither the security services nor any of their members may, in the exercise of their functions—
(a) act in a partisan manner;
(b) further the interests of any political party or cause;
(c) violate the fundamental rights or freedoms of any person.

(3) Members of the security services must not be active members or office bearers of any political party or organisation.

(4) Serving members of the security services must not be employed or engaged in civilian institutions except in periods of public emergency.

1. The law concerned is the War Veterans Act [Chapter 11:15] and in its section 2(c), “a “war veteran” means any person who underwent military training and participated, consistently and persistently, in the liberation struggle which occurred in Zimbabwe and in neighboring countries between the 1st January, 1962, and the 29th February, 1980, in connection with the bringing about of Zimbabwe’s independence on the 18th April, 1980.”
Without pointing to voluminous constitutional texts which fundamentally reiterate these quoted rules, it is clear what the law requires of the security sector in Zimbabwe. What this articulates in clear terms is that security sector involvement in political party affairs of Zimbabweans is illegal and unconstitutional. So is its involvement in civilian institutions unless in cases of national emergency. Although operating under the civilian authority of the President and responsible minister, and security sector authority of responsible commanders and commissioners who are subordinate to the civilian authority, the chain of command is subject to constitutional authority which is supreme. So, any authority commanding action of the security sector ought to do so in a manner consistent with the constitution of Zimbabwe which includes upholding the rules stipulated in section 208.

It is not clear in the constitution whether retired members of the security services are precluded from involvement in political and economic affairs given that they assume civilian life soon after retirement. However, the fact that the constitution clearly adds phrases like “…in the exercise of their functions…” in the same line that seems silent on the “serving” condition of the members speaks that the law prohibiting involvement in politics refers to serving members because only serving members can exercise the functions of the security services by virtue of belonging to one of the listed branches of the sector. Retired persons are therefore deemed to be civilians and therefore free to enjoy political rights due to civilians.

The constitution does not preclude involvement of serving security service personnel in economic activities of the country except those that involve direct membership to and involvement in activities of a political party and a civilian institution in a manner inconsistent with section 208. This seems in conflict with Section 29 of the Defence Act which gives the Minister of Defence powers to attach members of a Regular Force to the Public Service which might result in direct involvement in political and economic affairs of the nation-state administered by civilian institutions even if there is neither state of emergency nor crisis. However, the legal position resolving this legal conflict is stated in section 206(1), 207(2), 208(1) and most importantly section 2 of the constitution of Zimbabwe which rules that:

1) This is the supreme law of Zimbabwe and any law, practice, custom or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.

2) The obligations imposed by this constitution are binding on every person, natural or juristic, including the State and all executive, legislative and judicial institutions and agencies of government at every level, and must be fulfilled by them.

In summation, these sections clarify that: if the conflict occurs, section 208 must prevail. In other words, the Defence Act section concerned is in this respect null, unconstitutional and needs amendment. Thus, only serving members of the security services are not legally allowed to partake in political economy of the state in Zimbabwe in a manner repugnant of section 208. However, the involvement of retired members cannot be taken lightly because it means a lot about the propensity to please politicians during their lives in service in pursuit of rewards in the life after service and they can influence their serving colleagues. Retired members are worthy to be examined together with the liberation struggle war veterans because what they think or do gives a clear mirror of the thinking of their colleagues in service. If not, it would be indicating the discohesion within the sector and this is vital in analysing matters of politico-economic transition.

LIMITATIONS

The findings reported here are outcomes of a series of fieldwork key informant interviews and document analyses conducted by ZDI research team across the ten provinces of Zimbabwe. The team faced myriad challenges that threatened to hinder access to their target population and actual data. As it is known worldwide, national security structures are too securitized, full of insecure people, too politicized and propaganda is continuously fed into the system. So, this made it a tedious task to get data there from. Access to senior officials was sometimes deliberately refused or delayed limiting researchers to freely accessible retired and/or junior respondents. Documentary analysis was relied upon to compensate for the challenges mentioned above.

2. “Discohesion” is an analytic conceptualization used by ZDI (2016) to explain political polarization and internal divisions within a political system which when not handled properly and timely lead to an inevitable system breakdown. This the characteristic of the securocratic state in Zimbabwe which might possibly lead to its bloody breakdown.
The results of this report must be comprehended as indicative data considering the size of the sample. However, the study seeks to serve as a reflector of serious issues of national interest that deserve further in-depth study and attention.

BACKGROUND LITERATURE

The problem of security sector infusion in political and economic affairs of nation-states has become a virulent subject matter among media and academic analysts in Zimbabwe. Yet, scant academic literature has been produced to give a profound understanding of the nexus of challenges and opportunities this phenomenon has brewed for Zimbabwe’s politico-economic transition. Jenkins and Kposowa (1992) cited in Onder (2010) opined that there is an umbilical linkage between the very notion of the state (legitimate monopoly of violence) and this tendency of the security sector. Its role as the sole source and guarantor of legitimate violence monopolised by the state to maintain and retain power has strategically positioned the security sector as the real power behind the existence of the state itself.

In countries with weak civilian institutional mechanisms for counterbalancing this menace such as the rule of law, constitutionalism, parliamentarism and real democracy; the security sector has proven to be an alpha and omega institution that can be relied upon in guaranteeing the success or failure of politico-economic transition. In one context, it has served as a reliable enabler of transition to politico-economic democracy, while in another, it has proven to be very trustworthy in blocking it (Acemoglu et al, 2010). Hence, ruling elites that create a too strong military must be cognisant of the real double-edged sword it has put in waiting. This has resulted in a grotesque persistence of militarised party states especially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Zimbabwe being a perfect example) where civilian counter measures and/or institutions are weakest (Mandaza, 2016).

The security sector in poor countries like Zimbabwe has, “... for flimsy reasons and excuses, infiltrated the political administrative machineries of the states...” (Omilusi, 2015:3). However, in most cases, incumbents are the ones who give concessions to the security sector in the form of political appointments and economic incentives in an attempt to buy it off and/or co-opt it, rely on it to maintain and retain power and preserve the status quo in their favour not regarding whether such machinations violate the yearnings of the masses (Diamond, 2008). Thus, masses in those situations are reduced to parochial citizens with no real channels of political participation (Diamond, 2008). A bad case scenario has been the capture of key state political and economic institutions by the security sector using a stooge civilian bureaucracy as its front whilst in cases where incumbents have failed to give it incentives and a worst case scenario, coups d’états and military rule have been consequences. Either case, as Omilusi (2015:3) puts it:

has been ... blighted by multiple forms of bad governance: abusive police and security forces, domineering local oligarchs, incompetent and indifferent state bureaucracies, corrupt and inaccessible judiciaries, and venal ruling elites who are contemptuous of the rule of law and accountable to no one but themselves.

For instance, the military has meddled in and/or captured Myanmar’s politics since 1990s and it secured reserved seats in parliament, being part of cabinet and constitutional power to take power if need arises (Jones, 2014). In a similar case, the political economy of Pakistan has been increasingly militarised, the military has been pervasive in politics and economics directly and it has stalled transition to democracy in contrast to their counterparts in the early United States and Japan who were instrumental in nurturing transition to democracy. However, the security sector (the Tatmadaw) in Myanmar has of late (2011 onward) has taken a restorative stance similar to that of the Nigerian military by supporting transition to democracy despite years of stalling it. So, it all rolls to our basic argument that, transition to quality of governance in a militarised terrain devoid of real alternative force to counter the military appetite to dominate politics and economics of the country is impossible, unless that transition is in the interest of the security sector itself. Zimbabwe has a lot to learn from these cases in terms of its prospective transition, challenges and opportunities.

3. Even President Robert Mugabe himself publicly proclaimed this menace. See The Herald 28/07/2017, his address to Zanu-PF Women’s League National Assembly meeting at the ruling party’s headquarters in Harare on the 27th of July 2017.
4. The subject matter (though needing update to include current twists) has been tackled by CIZC, 2012; Onslow, 2011; Chityo, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2013; Kebonang, 2012; Zinyama, 2012; & Masunungure (n.d).
5. This has been even worse in those countries where independence was gained with the help of the military because this has made it seem like legitimate owners of the country. For instance, this is the belief of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces Commander; see The Herald, 15/09/2015.
It should be noted that military interventions in the political economy are not limited to authoritarian regimes, most democratic states including the United States; Botswana etc experience the same though under strict obedience to civilian control (Halprin, 1975; Onder, 2010). Robinson and Acemoglu (2012) contend that the security sector is an inalienable institution necessary for politico-economic transition. They convincingly argue that developed countries such as the United States and United Kingdom among others have histories of being governed by ex-military persons who were determined to create strong inclusive political and economic institutions responsible for their development take-off. The logic in this argument is that, unlike in Zimbabwe where political institutions are weak and narrowly designed to benefit a small group of the securocrat ruling elite and their conduits, developed countries managed to create strong political institutions (electoral systems, rule of law, state apparatus and accountability mechanisms) that guaranteed political participation and human rights of the people which made it very hard for the security sector to capture the state and get away with it (Fukuyama, 2014).

The overall implication (of Robinson and Acemoglu, 2012; Fukuyama, 2014), as argued in this report is that, it was in the interest of the security sector in those developed countries to create strong institutions that freed the political space for the people to have real power to govern, elect and remove leaders of their choice. This also enhanced the people’s capacity to use this real power to pursue their economic opportunities and prevent the proliferation of extractive institutions that derail economic development such as patrimonialism, corruption networks and bad governance (Robinson and Acemoglu, 2012). Consequently, political transition paved way for economic transition towards politico-economic development.

To be taken very seriously is the fact that, security sector involvement in political affairs of a nation-state does not appear in a homologous form everywhere all the time. This report posits two main different forms of military capture of the state namely: (a) absolute capture and (b) what this study problematises as institutionalised unconventional state capture. In an absolute military capture of the state, two tracks can be taken by the security sector that are: (i) absolute explicit state capture which comprise coup d’états by members of the security sector resulting in a junta government and, (ii) absolute clandestine state capture followed by creation of a pseudo civilian government that takes instructions from the barracks. At face value, one can think it (type – ii) is a civilian government due to its inclusion of civilian relatives and friends of security sector personnel in government posts at all levels. Under this setup, the security sector governs through civilian fronts or relatives and friends. Such fronts cannot independently make policy decisions that contradict permanent interests of the security sector without attracting outrage or threats. In both cases, the security sector wields decisive powers and the civilian government is subservient to it. This is a very prominent military capture of the state in many Sub Saharan Africa states.

Under institutionalised unconventional state capture, there exists a complex incarnation of the security sector in form of a political party (clandestine and public). The security sector captures a known political party and incarnates itself in a political party form to wrestle power. The civilian part of government is elected from among friends and/or retired security sector personnel but has too much dependence on security sector support in acquiring political power, maintaining it and retaining it to the extent that it cannot do anything without securing agreement from the security sector. However, the bottom line is that the party is a security sector incarnated in political party form. This is the case in Zimbabwe and it has successfully erected a ‘securocratic state’ which is currently facing possible self-destruction.

As it shall be shown in the next sections, the state has been fully captured by the security sector in Zimbabwe and a securocratic state that partially fits in what Levitsky and Way (2002) termed a competitive authoritarian regime has been created. They noted that, four key institutions of the state are targeted and/or captured and those are: (i) the electoral system; (ii) the legislature; (iii) the judiciary and; (iv) the media (Levitsky and Way, 2002). However, as argued by ZDI (2017), such institutions cannot be effectively captured through merely populating them with security sector personnel and friends, an authoritarian state deploys

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6. This is a theoretical extrapolation of this study deduced from empirical evidence in the Zimbabwean political economy.

7. The term is deduced from analytic conceptualizations in Mandaza (2016) to refer to a government of the security sector and their conduits by themselves and for themselves.
the military in every decision making body of the state at all levels to ensure that the impact in those four targets for maintaining and retaining power is well assured. This study adds that, the securocratic state differs from Levytsky and Way's (2002) conceptualisation in that it introducees capture of a dominant political party and turning it into a security sector incarnate with complex militarised patronage networks and webs running across the country.\footnote{Analysis of the Mhago Declaration in 1975 used by the securocrats to capture ZANU and subsequently restructuring of ZANU in a manner that leaves no doubt that it was incarnation of the security sector in the body of a political party ready to capture the state political economy.}

In Zimbabwe, the phenomenon has been variously problematised by different thinkers; some perceive it as 'a militarized form of electoral authoritarianism' (Masunungure and Bratton, 2008), militarized party/state conflation (Masunungure, n.d), liberation struggle inheritance (Onslow, 2011), military capture of the party/state (CiZC, 2012); securocrat state (Mandaza, 2016) and/or; capture of the state and military by the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party (Reeler, 2016). The security sector has been implicated in various instances of direct public support of ZANU-PF and participation in its political activities, appointment into leadership positions in key political and economic institutions and issuing of press statements supporting ZANU-PF and sabotaging and/or rubbing political opponents (Masunungure, n.d; CiZC, 2012; Reeler, 2016).

Important to note is the role played by the military in the 2008 June runoff elections which saw a brazen unleashing of violence against supporters of the main opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) which led to regional intervention that resulted in a Government of National Unity (GNU).\footnote{See CiZC (2012: 14-15) for a detailed list indicating that generals from the security sector were deployed as leaders of ZANU-PF campaign teams in all provinces of Zimbabwe during the 2008 June runoff presidential election which resulted in a rigged and disregarded election outcome.} However, as can be seen, the phenomenon has still remained with a cloudily conceptualization. There is still no certainty and/or clarity as to who captured who between ZANU-PF and the security sector and which among the two forces has captured the state although justice has been done in revealing that the state has been captured. This study sought to give clarity to this problem and analyse the impact and implications related to it.
SECTION 2: METHODOLOGY AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

"Since the study investigated the involvement of the security sector in Zimbabwean political and economic affairs, its very nature made its target group to comprise retired and serving military personnel, liberation war veterans, personnel from the intelligence service, and police officers."

INTRODUCTION

This section presents the methodology and theoretical framework adopted in this study. The study was purely a qualitative political economy approach; it was a combination of key informant interviews and desktop research delimited to Zimbabwe. A desktop study of the security sector involvement in Zimbabwean political and economic affairs was the first data collection strategy; newspaper articles and internet publications with statements and/or stories that carried indications of security sector involvement in the political economy of the country were scrutinized for relevant data. After a discussion by a team of research experts on emerging themes, a follow-up open-ended interview guide was crafted to cross-examine evidence on this topic. Researchers were then sent across the main provinces of Zimbabwe to conduct key informant interviews with purposively sampled respondents drawn from the security sector. A total of 43 interviews were conducted across the 10 provinces of Zimbabwe with key informants from the following groups: Zimbabwe Defence Forces; Air Force of Zimbabwe; Zimbabwe Prison and Correctional Services; Zimbabwe Republic Police; Zimbabwe National Liberation War Veterans; and other key informants who are still serving or have retired from the security sector.

The intent was to provide an insider version of the realities surrounding the security sector involvement in political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe and to ascertain the basic convergences and divergences within the sector and the extent to which this has posed real impacts on the politico-economic transition of the state.

ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

This study tackles a very sensitive subject matter with very sensitive respondents. The basic ethic of this study was that respondents must be protected at all costs. Their names are concealed and interviews were done in private to ensure confidentiality, prevent personal and career harm, enhance anonymity and encourage independent and freedom of thought. Thus, researchers preferred to use pseudonyms and codes in place of names so that respondents are assured that neither researchers nor readers know their names. Data collected was mixed up to further ensure anonymity. Participation in this research was voluntary, consensual and in full observance of human rights and dignity.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

This study was conducted to gather, interpret data and produce knowledge on the security sector involvement in political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe. Pursuant of this end, the research team went out to:

1) Critically examine the role and influence of the security sector in the political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe;
2) Examine the legality and legitimacy of the security sector involvement in political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe and how it is shaped and/or is shaping the political and economic transition;
3) Assess the role of security sector in the succession politics by interrogating their interests, fears and preferred transitional direction and the kind of leader they prefer within the feuding factions in ZANU-PF and;
4) Analytically examine the extent to which the military has been a decisive power bloc in maintaining the political hegemony of the ruling party in Zimbabwe and implications it has on the future of transition in the polity.

Overall, the research provides answers to how the security sector has been involved; what its political and economic motivations are; and most importantly how the security sector can play a positive role in the political and economic transition in Zimbabwe. The research also unravels how the strategic deployment of the military furthers the interests of ZANU-PF. The party's interests and fears that come with the involvement or lack thereof of the military in politics are interrogated as well.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In-depth interviews and documentary analyses were guided by the following key research questions:
1) What has been the role of the security sector in the political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe?
2) Why has the security sector played this role?
3) What are the political and economic benefits associated with playing such a role?
4) What implications does this involvement have on future politico-economic transition and how can the security sector be a critical enabler in the political and economic transition in Zimbabwe?
5) Is the security sector a homogeneous group in its role in the political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe?

In-depth interviews also investigated how security sector personnel have been deployed and involved in the ZANU-PF succession skirmishes. This report gives full description of the nature and composition of key respondents of the study and limitations encountered in the course of this study. The research team assigned to conduct interviews was stratified so that each researcher could focus on regions he/she knows better. Thus, this report is a result of a series of data collation, content analysis, thematic analysis and critical debate of findings by a panel of researchers.

FACTORS CONSIDERED BEFORE SELECTING RESEARCHERS

To ensure robustness and accuracy of findings, the following factors were taken into consideration before assigning researchers:

a) Researchers’ interviewing intelligence and experiences;
b) Ability to identify and probe issues arising during the interview;
c) Familiarity with the security sector configurations in their area of study and the political economy of Zimbabwe especially the state-military and party power dynamics.

DATA GATHERING

Data were gathered through tape recording of interviews and note taking during interviews which were later transcribed. Information was kept in its actual interview nature to avoid data distortions. Data collection assistants were hired for the purpose of assisting in note taking.

Local or home languages were used in interviews to enhance respondents’ thoroughness and accuracy in responding to questions. Responses were translated back to English by reputable translators. Secondary data sources such as newspapers, online blogs, and social media were thoroughly analysed and data was collected using a document study guide composed of key topics on security sector involvement in political and economic affairs in Zimbabwe. Notes were taken to accumulate data under each thematic area.

TARGET GROUPS

Since the study investigated the involvement of the security sector in Zimbabwean political and economic affairs, its very nature made its target group to comprise retired and serving military personnel, liberation war veterans, personnel from the intelligence service, and police officers. So, the security sector was delimited to the above mentioned security configurations in the country.

SCOPE OF THE STUDY

As alluded earlier, the security/military sector was construed to mean a collective of members (serving and retired) of the Zimbabwe Defence Forces, the Central Intelligence Organisation, the Zimbabwe Republic Police, the Zimbabwe Prisons Services and the Zimbabwe Liberation War veterans. Although political affairs and economic affairs in question comprise a plethora of interweaving issues, this study focused on electoral affairs, political party issues, politico-economic transition issues, and institutional setup within key political institutions in Zimbabwe such as the legislature, state media and judiciary. Thus, politico-economic affairs examined by this study were construed in that regard. The involvement of the security sector was investigated mainly in the mentioned institutions and issue areas. Generally, this study was conducted to gather data, interpret data and produce knowledge on the security sector involvement in political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe.

DEMOGRAPHIC CONFIGURATIONS OF RESPONDENTS

Respondents were pooled from across the sections, regions and age groups (generations) into which the Zimbabwean security sector (subject to the delimitations of this study) is stratified. Figure 3.1 below gives a full description of these configurations.

![Figure 3.1: Security sector stratifications in the study sample](Source: Fieldwork data analysis)
As shall be discussed later, respondents highlighted significant divergences regarding their perceptions of the involvement of security forces in politics and effects thereof. Regional configurations are very important because they depict political history of the sector, Midlands, Matabeleland and Bulawayo provinces were former strongholds of ZIPRA (a military wing of ZAPU) whereas, the remaining provinces were strongholds of ZANLA (a military of ZANU) while other areas were controlled by the Rhodesian Forces (RF) or distributed among the three. So, these historical differences were captured in figure 3.3 for their importance in understanding the variation of perceptions and proclivities across the security sector sample.

The retired security sector sample included war veterans and retired officers from the police, intelligence, and military drawn from the three former military wings. Apart from the intra-sector and regional stratifications depicted in figures 3.1 and 3.2, the security sector sample was further sub-divided into age and historic specific groups for deeper understanding of the nature of their involvement in politics across generations and possible role of varying histories in influencing political culture across generations.2

It should be noted that in Zimbabwe, there are three identifiable historical epochs that significantly tweak perceptions across the three generations (classified above) within the security sector. The first age group (51+ years) witnessed the Rhodesian era and most of them participated in the liberation war and have been there till date. This is the group that earns liberation struggle pensions, occupy acquired land, occupy top positions in government or in the security sector and has many retired officers1. The second generation (31-50 years) started being politically literate during the early years of black government, they are thus capable of comparing early independence and today's political economy, they have a significant number of officers in top positions, own movable and immovable assets12. The last generation (18-30 years) was born into many challenges of late 1980s till date, they have a large component of poor people with no assets, it is the content with no liberation struggle credential except by descent and association13. This generation has little representation in leadership of the security sector. This background should be considered in interpreting their perspectives revealed in this study.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: TRASITOLGY & SECURITY SECTOR INVOLVEMENT

A study of transitology theoretical literature brings to the fore that “transition” basically entails composite revisions in the political economy (status quo) of a society that emerges from a crisis (Linz and Stephen, 1996; Huntington, 1996; Bratton and De Walle, 1997)14. The status quo referred to here is typified by conflicts and oppositions between the ruling authoritarian regime and opposition parties over the former's policy fissures held responsible for perpetual decay of the political economy of the nation-state (Steyn-Kotze, 2010). At the centre of the crisis is the ruling despot that seeks to regain lost domestic and

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1. This group was aged =/>16 years at independence (Background Review Interviews, July 2017).
2. This group was aged =/< 15 years at independence (Background Review Interviews, July 2017).
3. This group was born from 1987-1999; it generally became political literate and sensitive during the crisis period since late 1990s. (Background Review Interviews, July 2017).
4. “Transitionology” is a term used by Steyn-Kotze (2010) to describe theoretical and empirical studies dealing with politico-economic transition. In this study, it simply means transition studies or transitology.

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international legitimacy after military defeat or outright failure to govern and failed exclusion tactics (Casper and Taylor, 1996:1).

In Zimbabwe, it is apparent that transition began after the politico-economic crisis in 2008; but, it has stagnated and/or is in the verge of reverse pedalling\textsuperscript{15}. Undercurrent forces responsible for this transition zigzag need to be identified and resolved. It is important to problematise the transition talked of, to make it Zimbabwean. Questions such as politico-economic transition from what and/or where to what and/or where are often asked by many. This report posits that Zimbabwe is in a transition quagmire, it is increasingly getting blurry whether politico-economic transition that took off during the 2009 to 2013 GNU era will possibly progress or reverse. The transition examined here is a dual transition from economic collapse and dictatorship to democracy and economic growth. The role of the security sector as one of the key social groups and/or institutions entangled in the squabbles with political parties over direction of reform spoils deserves serious attention.

There are three phases in the development of democracy stipulated in transitology studies namely: (i) transition phase which involves transfer of power through relatively free and fair elections that usually follow a period of negotiated political settlements between the democrats and reformist autocrats in a state; (ii) democratization phase and (iii) democratic consolidation phase which involves sustained institutionalization of democracy and deepening democratic values across the nation-state (Steyn-Kotze, 2010:28). However, this report focuses on the first phase of the development of democracy because Zimbabwe still staggers to cross this stage. The elections that followed the negotiated settlements and constitutional reforms in the 2009-2013 era did not lead to democratization resulting in transition seemingly getting derailed.

Within the transition phase, three fundamental reforms have been stipulated as pivotal to its success and these are: (i) restructuring of state/society relations in a manner that deepens state responsiveness to demands of the society, increased civil society role as the voice of the people and presence of an enabling environment for civic society to work; (ii) creation of strong institutions and means of power transfer that ensure smooth, fair and nonviolent transition and; (iii) entry into office of a new democratic administration following the ‘founding elections’ (Linz and Stephen, 1996; Huntington, 1996; Ethier, 1990). Although the constitutional reform in Zimbabwe can, on paper, be associated to the first reform\textsuperscript{16}, the successive two other reforms were not done in Zimbabwe and this make a valid point according to transitology theory, that transition was either sabotaged, hijacked or abandoned.

ZDI’s undergirding philosophical inclination is that transition in a nation-state, be it political or economic, it cannot be best understood in separation from its background factors. For this reason, the political economy approach to transitology in Zimbabwe is the best way of interrogating this problem. It is a composite analysis of “the interaction between political institutions, social consciousness and ideas within the framework of economic relationships” (Marangos, 2003:3). So, the future of politico-economic transition must be prognosticated through an analytic lens that takes into consideration the histories, power relations and configurations, interests of social and political institutions because “the transition process is holistic, historical, dynamic and comparative in nature...” (Marangos, 2003:3), thus, a political economy approach is most appropriate.

The ancestry of this approach can be traced back to the Marxist state theory which stresses analyses of how social conflicts over power and control of resources shape the transformation and exercise of state power (Jones, 2014). By giving enough attention to struggles and contestations over spoils of reforms between major groups in the society, this approach is useful in unpacking key issues of transition from a militarized dictatorship to democracy and economic progress.

At the bottom of the political economy approach is the belief that economic relationships cannot be understood in isolation, explicit awareness of power, institutions and values is necessary because it is due to a variation in these that transition outcomes vary across countries that employ similar strategies (Heilbroner, 1996; Roland, 2001). Politics, economics and the existing background histories and social values must not be separated; they influence each other in any transition process in a society.

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\textsuperscript{15} Observations from collected data, July 2017.

\textsuperscript{16} The genuineness of constitutional reforms is contested; the Zanu PF government has been hesitant to amend and/or repeal despotic legislation such as AIPPA, POSA, BSA and ICA that legalise acts that are inconsistent with the constitution. Continued use of these laws despite the new constitution attests that the constitution has changed on paper but the political culture and legal framework is largely the same.
SECTION 3: GENEALOGY OF SECURITY SECTOR INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS

“... a bush-to-office modus operandi ran deep in the bloodstream of all liberation movements and has metamorphosed into what is today seen as state capture by military interests and a vice that works contrary to the basic ideals of the fathers of Zimbabwe, those of a democratic society where the ‘one man one vote’ rule determines the distribution of leadership positions.”

INTRODUCTION

This section traces the origins of the involvement of the security sector in civilian political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe. This is followed by presentation and discussion of findings relating to the origins of politicisation of the security sector, the nature and extent of this politicisation and reasons behind the politicisation of the security sector and the rest is discussed in section 4. It is an analysis of research findings collected across the 10 provinces of Zimbabwe through interviews with individuals from various sections of the security sector.

The findings reveal that security sector involvement in politics and related economics is rooted in the very existence of post-independence Zimbabwe, the brand of politicians who entered the political scene thereafter and their histories and their fears. Capture of ZANU by securocrats was the first move to institutionalise and entrench security sector involvement in the political economy of Zimbabwe. After reincarnating themselves into a post-1975 ZANU led by Robert Mugabe, the securocrats got to government with their bush mentalities, values, structures and fears and it is that bush legacy which has been jealously preserved and prolonged. Findings indicate that a bush-to-office modus operandi ran deep in the bloodstream of all liberation movements and it has metamorphosed into what is today seen as state capture by military interests and a vice that works contrary to the basic ideals of the fathers of Zimbabwe, those of a democratic society where the ‘one man one vote’ rule determines the distribution of leadership positions.

THE BUSH-TO-OFFICE LIBERATION STRUGGLE HANGOVER

The security sector involvement in political and economic affairs is not a new problem in Zimbabwe; it is in fact a hangover from the liberation struggle texture and modus operandi. A convoluted ZANU-PF securocrat patronage network has emerged from this legacy and it has been made pervasive in every corner of the society and used in key political and economic affairs of the country. It is through this networking that the security sector is dispersed across state institutions whilst new recruits join the sector through the same network. Five basic interwoven theories and/or tenets of this liberation struggle hangover were identified by the study and have to be seriously considered to get a clear picture of the realities surrounding the genealogy of state capture by military interest in Zimbabwe and problems ahead.

Figure 3.5: Genesis of the Securocratic state

Source: Percyvumuyu teases out historical parallels between #ZANLA's 1975 Ngagao Declaration & #ZNLWVA statement in July

20. The claim that security sector was a largest component within pre-independence nationalist political party membership and leadership had 00% disagreement across all interviews and related public datasets consulted.
21. Interviews with key informants, July 2017 indicated that family military history and reference or ZANU-PF membership are first considerations in security sector recruitment and appointment to top public service decision making bodies.
22. Available at: https://3A%2F%2Ftopsy.one%2Fhashtag.php%3Fq%3Dzanal &psig=AOvVaw3fOP4eNethnb31I_whvcs&ust=1508505759 419762.
First, it is the belief that Zimbabwe is free today because of the security services and they thus legitimately deserve a lion’s share of the political spoils. Actually, the state media has been effective in making it acceptable to many as a matter of fact that, the freedom fighters are the ones who won the war and liberated the country. The ZANU-PF that won elections in 1980 was no longer a civilian party, it was a group of securocrats (guerrillas) and their civilian surrogates who could go to any length to capture the state the way they captured ZANU and legitimized themselves thereafter. It is this political manoeuvre of the security apparatus, as revealed by the findings of the study, that has made security sector personnel perceive themselves as ‘stock holders of the country’—the legitimate and bona fide beneficiaries of the political and economic fruits of independence. So, the security sector has always expected to be given ‘political inheritance’ after service and worked to ensure that leaders capable of assuring inviolability of this desire retain power. This is part of the liberation struggle-hangover phenomenon that has entrenched military interests in the economic and political fraternity of Zimbabwe to the point of a visible state capture by military interests.

There was a general uniformity in all interviews carried out across the country’s security segments and provinces that the structuring of liberation struggle political parties compromised the separation between gunmen and politicians. It was stated that;

... it should be remembered that the two major liberation political parties had their respective security apparatus, so you had to belong to a certain political party so as to be part of its security system and once


24. Key informants, stated that the frequent playing of liberation struggle footages and mention of “commandeering chief of the ZDF” every time President Robert Mugabe features on media is aimed at educating the nation that the security sector rules through him (Masvingo, 15/07/2017).
25. This view had a 68% frequency across interviewed key informants, July 2017.
26. See The Herald, 17/04/2016. Security sector on high alert: Chiwenga. Available at: http://www.herald.co.zw/security-sector-on-high-alert-chiwenga/ This was put forward by ZDF Commander Chiwenga as his understanding of the place of the security sector in Zimbabwe. This attracted fierce social media criticisms and rebuke from Professor Jonathan Moyo who pointed the people of Zimbabwe as stockholders.
28. You get competitive advantage for political office in the life ahead. So, politicians and their militia were inseparable, politicians used the army and intelligence to execute their political goals whilst security personnel relied on politicians for strategy, funding and guidance (...). People like Josiah Tongogara, Joyce Mujuru, Opah Muchinguri, Emmerson Mnangagwa, Dumiso Dabengwa, and Phelekezela Mphoko were at the helm of the military and intelligence system but also served as political leaders who assisted in all political negotiations and coalitions that led to independence.

Not surprisingly, most of the mentioned security sector figures (Joice Mujuru, Opah Muchinguri, Emerson Mnangagwa, Dumiso Dabengwa, and Phelekezela Mphoko) retired and joined political leadership occupying influential positions in the first and successive governments since independence. It cannot be an overstatement to note that these figures expected political rewards and the politicians rewarding them saw it fit to do so. Actually, having liberation struggle credentials and/or attracting such credentials to yourself by parentage or association has for a long time now been a most important prerequisite qualification for top political posts. Arguments that rose following the appointment of the current Vice President Emerson Mnangagwa and Phelekezela Mphoko and implications of the Minister of Defence Sidney Sekeramai as the most qualified candidate to succeed President Robert Mugabe spoke clearly to this fact—military history is still an irrevocable credential considered in most politically relevant appointments made by ZANU-PF government. Thus, a political process of militarising key political appointments and henceforth economic benefits thereof has been propagated, watered and relayed from one generation to another.

Joyce Mujuru and her cronies have insisted that she must lead any coalition of opposition parties and stand as a possible successor of President Robert Mugabe because she has history and support in the security sector. And, this is the liberation struggle hangover which political leaders should always grapple with in their attempt to initiate political transition.

28. Interviews with a retired senior official from the ZDF (Mutare, 5/07/2017).
29. Instructive words of a serving and senior security sector key informant of this study – interview, Masvingo, 12/07/2017.
30. For instance, General Constantine Chiwenga stressed his intention to instruct the ZDF to disobey Morgan Tsvangirai if Robert Mugabe lost elections. Read: Chiwenga threatens coup if Mugabe loses election. SW Radio Africa, 10/03/2008.
31. See the The Standard, 04/06/2017. Succeeding Mugabe: Battle of the water carriers. Available at: https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2017/06/04/succeeding-mugabe-battle-water-carriers/
32. Interviews, (12/07/2017); See also, Daily News, 04/07/2017. It Tsvangirai or Never: MDC. Available at: https://www.dailynews.co.zw/articles/2017/07/04/it-s-tsangirai-or-never-mdc
From these revelations, persuading is the fact that, change of character and form in Zimbabwean politics cannot be expected anytime soon as long as the same comrades from the bust remain in office. No miraculously easy de-politicisation of the military and/or demilitarisation of politics is possible, not even to ZANU-PF civilians. Old tricks that worked for individuals in the bush will always be remembered and used.

Secondly, the ethos of the liberation struggle hangover have manifested through the politicised military leadership’s ‘religious belief’ that the presidential office is a “straightjacket” and a prerogative of leaders of the liberation struggle movement. This should be taken very seriously because it came from the then Commander of the ZDF, Vitalis Zvinavashe before the 2002 presidential elections and it has been repeatedly used to discredit MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai as a legitimate possible president. It is foreseeable that it can be used against future democratically elected leaders who do not have such credentials. This is the political deficiency syndrome suffered by Grace Mugabe and a stumbling block to her presidential ambitions.

A third pillar of the liberation struggle hangover has been the ZANU-PF-military collation which has made it very difficult to separate ZANU-PF from the security sector and vice versa. Respondents stated that it is a reality that the security sector is as inseparable from ZANU-PF as ZANLA and ZIPRA were because they were the bargaining power behind political relevance of the nationalist politicians and their subsequent victory. It should be noted that the late General Josiah Tongogara, Dumiso Dabengwa, General Peter Walls and Air vice Marshall H. Hawks were key players in the Lancaster House delegation that negotiated the independence of Zimbabwe. This is a clear precedence that cannot be ignored today and in the future about the political weight of the security sector in politics of transition in Zimbabwe. Army generals were very influential and directly participated in the GNU negotiations that gave way to the current political dispensation.

The current ZDF, police services, intelligence services and prisons services are a residue of the politicised ZIPRA and ZANLA forces and a carbon copy in their propensity for involvement in politics and its economic pay-offs. Actually, ZANU-PF membership, having parents and/or relatives who are strong ZANU-PF members or having those as referees has been a among key factors considered before recruitment into the security services. While, allegiance to ZANU-PF and President Robert Mugabe (a civilian conduit of the security sector) in particular has been misconstrued to replace allegiance to national interests of Zimbabwe and every soldier is bound to this oath of allegiance. This means, the security sector has continued being ZANLA. Thus, their role in politics cannot be ignored because they feature in cases that matter the most for the country’s transition.

Fourth is the use of the security sector and its declarations to gain political office and/or as a mode of changing party leadership. As a sign of commitment to the ZANU-PF-military solidarity, the security sector has been implicated in all Zimbabwean elections since 1980 as a partisan force used to ensure the victory of ZANU-PF. This was not invented anytime other than during the liberation struggle. For instance, respondents revealed that,

It has always been central in Robert Mugabe politics, gaining and maintaining power through blatant reliance on the security sector. The 1975 Mgagao declaration by junior ZANLA officers that propelled the replacement of Ndabaningi Sithole with Robert Mugabe as ZANU leader is a very serious case in point […] It should also be remembered that the same declaration emphasised the former’s sympathy with the architects of the Nhari rebellion as one of the reasons for his fall from grace and sounded more support for ZANU leaders imprisoned in Zambia over allegations of killing former party chairman Hebert Chitepo also a sympathiser of Nhari rebels (…) All these instabilities ensued towards and after Mugabe’s release from prison and his subsequent coup against Ndabaningi Sithole, they should not be reduced to a sheer coincidence.

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34. Grace Mugabe has gone public denouncing this liberation struggle-based presidential material vetting. See the Zimbabwe Independent, 26/02/2016. Mugabe battles to contain army.
37. There was a 100% frequency of this answer in all Key informant interviews held, July 2017.
40. See CIZC (2012); Masunungure (n.d); Mandaza (2016).
41. Interviews, Manicaland, 08/08/2017.
42. Interviews, Manicaland Province, 02/08/2017.
In addition, accusations levelled posthumously against Retired General Solomon Mujuru by President Robert Mugabe such as: (i) architecting the infamous 'Bhora Musango' incident where ZANU-PF constituencies were mobilised to vote for ZANU-PF Members of Parliament (MPs) but vote against the ZANU-PF president; (ii) assisting the formation of MDC to wrestle power from Robert Mugabe and; (iii) that Mujuru publicly accused Mugabe of being responsible for the suffering of Zimbabweans and advised him to step down and give MDC a chance among others indicate that Mugabe is aware of military control and/or influence over ZANU-PF politics and leadership transition. Actually, he fears this patronage network. The appointment of Joyce Mujuru the former ZDF Commander's wife to vice presidency of ZANU-PF and the country cannot be divorced from this military power to determine the nature and fibre of leadership in Zimbabwe—a culture encouraged during the ascension of Robert Mugabe to the leadership of ZANU-PF and Zimbabwean government. It is also not any different from the vitriol spewed by incumbent ZDF Commander; General Chiwenga seemingly in support of the Team-Lacoste faction aligned to Vice President Emerson Mnangagwa against the Generation 40 (G-40) allegedly led by Grace Mugabe the President's wife in their battle to succeed Robert Mugabe.” Thus, the hand of the security sector whether visibly or invisibly in the political transition of the country will never be overlooked.

Apart from that, there is a serious infusion and/or use of the security sector in party politicking strategies that involve appointment of securocrats to political positions from community level to national level and this will always be a very difficult phenomenon to disentangle. This aspect of the militarisation of politics and/or government will always be cardinal in defining and/or defying genuine transition waves. This also is a baggage shipped from the liberation struggle into independent Zimbabwe. The security sector was well entrenched in ZANU and ZAPU structural and most political activities were military-dominated. A former senior Zimbabwe People's Army (ZIPA) officers responding to interview questions on whether there were rules limiting security sector involvement in politics during the liberation struggle submitted that:

You will remember that the period of the inclusive Government, which we need to be quick to forget, created a myriad of obstacles which were put in the way of effective policing by our detractors.

These views should be understood in their context. Three basic facts should be taken into account to understand the political reality conceived in Chiwuri’s statements: (i) during the GNU, the ZANU-PF leadership was obliged to take actions in consultation with their MDC partners, neither Chiwuri nor Kembo

44. See The Herald, 27/06/2019. Gen Chiwenga reads riot act, Warns anti-Command Agric lobby: Security services aware of saboteurs. By attacking Professor Jonathan Moyo a pro-Grace Mugabe critic to protect Mnangagwa, it was apparent that the army commander was fighting factional wars as he is part of the pro-Mnangagwa faction.

45. Interviews, Mashonaland Central, 07/08/2017.
46. Interviews, Bulawayo Province, 02/08/2017.
47. Interviews, Manicaland Province, 02/08/2017.
50. Interviews, Mashonaland East Province, 15/08/2017.
51. See The Chronicle, 12/12/2013.
52. See The Chronicle, 12/12/2013.
Mohadi (then minister of Home Affairs for ZANU-PF) could use patronage networking without criticism; (ii) there was a Joint Monitoring and Implementation Committee (JOMIC) which performed a multi-partisan oversight of the implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which emphasised anti-corruption, non-violence and non-partisanship among the police and other state institution and; (iii) opposition political parties enjoyed majority in the national assembly thus giving it real parliamentary oversight capacity, thus reducing ZANU-PF powers to control parliament. So, the General was referring to these factors that blocked ZANU-PF patronage networks. Later on, the same General, addressing Assistant Commissioners and Deputy Commissioners at a retreat conference in Vumba, Eastern Highlands, he stressed that they should ensure their officers support ZANU-PF in the 2013 election and threatened, “The time to leave is now, if you are not going to toe the line ...”. These are clear cases of senior level security sector involvement in politics and there are many cases of police brutality targeted at opposition politicians as a strategy of liquidating opposition.

Open support and claims of legitimate allegiance to ZANU-PF based on liberation struggle histories have also been the line taken by the ZDF top leadership, and this has been strategically broadcasted to the electorate by state media towards all contested elections. Addressing around 3 000 Second Brigade soldiers in 2012 towards 2013 elections, Major General Martin Chedondo stated that:

We cannot be seen supporting a political party that is going against the ideals of a nation, which came by as a result of a liberation struggle, which saw many of the country’s sons and daughters losing their lives. As soldiers we must support ideologies that we subscribe to, I for one will not be apologetic for supporting ZANU-PF because I was part of the liberation struggle...”

He went on to argue that soldiers are political animals and, by that virtue, they ‘must’ be allowed to enter and partake in national politics.

Three important factors that speak clearly of the fusion of ZANU-PF and the security sector and implications therein can be identified here. Firstly, the blatant violation of the constitution (section 208) which forbids partisan conduct in the security sector (worse done by top leadership) and commanding thousands of low rank officers to follow suit shows that securocrats are not deterred by constitutional limits to their political ambitions. It is clear that ZANU-PF sees itself as superior to the constitution because such utterances from General Chiwenga, Chihuri, Chedondo and others would have warranted court proceedings and resignations or dismissals for violating the constitution. There is not only silence over this issue, ZANU-PF controls the state media and uses it to make such violations public. It will be foolhardy to say the judiciary system is not party to such schemes by deliberate omission. In fact, a clear message conveyed through such conduct is that the security sector will not be curtailed by the constitution if political transition puts its vested interests in jeopardy. Secondly, strategic timing of press statements issued by top security leadership towards elections should not be overlooked because they speak to their desired electoral outcome—a ZANU-PF win. Their breach of the constitution in support of ZANU-PF implies their message to political opponents that the constitution does not bind them and will not bind them after receiving news of ZANU-PF defeat. It also strikes fear into the hearts of ordinary Zimbabweans who are reminded of the ramifications of voting for anything other than the ‘revolutionary’ party. These are serious threats.

Lastly, capture of such unconstitutional utterances by state controlled media in contravention of the constitution that forbids all state agencies from conniving in unconstitutional “practices” clearly demonstrates that such is a political strategy cooked by ZANU-PF in partnership with or under tutelage of the security sector. Key state institutions such as public media have been captured by military interests. Respondents revealed that ZANU-PF itself has been captured by military interests to the extent that ZANU-PF is now the security sector and the security sector is ZANU-PF. If not, there should be traceable instances where military interests clash and either party prevails

53. See Nehanda Radio, 09/03/2013.
55. See The Herald, 08/05/2012.
56. This theme ran through all interviews, Key Informant interviews, July-August 2017 bwe.
to justify allegations of mutual partnership over the observed infusion of the two. The absence of one makes a compelling assertion that there is a defacto fusion between ZANU-PF and securocrats and this fusion is historical.

ZDF commander General Constantine Chiwenga (L) and ZNA commander, Lieutenant-General Phillip Valerio Sibanda, during the country's 28 years Independence celebration
SECTION 4: STATE CAPTURE AND INSTITUTIONALISED SECURITY SECTOR POLITICKING

“Four fundamental state institutions—media, legislature, judiciary and the electoral system—have been captured by military interests and are thus used as zones of ZANU-PF—military politicking. This capture is either directly—through rapid frequency in recruitment of security sector personnel by those institutions or indirectly—through patronial recruitments enforced in these institutions.”

INTRODUCTION

This section presents the findings and discussions of the study that unpack the nature of militarization in the political economy of Zimbabwe. As revealed in the previous chapter, the involvement of the security sector in political affairs was institutionalized when ZANU-PF as a political party was captured by the military as early as 1975. In their manoeuvres to capture the state, securocrats went on to regroup themselves into the ZANU-PF we know today—a securocrat political party. In light of this background, this section goes on to present an analysis of how the security sector incarnate—ZANU-PF—has captured the state and entrenched a patronage network around which it perpetuates its vested interests. The main observation running through this section is that, key state institutions have been targeted and captured to institutionalize securocrats’ ubiquity in the political economy of the state. Thus, any form of transition depends on how this security sector networking is dealt with.

FOUR ZONES OF MILITARISED POLITICKING AND INTERLINKING

The findings show that there exist four major state institutions that have been captured for securocrat politicking. This captured political space is characterised by a complex and well-coordinated patronage web with which the status quo is maintained and guaranteed. Four fundamental state institutions—media, legislature, judiciary and the electoral system—have been captured by military interests and are thus used as zones of ZANU-PF—military politicking.57 This capture is either directly—through rapid frequency in recruitment of security sector personnel by those institutions or indirectly—through patronial recruitments enforced in these institutions. This military strategy has been more sophisticated and clandestine to the extent that an outsider analysis might fail to capture the essence of military recruitment and appointments in political affairs. The government has encouraged its troops to attend university studies to the extent that they pass the meritocracy test.58 This is even worse with CIOs, they are hard to separate from civilians and many appointments of what we think to be civilians are but recruitment of intelligence services into public institutions.

A. Media Capture by Military Interests
First is the capture of the state media and machinations to stifle private media by military interests. As argued in Levytsky and Way (2002), the media is always a target of a competitive authoritarian regime because on one hand, it can be its possible way-out of power while on the other hand, being a tool for maintaining power through propaganda and decimating the opposition’s political appeal to the electorate. Apart from reliance on repressive legislation such as the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA), Broadcasting Services Act (BSA), Interception of Communications Act (ICA) and Public Order and Security Act (POSA) among others, the ZANU-PF government has maintained military presence in top leadership positions of the national broadcaster—the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC), Broadcasting Authority of Zimbabwe (BAZ), Zimbabwe Papers group (ZIMPAPERS) among others.

In 2009, eight senior security sector members were appointed by the then Minister of Information and Publicity, Webster Shamu into these bodies (CiZC, 2012). Among retired security sector officials appointed were:

Brigadier-General Epmarcus Kanhanga (Zimpapers), Retired Colonel Rueben Mqwayi, Brig-Gen Elasto Madzingira (both BAZ), Brig-Gen Benjamin Mabenge, Major-General Gibson Mashingaidze (both ZBH), Brig-Gen Livingstone Chineka (Transmedia) Brig-Gen Collin Mayo (Kingstons) and Col Claudius Makova (New Ziana).59

57. This is a specific and main theme identified across primary and secondary data.

59. The Zimbabwean, 7/10/2009.
Denis Magaya, a son of ZANLA High Command member Cde Arthur Magaya was a short-lived ZBC board Chair in 2014 alongside members like Professor Charity Manyuruke, a UZ dean of Social Studies linked to the security sector and a close ally of Grace Mugabe and Cleopatra Shingirai Matanhire-Mutisi, the wife of Brigadier-General Francis Mutisi among others. The message is very clear, military interests need to be protected in all key areas of state power and the media is one of them. As a result, state controlled media has been very vibrant in diverting attention from political decay that is causing poor economic and social wellbeing in Zimbabwe and instead laying blame on targeted sanctions imposed by certain western countries on key ZANU-PF leaders. Opposition political parties have also been victims of propaganda which has made it difficult to expose electoral fraud to the nation and stifled their chances of winning an election.

With the proliferation of social media platforms, the state media has faced serious challenges in executing its military conduit task in Zimbabwe. Opposition political forces have resorted to social media and private media for publicity and mobilization. The social movements (Tajamuka and detainee Pastor Evan Mawarire’s This Flag) have effectively mobilized citizen protests against deepening economic crises in Zimbabwe that almost ‘shut-down-Zimbabwe’ in 2016. However, the security sector has been working very hard to subdue this media space as well. Phillip Valerio Sibanda, the ZNA commander, revealed this strategy through State media in August 2016 when he stated that social media use by insurgents and regime change agents (probably against vested security sector political interests) has emerged as a security threat. He also said;

We are already dealing with these threats. As an army, at our institutions of training, we are training our officers to be able to deal with this new threat we call cyber warfare where weapons — not necessarily guns but basically information and communication technology — are being used to mobilise people to do the wrong things. We will be equal to the task when the time comes.

This security sector policy statement must be understood in the context of the prevalent military-dominated political economy in Zimbabwe. Firstly, social movements have used social media and have proven to be capable of dislodging ZANU-PF if left uncontrolled. It is through the same social networks that election rigging can be exposed by citizen journalists. This threatens the interests of the securocrats pursued through ZANU PF. Secondly; the security sector is convinced that protesting against ZANU-PF’s failure to better the lives of the poverty stricken majorities in Zimbabwe is a threat to their permanent interests and reversal of their liberation struggle gains. How is this so? Robert Mugabe is a key party to the military political strategy of capturing ZANU-PF and the state—he was installed in his position by the military against stipulated party procedures—so demonstrating against a conduit of military interests is tantamount to protesting against security sector dominance and this has stirred the outburst of the generals.

Thirdly, it is not a mere coincidence that threats to social media users and temporary shutdown of the ease of mobile communication by the Postal and Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of Zimbabwe (POTRAZ) was followed by General Sibanda’s press statement with similar intent vis-à-vis the specific setting of campaigning and strategizing ahead of the 2018 election. POTRAZ’s decision to arm-twist telecommunication service providers to stop programmes that gave cheap access to mobile telephony and its issue of strong threats to social media based activists in 2016 was clearly aimed at limiting the number of citizens who access social media due to cheap data charges given by these operators. This was obviously aimed at hardening recruitment capacity of social movements that rely on social media. Failure to view these events in the same political schematic package will be a clear-cut miscarriage of political science. So, the media is a fundamental military politicking zone that will always defy or define transition in Zimbabwe. In the context of the G-40 vis-à-vis Team Lacoste factions in ZANU-PF, it has become apparent that the state media is captured and used by the latter against the former. This also

61. See the Zimbabwe Independent, 23/12/2016. 2016 political highlights. Available at: https://www.theindependent.co.zw/2016/12/23/2016-political-highlights/.
62. See Nehanda Radio, 05/08/2016.
63. See Nehanda Radio, 05/08/2016.
64. Interviews, Matabeleland South Province, 06/08/2017.
corroborates the previous assertion that the securocrats are in the Team Lacoste and that the state media was captured by the securocrats, hence the state media is used to further VP Mnangagwa’s political ambitions and campaigns.

B. Seizure of Electoral Processes
The second key area captured by securocrats’ interests has been the electoral process. This refers to actions and inactions taken by the security sector before, during and after elections that have skewed the electoral environment to benefit its ruling ZANU-PF party. Capturing this political arena has given the system the necessary surety of continuity despite opposition electoral pressure. The strategy for capturing the electoral process has been executed through: (i) use of the security sector as a key part of campaign teams; (ii) deployment of retired securocrats and war veterans to create an environment of fear and sabotage to ensure victory for ZANU-PF; (iii) pre-election military terror campaigns or operations meant to tweak voting patterns and choices; (iv) issuing of televised press statements by army generals during the run-up to elections with the intention of reminding the electorate that voting ZANU-PF is better than assured punitive consequences of voting the opposition and; (v) populating state institutions responsible for administering elections with securocrats and their loyalists capable of sacrificing professionalism for loyalty to ZANU-PF.

Firstly, the military has directly and indirectly taken charge of the election processes and made it very hard that anyone not aligned to it would win the presidential office. One respondent stated that:

The electoral system or process is a very important area that might pave your way out of power if not well fought. This has been a clear message to ZANLA and ZIPRA cadres since the campaigns leading to 1980 elections till date. Key liberation struggle political parties relied on their securocrats to handle their election strategies. We wouldn’t expect anything new now.

In addition, the findings of this study revealed that after the security sector successfully installed Robert Mugabe in the leadership of ZANU-PF, all elections that followed have been militarised. In 1980, the governor of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia had initially expressed that elections might not be conducted in some ZANU-PF strongholds due to violence perpetrated by ZANLA forces during campaigns only to change this few days towards elections. ZIPRA forces were not immune from doubling as campaign teams of Joshua Nkomo. This has created a culture of letting the securocrats influence election results.

The security sector that installed Robert Mugabe after capturing ZANU went on to force PF-ZAPU into the 1987 Unity accord after it had been satisfied that the Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), 5th Brigade and other militia had done their assigned campaign strategy across ZAPU strongholds.

An estimated number of deaths amounted to around ten thousand and above following the ZANU-PF militarized campaigns in Matabeleland region before 1985 election and afterwards. A similar militarised violent campaign was used in 2008 presidential run-off elections.

Figure 4.1: ZANU-PF Gukurahundi pre-election campaign.


69. Interviews revealed that ZIPRA forces were key campaign teams for PF-ZAPU and until to date, it has been pivotal in Matabeleland as part of ZANU-PF war veteran campaign machinery.
This legacy will always remain in the minds and hearts of Zimbabweans as they approach elections and it has been often invoked to instil fear and influence choices of the electorate.

The retired security sector content and war veterans have been a very cardinal agent used to enhance capture of the electoral process and ensure continuity of the securocratic state. They have helped to pursue and enhance military capture of the electoral process in following ways: (i) use of violence, threats and forcing a sell-out tag on opposition members and supporters in their door-to-door ZANU-PF campaigns; (ii) they are scattered across the country’s communities to indoctrinate, monitor and spy on citizens at household levels; (iii) they are used to make grass-roots to perceive them as ZANU-PF creators, kingmakers and fathers of the army; (iv) their capture and use of public resources (schools, government aid and projects, local government infrastructure) to further ZANU-PF political interests; (v) they preside over ZANU-PF capture of government food handouts and using them in ‘food-for-a-vote’ campaigns in hunger stricken villages and; (vi) they undermine and frog-march traditional leaders at kraal head level to vote for ZANU-PF. Under such circumstances, election results are already predictable before elections take place. The electoral process is thus captured.

Memories of pre-election ZANU-PF military exercises such as: Operation Gukurahundi (1983-7) land reform (2000), Operation Murambatsvina (2004) and Operation Makwhoterapapi (2008) are still fresh in the minds of victim communities. The clampdown on vendors that coincided with voter registration in Harare for 2018 elections is another example; it must be understood as more of a political strategy of sabotaging opposition strongholds than clearing the streets. These ‘military operations’ have been a clear long-term strategy of rigging the electoral environment in that: (i) they have all been strategically timed—implemented towards contested presidential elections; (ii) they were targeted at areas where ZANU-PF would have performed dismally in the previous election and, (iii) violence has been used without mercy and judiciary remedies. Masunungure (n.d) noted that the 2008 June Presidential re-run elections were “militarized elections” and it is because “president for life” and told the nation that;

of the security sector’s capture of the electoral process that Robert Mugabe emerged as the winner. These military operations have sent a clear message to the electorate that the military is ZANU-PF; it kills for a vote and ‘voting it out’ without protection is suicidal.

Electorates and presidential candidates have been continuously reminded and assured—always towards presidential elections of a repeat of similar operations and/or worse if in any event, ZANU-PF loses a presidential election. The most notable assurance came in the run-up to 2002 presidential elections when the then ZDF commander the late General Vitalis Zvinavashe released a press statement in the state:

> We wish to make it very clear to all Zimbabwean citizens that the security organizations will only stand in support of those political leaders that will pursue Zimbabwean values, traditions and beliefs for which thousands of lives were lost, in pursuit of Zimbabwe’s hard-won independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and national interests. To this end, let it be known that the highest office in the land is a straitjacket whose occupant is expected to observe the objectives of the liberation struggle. We will, therefore, not accept, let alone support or salute, anyone with a different agenda that threatens the very existence of our sovereignty, our country and our people.  

General Nyikayaramba, Chendo, ZPS General Paradzai Zimondi among others in many instances towards June presidential elections sent similar threats to the electorate and those with presidential ambitions. Robert Mugabe also issued a solidarity statement clearly toeing the line drawn by the securocrats in one of his addresses in the same period when he said:

> The war veterans came to me and said, ‘President, we can never accept that our country which we won through the barrel of the gun can be taken merely by an ‘X’ made by a ballpoint pen. ‘Zvino ballpoint pen icharwisana ne AK? (Will the pen fight the AK rifle?) Is there going to be a struggle between the two? Do not argue with a gun.”

ZNA Major General—Douglas Nyikayaramba has recently emerged like a spokes person of the ZANU-PF military electioneering team. During the GNU era, he was chosen to represent military presence in the constitution making committee and he advocated a constitutional clause that will ensure that Mugabe is

72. Interviews, July-August 2017. See also, The guardian. 22/06/2008. This is no election. This is a brutal war. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/jun/22/zimbabwe1

73. See, Zimbabwe: Press Freedom, 01/16/02. Available at: https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Urgent_Action/apic-011602x.htm.

“president for life” and told the nation that:

Truly speaking, I am in ZANU-PF and ZANU-PF is in me and you can’t change that … I am sure everyone, including yourself, has now woken up to realise that he (Tsvangirai) is not the right candidate … The bottom line is that I will not surrender; I will not salute someone like that personally … What he (Tsvangirai) is saying is nonsense. We are dealing with a national security threat…

Now that the country is bracing for the watershed 2018 elections, a serving ZNA Major General Douglas Nyikayaramba on September 2017 in a ZANU-PF military politicking crusade, commandeered chiefs assembled at 4 Brigade in Masvingo to ensure that President Robert Mugabe wins the 2018 elections. He unequivocally stated that:

Did anyone ever say to a traditional chief that you are old, leave the chiefship for me? That is unheard of; What will happen to the chief’s aids? We need to remind each other. No chief was voted for. No son has ever ordered his father to step down from his role as leader of the family, so the same applies to our case with President Mugabe. That is what we should remind each other when we meet. Whites want divide-and-rule, and they saw that Mugabe is the nerve centre of the country. Let us not sell the country for the love of sugar. We are here to strengthen the relationship between chiefs, the President and the army.

Militarising the election environment renders the results of an election concerned devoid of being an indicator of the people’s democratic choice but rather an expression of the people’s choice of life over death. No matter how independent the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) might try to be, if the context of the electoral process is not liberated from military capture, elections will remain neither free nor fair. Election based transition that is contrary to military interests is left impossible. ZEC is among the most politicized bodies in Zimbabwe with its administration infiltrated by un-uniformed agents of the security sector and its political compradors. In 2002, an ex-colonel in the ZNA Soboza Gula-Ndebele was appointed to chair the Election Supervision Commission (ESC) whilst Brigadier-General Douglas Nyikayaramba was ESC Executive Officer and this military-led team presided over the running of first contested presidential elections post-Unity Accord (CiZC, 2012). He was later promoted to an Attorney General in 2008—a move seen as a direct reward for the 2002 flawed election services.

Currently, Justice Rita Makarau a Supreme Court judge, seen by many as a ZANU-PF Trojan horse with many government appointed is Chair of ZEC. It is said that she is a tried and tested conduit and security sector interests are safe in her hands. This is the same Makarau who has presided over the Bio-metric Voter registration wherein, Robert Mugabe has made contentious launching services that have shown ZEC’s continued bondage to ZANU-PF.

C. Militarized Judicial System

The judiciary at all levels is expected to be very active in setting a clear demarcation between the political terrain and the military topography and reprimanding security personnel for crossing from the latter to the former. However, due to its capture by securocrats’ interests, the judiciary has failed to play its constitutional role of oversight through judicial activism; it only acts when cases have been brought to it. And, many politically charged cases that have been brought to the judiciary have been perceivably stage-managed by ZANU-PF to use the judiciary to cause inaction or action that furthers its interests. The judicial system has also been captured by military interests through recruitment of military personnel, ZANU-PF agents and loyalists which have made the system lose its credibility in the public domain.

Capture of the state judiciary intensified simultaneously with the emergence of MDC as a serious threat to ZANU-PF’s political hegemony. The ZANU-PF military operation Fast-Track-Land-Reform Programme that targeted white commercial farmers whom the government believed to be financial and electoral aids of the newly formed MDC led to an outright judicial capture by military interests. This led to the resignation of then Chief Justice Anthony

75 See, Financial Gazzate, 18/07/2011.
76 See, Pindulanews, 12/09/2017.
78 In Jealousy Mbizvo Mawarire v Robert Gabriel Mugabe N.O, Morgan Richard Tsvangirai N.O, Arthur Gusei Oliver Mutambara, N.O, Welshman Ncube and the Attorney General. [SC 146/13, CCZ 18/13], Mr Mawarire successfully filed an application seeking an order directing the President to proclaim the elections to be held (after amendment) by 25th July and the Constitutional Court ruled in his favour. It had always been ZANUPF desire to have early elections before electoral reforms whereas opposition parties in the GNU preferred them to be done after electoral reforms agreed in the GPA had been done. Mawarire was either sent by ZANU PF or his actions were encouraged by ZANU PF to secure a winning strategy.
Gubbay, Nicholas McNally, David Bartlett among others from their posts after the security sector allowed war veterans to enter and dance on top of Supreme Court tables. Commenting on the same issue and displaying disregard of the courts, President Mugabe had the following to say:

_The courts can do whatever they want, but no judicial decision will stand in our way. They are not courts for our people and we shall not even be defending ourselves in these courts._

He further disapproved and criticized the court declaration of the land reform as unlawful in 2000 labelling judges as “guardians of “white racist commercial farmers.” Later, in 2005, when High Court Justice Tendai Uchena’s ruling allowed Roy Bennet—an imprisoned opposition MP—to contest elections in prison, Robert Mugabe dismissed the decision as “stupid” and the justice concerned reversed the judgment.

From year 2000 onward, President Robert Mugabe used his party’s militarised patronage network to populate the judiciary bench with his Trojan horse judges at a time when a critical land reform case was before the courts. It was through the work of these judges with the help of the Constitutional Amendment Number 17 Act (2005), introducing section 16B in the constitution that the illegal farm grab exercise and violation of property rights were legalized despite SADC Tribunal ruling declaring those actions illegal (Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd et al. v. Republic of Zimbabwe). The late Chief Justice Godfrey Chidyausiku (former ZANU-PF MP and Deputy Minister); Justice Guvava (the former’s niece), Justice Charles Hungwe (ZANLA war veteran and one of the founders of ZNWLWA); the current Chief Justice Luke Malaba (beneficiary of the land reform), former Judge President Rita Makarau, current Judge President George Chiweshe (a Retired Brigadier General, Chair of ZEC during disputed 2008 elections) were among other justices that have found their way to the judicial system through the patronage network resulting in defacto capture of the system by security sector interests.

79. See, www.pindula.co.zw/.
82. See, www.pindula.co.zw/.
83. See, About George Chiweshe- Pindula, Local Knowledge. Available at: www.pindula.co.zw/index. php?title=George_Chiweshe&mobileaction=toggle.
86. See, NewsDay Zimbabwe, 26/01/2017. Tomana tribunal concludes. Available at: https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/01/tomana-tribunal-concludes/.

The judiciary has demonstrated too much partisanship when it comes to cases that involve vested interests of ZANU PF seccoract system. It must be remembered that war veterans were key architects of the farm invasions in early 2000s and, putting war veterans on the judicial bench was a clear highlight that ZANU-PF will do anything to protect the security sector even if it violates the constitution. In reference to a recent dismissal of the case challenging the adoption of bond notes, Alex Magaisa, a Kent University legal expert aptly sums up the decay in the judiciary as follows: “Taking matters to Chiweshe’s court is like goats taking a petition to a hyena.” The Campbell case also fell within this simile. Similarly, during the 2016 national demonstrations by social movements and opposition parties calling for electoral reforms, the High Court declared police violent clampdown of peaceful demonstrations on August 26, 2016 unconstitutional. President Robert Mugabe (in solidarity with the police) at a ZANU-PF youth rally captured on national television criticized the court ruling as ‘reckless disregard to peace.’

The National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) is another militarized judicial body with more than half of its staff drawn from the security sector. Prosecutor-General (PG), Roy Goba attested to this fact during public interviews when he stated that its “personnel -mostly seconded from the police, air force, army and prisons - are unqualified for their job, thereby compromising the justice delivery system while factionalism is also rampant in the crucial institution.” This institution has been affected by factionalism in a manner that reflects factional loyalties in ZANU-PF and more military recruits into this institution are allegedly aligned to their war veteran ally, Emerson Mnangagwa. Former Prosecutor General Johannes Tomana’s dismissal over allegations of abuse of office when he connived in protecting suspected military intelligence personnel who were accused of a failed bombing attempt at the Gushungo dairy plant—a suspected Mnangagwa faction’s ploy against Grace Mugabe and her faction attested to the veracity of militarization of this body. In 2014, the Zimbabwe Law Officers’...
Association (ZILOA) filed an application to the Constitutional Court (ConCourt) challenging the constitutionality of the recruitment of military personnel to the NPA. But, the ConCourt has not taken action till date. The NPA has therefore been discredited for being used to pursue Mnangagwa presidential ambitions.87

The Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment (No. 1) Bill, 2017 (H.B. 1, 2017) has been allegedly part of efforts by Mnangagwa to capture the judiciary in light of indications that he has become the best champion of military interests compared to his Generation Forty (G-40) counterparts aligned to the First Lady Grace Mugabe. The disruptions that occurred during the appointment process of the new Chief Justice Luke Malaba are believed to be part of the Mnangagwa state capture calculations as he preferred his former comrade in arms—Retired Brigadier General George Chiweshe JP instead of CJ Malaba who has a history of making unpredictable court rulings and sympathetic to G40.88 It is believed that by putting JP Chiweshe in charge of the Constitutional Court, Mnangagwa wanted to insulate his future actions from being declared unconstitutional by the ConCourt in the event that he takes over power from Robert Mugabe. Thus, Hofisi and Feltoe (2016) argued that, there exist a theory espousing that:

... Amendment of section 180 to give the President the sole discretion in appointing the Chief Justice was to enable the President to appoint Justice Chiweshe who has a liberation war background and strong ties with the military... It seeks to get rid of the public advertisements and interviews in respect of the three senior positions of Chief Justice, Deputy Chief Justice and Judge President of the High Court. These appointments are to be made by the President after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission. Section 339(2) of the Constitution defines the phrase “after consultation” as requiring the proffering of views which are not binding on the appointing authority... The amendment proposes a return to the provisions of the Lancaster House Constitution (as amended), which scholars noted was “legally opaque” and only allowed for appointment of persons acceptable to the government.

So, the military man— Emerson Mnangagwa—has been working tirelessly to ensure that the military regains its control over the judiciary and fortunate enough to him, parliament has rubberstamped his plans. He has argued that the Head of State must be above every institution to the point of even appointing the Speaker of Parliament. The ridiculous logic behind an attempt to return imperial powers into modern politics ceases being satire if one considers that the military forces behind him have a history of going for broke to entrench its interests. Amendment number 17 Act to strip the judiciary of all powers to consider cases arising from land reform disputes made it clear that securocrats' interests are beyond the reach of judges.

D. The Legislature—tied hands and mouths by military political machinations

The legislature is the main watchdog of the interests of the people, to ensure that the security sector among other government entities does not usurp government authority. However, the preceding accounts of state capture by military interests have happened not only under parliament oversight, but parliament has connived with military conduits and often acting as a conduit itself. Parliament was captured in 1980 as it was dominated by ZANU-PF, a party viewed as a political extension of the dominant securocrats of that day. Although the dominance of ZANU-PF has been weakening since 2000 elections, the securocratic system has successfully recaptured the legislature following the 2013 ZANU-PF electoral victory.89 Table 4.1 below lists some of the serving legislators (2013) drawn from the security sector patronage network.

Table 4.1: Some Security sector recruits in the Legislature.90

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>MP</th>
<th>Security Background</th>
<th>Sector</th>
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<tr>
<td>Hon Mawere-Mabvumbo</td>
<td>ZANLA War veteran</td>
<td>&amp; Ex - CIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>San Cain Mateama</td>
<td>ZIPRA war veteran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Jaboon Jeppy</td>
<td>President’s Office (ex-CIO)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon Makunde Tendai</td>
<td>ZANLA War veteran</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon Mashange Wonder</td>
<td>Ex-CIO</td>
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<td>Hon Mavenyengwa Robson</td>
<td>Ex-police office &amp; ex-CIO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon Obedingwa Mguni</td>
<td>ZIPRA war veteran</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hon Emmerson Mnangagwa</td>
<td>ZANLA war veteran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Mukwena Robert</td>
<td>War veteran (former Chair for Chiredzi district)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Mutamba William</td>
<td>Ex-CIO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Harris Ncube</td>
<td>War veteran (retired Major General)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Chikwinya Nyasha</td>
<td>ZANLA war veteran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Nomthandazo Moyo</td>
<td>War veteran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Rossy Ngozi-Mpolu</td>
<td>ZIPRA war veteran</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hon Savior Kasukuwere</td>
<td>Ex-CIO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

88. See Hofisi and Feltoe (2016).
This list is not exhaustive but indicative of the extent to which the security sector extends to democratic institutions such as parliament in Zimbabwe. There are allegations where MDC MPs claimed they had received threats not to boo Mugabe in the house and to attend his opening of Parliament. And they did act accordingly. As a result, the legislature has been reduced to a talkshop that serves to rubberstamp even the most ridiculous military plays to reverse the democratic gains achieved during the GNU era. The manner with which the first amendment Bill sailed smoothly through parliamentary safeguards has a lot to tell about it having tied hands and mouths by military interests. Three most important pointers can be singled out: (i) the parliament failed to defend the constitution in the face of an ubiquitous executive; (ii) the parliament failed and continues to fail to reprimand the army generals who violate constitutional clauses forbidding them from supporting any political party including ZANU-PF in public; (iii) the parliament is populated with retired security sector personnel who have been planted to enhance military interests in parliament and cabinet.

Indeed, it is a democratic practice to allow entry into legislative politics to any citizen regardless of background. But, it is not what it seems to be in ZANU-PF, the security sector has increasingly closed the tent for general citizens to access legislative positions by capturing ZANU-PF and assuring their permanent first-preference is observed in major nominations for parliamentary seats. Actually, most non-military parliamentarians are friends, family or relatives of influential securocrats. As a result, the military legacy is jealously protected and preserved. Transition efforts have to paddle through this complex military network cognisant of the fact that the same network will seek to perpetuate the stated vested interests. However, it is this network that will lead to regime breakdown if a major division within the security sector emerges and/or if its compradors in ZANU-PF decide to shake-off the military shackles.

It should be noted that the securocratic politicking network has gone beyond the four state institutions discussed here. This report however deliberately delimited its analysis to the four because they are key targets of gerrymandering and/or electioneering strategies of competitive authoritarian regimes like the Zimbabwean one. As the country approaches the 2018 elections, many people are expecting a breakthrough and/or political transition. These institutions will be very useful for they will break or make the transition.

**STRATIFICATIONS IN THE SECURITY SECTOR REGARDING THE SACRED MARRIAGE TO ZANU-PF AND STATE CAPTURE**

An attempt to contextualise the security sector within the current politico-economic transition dynamics reveals serious inter-regional and inter-generation controversies and this raises fierce implications for the future of transition to democracy in the country. The study sought to ascertain whether there is unity of perspective, preferences, thought and foresight across the various configurations of the security sector and serious contradictions and divergences were highlighted. The study found that the security sector neither speaks in one voice nor see through the same eyes. There emerged four basic areas of disagreement centred around: (i) acceptability of the politicization/militarization of the political economy; (ii) preferred power shifts in ZANU-PF and; (iii) preferred ideal transition in the political economy of the nation-state.

**Factionalized Perceptions Regarding Militarizing Politics**

The first question posed to capture how the security sector perceives the militarization of politics was: Shouldn’t there be a separation or strict barring of the security sector from mingling in political issues and maintain an apolitical stance? Figure 4.1 below gives an illustrative explanation of generation to generation divergences across the security sector sample regarding this question.

**Figure 4.1: Demographic Dichotomization in the Security Sector regarding militarizing politics**

![Bar Chart](image)

**Demographic Description (Age Group)**

Source: Analysis of project findings.
These findings reflect a 70% agreement in our sample that the current involvement of the security sector in politics should be abolished and an apolitical stance should be maintained. However, differences across generations in the security sector are: (i) although dissatisfied with the status quo (53%), the first generation (age group 51+ years) of Zimbabwe is more agreeable to the current status quo of giving political opportunities to the security sector compared to other age groups; (ii) the middle generation (31–50 yrs) is generally against politicization of the security sector and/or militarizing politics (62%); (iii) a small section (38%) in the middle generation seems satisfied with the status quo; (iv) the last generation (92%) (18–30 yrs) is dissatisfied and/or against the tendency to militarise politics and/or politicize the military against 8% who prefer continuation of the status quo and; (v) a great majority in the military (70%) most of whom are 18–50 years support the idea that the security sector must be depoliticized to avoid discord in the sector based on political fictionalisation.

Three logical explanations to the divergences in the security sector sample can be deduced. Firstly, the first generation (age group 51+ yrs) is comprised of top leadership personnel in the security sector, serving ex-military politicians and generally, war veterans spread across ex-ZANLA, ex-ZIPRA and ex-Rhodesian security sector camps. Many in this group benefit from the military based patronage network of ZANU-PF. It is actually the main component of ZANU PF leadership and recruiting handle. It is in this group that politicized generals are found. These findings entail that few top securocrats support the securocratic state and are likely to oppose transition that breaks the securocratic state patronage networks. One respondent from this stratum of the sample argued that;

*I am what I am today because of the liberation struggle whose face was ZANU-PF military. So you won’t expect us to desert our struggle and military leadership. You will be deserted by us not our system.*

So, the support of the status quo highlighted in this group must be understood in line with its dominant role in ZANU-PF and the status quo. The larger percentage of this group that sees a need for depoliticizing the security sector must be understood in the context of ex-military personnel that have either fallen from grace, originated from ex-ZIPRA cadres who either opposed the Unity Accord with ZANU-PF or left with Dumiso Dabengwa to form new ZAPU, ex-Rhodesian forces or ex-ZANLA who have joined the opposition (mostly Joice Mujuru’s party) due to dissatisfaction with the status quo.93 An overarching view of this pro-reform component was that:

*Our security services are increasingly compromised by politicisation. Today we have divisions in the political terrain and you will expect divisions among us. This is not good for a true general. Politics must not distabilise the security services because it ought to remain when politicians come and go.*

Overall, these findings show that more war veterans and aged ex-service veterans have and are defecting from ZANU-PF and 2018 election will be very interesting with a significant war veteran component in the opposition campaign system against ZANU-PF.

Secondly, the second generation (age group 31–50 yrs) represents born free and those who did not participate in the liberation struggle but are part of the security sector by recruitment partly through the patronage network.94 Among this group is sons of the first generation group, relatives and friends. Most of them are serving lower rank personnel though few of them are retired, some are serving politicians. This is the largest and most educated component of the security sector. Implied here is that, the largest and growing portion of the security sector is not that politicized and not having meaningful beneficial links in the political terrain, thus their need for depoliticisation of the military. This middle generation is likely to act against factionalisation in the security sector and is ripe for reform. However, there is a significant minority in this group that seems content with the status quo and its continuity. This component is content with the payoffs benefited from the patronage network and it therefore poses as a strong force against any transition that disrupts its benefits without presenting better alternative benefits. Generally, this trend reveals that military resistance to transition that contradicts the interests of the securocratic state is likely to come from a minority ZANU-PF generals in top positions and with vested interests in the status quo. Handling the head which the is likely problem in Zimbabwe is far much practicable as was the case in Lesotho than the tail as was the case in Somalia.

Thirdly, the last generation (18 – 30 yrs) is the youngest stratum of the security sector and comprises general and lowest rank officers. Most of them have a parochial political identity and ZANU-PF patronage network goes nowhere beyond recruitment and families of this strata are generally exposed to politico-economic shocks. This is the most ‘ripe-for-transition’ stratum and the one that mostly identifies with the suffering masses. This stratum is close to equal to the second generation in the security sector. It should be noted that this stratum is generally youthful and not immune from the rebellious tendency typifying their youthful colleagues among the masses. This is the reason why ZANU-PF has targeted the youth as its main politicization target in its 2018 election campaign strategy—an attempt to identify with the majority in fear of rebellion.

Although there was no significant polarization of ideas and perceptions between the main security services into which the security sector is divided, regionally skewed polarization was identified. The security sector is factionalised according to regional loyalties, histories and specific backgrounds. Marginal dichotomy was identified between the major regions—Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Respondents from Matabeleland provinces and Harare showed overwhelming support for reform of the status quo (79-92%) alongside youths across all provinces. Figure 4.2 below sums the regional dis-cohesion regarding perceptions on the reform of the security sector.

Figure 4.2: Regionally Skewed Perceptions on the Reform of the Security Sector

Save for Mashonaland Central, respondents in all regions supported the reform of the current status quo (55% to 92% support by respondents per province) citing fears of defections and infightings if the sector continues under politicisation. Divergences among these regions particularly Mashonaland vis-à-vis Matabeleland can be explained through military history of Zimbabwe. The military in Matabeleland has been generally drawn from PF-ZAPU’s ZIPRA and its patronage network whilst the large content of the military in Mashonaland has been ZANLA and its patronage networks. What these findings reflect is a general dissatisfaction with the ruling ZANU-PF military network and this is more pronounced in metropolitan provinces and Matabeleland region. But, a significant majority of respondents reflects that the generality of the studied security sector personnel is not in support of politicization of the security sector.

The reasons respondents gave for detesting the conflation of the security sector and political actors were: (i) factions in the political arena cause factions and mutiny in the security sector which causes civil wars and threat to territorial unity; (ii) a militarised government is corrupt, is accountable to no one, repressive, fond of disregarding constitutional supremacy and not ideal for the future of Zimbabwe; (iii) incompetent people get to run government leading to poor performance and heartless neglect of our people who are suffering in poverty; (iv) it is against the ideals of the liberation struggle—those of a democratic state not a junta state. It was argued by respondents that, if the security sector is allowed to be reduced into a political party militia, then peace is not guaranteed because the moment that political party splits, people must be prepared for armed conflict. Arguments for the continued status quo were that: (i) ZANU-PF is the sole political party capable of protecting the ideals of the liberation struggle, thus it deserves military support and assistance; (ii) ZANU-PF has what it takes to keep officers and ex-officers well fed and that; (iii) there is currently no viable alternative that might assure the security sector of continuity, unity and peace beside ZANU-PF. One senior respondent stated that:

The recent beating of MDC-T Vice President Thokozani

96. It should be noted that three securocrats; police commissioner Augustine Chihuri, prison service chief Paradzai Zimoni and Central Intelligence Organisation director general Happyton Bonyongwe were known as key allies of the fired former Vice-President Joice Mujuru. So it can be expected that they are currently taking a low profile because they either need Mujuru back or reciprocate Mugabe’s generosity shown by his decision to spare them the enmity when their patron was ejected from government. See, Bulawayo24, 19/08/2015. Mugabe saves pro-Mujuru generals. Available at: http://bulawayo24.com/index-id-news-sc-national-byo-72744.html.


100. Interviews, July-August 2017.
The recent beating of MDC-T Vice President Thokozani Khupe and most senior Matabeleland members of MDC-T by a militia allegedly sent by President Tsvangirai are a clear indicator that the main opposition might cause regional Balkanisation of the country and we cannot let that happen... We prevented this through a Unity Accord in 1987 no matter how politically ridiculous it seemed; we wanted to stop bloodshed only. We stand opposed to the return to that moment of madness... 102

Dichotomies regarding Preferred Power shifts within ZANU-PF

Since this study was conducted in the context of raging factional fights and competitions within the ZANU-PF party and government, interrogating the extent to which this factional competition has reached the security sector establishment was germane in understanding the most possible political transition. Given that ZANU-PF has virtually been militarised and this militarised ZANU-PF has been networked across the political economy of the state, it follows that factional fights might fracture the state government if not handled properly. In addition, power shifts in ZANU-PF in favour of either G40 or Team Lacoste will definitely cause significant reconfigurations in the political economy of the nation-state and alter ZANU-PF electoral competitive advantages vis-à-vis the main opposition parties. This is partly due to the fact that there will be two militarised camps vying for government and/or grabbing various parts of ZANU-PF political strongholds. One undying fact is that, Robert Mugabe's natural departure due to age and frail health is imminent and his departure from the political arena is an assured transition. One of the factions will have to takeover in ZANU-PF.

Respondents were asked to indicate their preferred successor among the two contenders Emerson Mnangagwa and DR Grace Mugabe—wife of the incumbent president. Although many respondents expressed their preference for Emerson Mnangagwa to takeover ZANU-PF leadership after Robert Mugabe,103 there was a significant number of respondents who either preferred Grace Mugabe and her G40 allies or neither of the two.104 Grace Mugabe emerged as the least preferred candidate to succeed Mugabe with 26% of respondents preferring her against the 43% and 31% preferring VP Mnangagwa and "None of the two" respectively.105 Putting aside those who preferred neither of the two factions in ZANU-PF, findings would imply that Team Lacoste is more pronounced among the age groups 31-50+ years which is the location of top security sector personnel and well connected securocrats compared to G40 which has an upper hand in the youth group (18-30 years). Does this tell that the securocratic state is gravitating around VP Mnangagwa for survival and continuity? Since respondents revealed their belief that President Mugabe is actually the shadow leader of the G40,106 does this mean the country is nearing a rejection of Robert Mugabe by the core securocrats and/or is Mugabe trying to reform ZANU-PF in a manner that liberates it from the historical capture by security sector interests or is he attempting to throw away old friends and introduce new loyal ones while maintaining the status quo?

In addition, the fact that 31% of the sample preferred neither VP Mnangagwa nor Grace Mugabe raises three implications: (i) that the G40 faction (that

103. The 31+ years age group stratum was quantitatively the largest (51%) in the sample followed by the 31-50 years stratum (28%). This explains why the pro-Mnangagwa preference might seem less than the “none of the two” in the representation in Fig 4.3 while being quantitatively higher (43%) in actual representation in the overall sample because it earned more points in the large groups (62% & 34%) of the sample. The 18-30 years age group had the smallest quota (21%) in the sample, thus its contribution in the “none of the two” preference failed to surpass preferences of Mnangagwa dominant in the other age groups.

104. In terms of proportional share (number of respondents preferring neither of the two competing candidates) in the whole sample, this group came second (31%) after the pro-Mnangagwa preferences and the pro-G40 being the least preferred (26%).

106. Interviews, July-August 2017. This belief had a significant representation in the sample as it appeared in 59% of the interviews held by this study.

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Figure 4.3: Preferred power shift within ZANU-PF

- Dr Grace Mugabe takeover
- Neither of the two
- ED Mnangagwa take over

Source: Analysis of collected data.102

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appeals to the youth) has a chance of turning this apathy to its favour or else risk a resounding support to the Team Lacoste if the generals do their good job in pummelling their subordinates in line with their wishes – that is – to support Mnangagwa; (ii) that there is a significant portion in the security sector that is capable of supporting a third and better alternative in the event that these factions are neither resolved amicably nor make a marriage of convenience to fight the election together in the 2018 elections; (iii) the current status quo – a securocratic state – is losing support and/or cohesion and this can be a loophole if there is a willing and strong opposition alternative that can give this sector real prospects for change. Grace Mugabe raised alarms on increasing insecurity and instability in the securocratic state when, in response to VP Mnangagwa’s implications that he was poisoned in a Gwanda rally through an ice-cream produced by Grace and Robert Mugabe’s dairy, she said:

“... because it is impossible to say I like the President but I do not like his wife, impossible, hazviite (it can’t), which means you do not like the President himself” 107(...) We must all agree when the president decides one day says he is leaving office ... We must all agree as the party about who will take over. Not pointing guns at each other … bazookas … No. (...) We are being threatened day and night that when someone comes into power we are going to kill you. Ah! Ahh! We will not bow down to that pressure. Never. You will have to arrest all of us and lock all of us in jail so that you can rule (Zimbabwe). Who says everyone wants to rule? And there is an issue that someone is holding a gun on his hand and fighting alone, we don't want to hear all that (...) If they don't want you, they don't want you. Period. You tell people that I will be with so and so (when in power) ... No one recognizes coups, you know it. The AU (African Union does not recognize coups and SADC (Southern African Development Community) does not recognize coups. And don't even dare talk about it because it's treason. 108

The findings entail that, if Robert Mugabe dies in office before naming his successor in a manner that will unite the two estranged factions in ZANU-PF, there will be three or more political forces with security sector support in the post Mugabe era jostling for power with opposition parties. It must be noted that Robert Mugabe has declared that he has no intention to hand over power to anyone and that no one other than himself in ZANU-PF is capable of winning elections against MDC-T’s leader Morgan Tsvangirai. In line with this logic, it can be predicted that ZANU-PF will lose its political dominance as soon as Robert Mugabe dies in office and/or in the elections to follow.

Generally, many of those who preferred none of the competing candidates among sampled respondents were from Matabeleland region provinces while some from the same region preferred to leave the question unanswered. Few respondents from this region chose Grace over Mnangagwa. It should be noted that most respondents of this study were either recruited through ZANU-PF patronage networks or were former members of ZANU-PF. Thus, according to this background of the sample, respondents were expected to be 100% ZANU-PF and, the manner with which they responded contrary to this expectation should be understood in this context.

In support of VP ED Mnangagwa's succession, respondents gave the following reasons: (i) he is capable of safeguarding the vested interests of the security sector; (ii) he has the loyalty and assured support from across the sections of the security sector, thus can avoid military confrontation in the transition period; (iii) he is the most experienced and qualified to rule as Robert Mugabe is—military background and the liberation struggle credentials; (iv) he is pragmatic and result-oriented, he is thus capable of turning the country's economic fortunes as shown by his implementation of Command Agriculture programme and his ability to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from the East, West and South. 109

The ZDF Commander, General Chiwenga has broken the security sector silence regarding succession politics and his strong alliance with the Mnangagwa faction and his preparedness to oppose G40 in a manner a general opposes a threat to national peace. 110 The words of the general clearly expose the point brought forward by this report earlier that, the security sector views its interests as national interests and in this case, Mnangagwa’s succession seems to be the interest of the generals. This has been the line of thought peddled by the war veterans led by the fired ex-minister of the war vets Christopher Mutsvangwa who has left nothing hidden about his faction's
preference of VP Mnangagwa. This has enticed hot criticisms from G40 and President Mugabe himself who has threatened to send soldiers who mingle in ZANU-PF politics to retirement.

In one occasion while addressing ZANU-PF Women's League members, President Robert Mugabe stated that;

_The military yese (whole of it) has no right, you know, to be interfering with the political processes; theirs is to support. They can give their own views within the constitution and according to also the principle that politics shall always lead the gun and not the gun politics. (...) Iyo inenge yavo coup iyo (that will be a coup). Hino chiona zvimwe zviri kuitika zvichibva ikako kuvakuro varikoko kuti ah president ngachichena (Now see what is coming from some of the senior army personnel, they are saying the president should go). Vachibva kuchipinda ani? Ndian akatarirwa kuti ndiye anosungirwa kupinda? (Leave to accommodate who? Who has been identified to take over?). It's disgraceful for anyone to say 'I am the one now, President must go'. Kungonzira ka dundundu kuti (Someone is being boastful saying) yes, I am the one now; aiwa hatidi, hatidi, hatidi (No, we can't, we can't, we can't!)._ 113

Such a statement was a very satiric and narrow oxymoron to many as they wondered how would the President expect a boundary between the military and ZANU-PF in light of (i) how the military elevated him to ZANU-PF leadership and its ability to do the same today and tomorrow; (ii) how the military has jealously protected its politico-economic interests and; (iii) how change of ZANU-PF leadership definitely affects the same interests whose preservation has kept him in power for above three decades despite his poor government performance. It should be noted however that these remarks by President Robert Mugabe followed soon after ZDF Commander Constentario Chiwenga had came out against a G40 loyalist, Professor Jonathan Moyo in an unknown support of Team Lacoste. This implies that President Mugabe supports G40 and was seemingly unsettled by the shifting of army generals' support from him to VP Mnangagwa. President Robert Mugabe's ambiguous attack of the military has been dismissed as mere sentiments of a troubled politician in a serious dilemma of choosing between old friends and new friends without losing the means of staying in power—choosing the best devil between the two. 114

However, some respondents argued that Mnangagwa has shown serious appetite for power that makes him "prone to do anything democratic and not to acquire and consolidate his stay in power" and this makes him lose support among the electorate. Reasons were that: (i) his history of dismal performance in elections and lack of national support coupled by his central role in the formation of ZANU-PF/PF-ZAPU GNUs and ZANU PF; MDC GNU makes him prone to use the latter to gain power; (ii) his central role as the advisor to Robert Mugabe saw them using military force to force opposition to surrender and accept what they offered—the Gukurahundi massacres resulted in a Unity Accord and ZANU-PF dominated government in 1987; Land Reform; Operation Murambatsvina and Operation Mavh terapapi led to the GNU in 2009 dominated by ZANU-PF, he is likely to use his old tricks to remain in the political fraternity; (iii) Mnangagwa has shown a religious belief in the dominance of the executive over the legislature and judiciary and populating political offices with personnel from the security sector, it is likely that Zimbabwe will return to a government by one man surrounded by securocrats and breakdown of the rule of law and; (iv) that Mnangagwa has proven to have little to no regard of the sanctity of the constitution, his arguments during the introduction of the first amendment to the constitution revealed that he will always amend the constitution whenever convenient to his interests and in the words of one of the respondents 'this is doom for the future of democracy in Zimbabwe'. 115

On the other hand, reasons given in support of Dr Grace Mugabe's candidature were that: (i) she is the only woman with competitive advantage to lead ZANU-PF and a possible chance for Zimbabwe to be ruled by a woman; (ii) she will be a first move in the destruction of ZANU-PF's strict use of liberation struggle credentials to deprive Zimbabweans of their democratic right to access political offices; (iii) she is a weakest alternative which will help the opposition to win power and finish the blocked political transition it started in 2009. 116 Those opposed to her stated that: (i) she will weaken ZANU-PF and disadvantage it in

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111 See, Video, Mutsvangwa savages G40 vows to deal with the faction. Sep 14, 2017. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mT9CfYHcGkLg.
112 See, The Standard, 30/07/2017. Mugabe: Generals face the axe. Available at: https://www.thestandard.co.zw/2017/07/30/mugabe-generals-face-axe/
114 Interviews, August 2017.
115
116
elections to come, it is thus unreasonable to let her succeed Robert Mugabe; (ii) she lacks any clue of leadership or ideals of the liberation struggle; (iii) she has a history of using her position to conduct human rights violations and take private property by force, such conduct is not what Zimbabweans want. From the stated points, it can be generally said that Grace Mugabe is opposed or supported for her foreseeable role in leading ZANU-PF out of power anytime she gets to power. The significant figure of those who preferred none of the two is important in so far as assessing the endurance of militarisation of ZANU-PF politics is concerned. Rough reading of it indicates that, if not reinvigorated or worse if Team Lacoste is outsmarted by G40 in their competition to succeed Mugabe, this will wane with generations to come, even within ZANU-PF itself.

Preferred Transition in the Political Economy of the Nation-state.
Besides intra-party discohesions in the seccrator state system, respondents were interviewed to capture their preferred form and source of transition in the political economy of Zimbabwe at large. Sampled respondents revealed their dissatisfaction with the level of politico-economic development in the country. They instead expressed their preference of a democratic change in the political economy of the country although they differed in their preference of the political source of democracy between ZANU-PF and MDC. None of the respondents preferred the current politico-economic development status quo—meaning transition is a dire need even to those at the centre of ZANU-PF seccrator patronage networks.

On this question, the majority of sampled respondents (51%) preferred a ZANU-PF driven change in the political economy of the state compared to a 27% preferring change driven by forces outside ZANU-PF and 22% who preferred change from anywhere in Zimbabwe. Respondents in the smallest stratum of the sample (22%) stated that they do not care whether democracy comes from ZANU-PF or elsewhere in Zimbabwe, what is needed is change to the lives of their children and their grand children politically connected or not. There were no significant divergences across provinces and regions with regards to this question.

Two explanations can be given to this data: (i) the respondents are within the seccrator state’s patronage network, they are therefore prone to prefer ZANU-PF reforms; (ii) the largest component (76%) in the stratum that preferred ZANU-PF led reforms is in the 51 + years age group and composed of most senior seccrators and beneficiaries of the seccrator state, they are therefore prone to prefer a reform that protects their interests. The young generation and middle generation were among the largest content (86%) of the respondents who showed no preference of the source of democratic transition in the country whilst, many (76%) among the elderly generation (51+ years age group) preferred a ZANU-PF democratization that will start from within and spread across the country via the existing patronage networks. Another observation from the study sample is that, a large component (60%) of the youth (18-30 years) preferred politico-economic transition from outside ZANU-PF against a few (12%) who preferred a ZANU-PF led reform and 28% who prefer reform from any player in Zimbabwe. Since these were open ended questions, it is very interesting to note that the seccrator state has lost support among the young generation most probably because it has not well integrated it in the beneficial patronage network. This is a very important group because in a decade to come, it will be the major content in the security sector and capable of subverting the seccrator state’s patronage webs when not bought off fast.

Figure 4.4: Preferred political source of politico-economic betterment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Anywhere in Zimbabwe</th>
<th>Within ZANU - PF</th>
<th>Outside ZANU - PF</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>51+</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31-50</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-30</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Analysis of Research Findings.

120. Interviews, July-August 2017.
SECTION 5: DISTRIBUTION OF ECONOMIC RESOURCES-MILITARISED PATRONAGE NETWORKING

"... it is through those direct connections to the liberation struggle or indirectly via serving politico-military parents, relatives, best-friends and lovers that economic opportunities, favours and profits are distributed across the national citizenry. Our political economy has become clustered around connections to the ZANU-PF patronage network—the military network...."

INTRODUCTION

This section presents findings and analyses of this study on how ZANU-PF securocrat patronage networks have been webbed across key economic zones in the national economy to influence and control the authoritative allocation of economic opportunities. This study delimited the national economy into three main economic zones, which are: (i) government employment and distribution of opportunities; (ii) the mining industry and; (iii) agriculture. These are the key most patronized economic zones whose management is pivotal for transition to take place. Findings revealed that, it is through patronage network in these economic zones that ZANU-PF has been leveraged to determine who gets poor, when and how across the ten provinces of the country. A close scrutiny of this patronage web—as observed by this study—reveals it as the origin of corruption, extortion, unconstitutional prey on individual private property, erosion of investor confidence, lack of accountability and generally poor quality of governance.

PATRONAGE NETWORKING IN KEY POLITICAL APPOINTMENTS AND RESOURCE DISTRIBUTION

This study observed that, political appointments are ranked among the most important and most lucrative economic resources and/or opportunities and profits that are fiercely competed for. It was revealed that when one is appointed as a judge, minister, commissioner, vice-chancellor, ambassador, administrator, permanent secretary, and/or district administrator, his or her economic opportunities double and/or quadruple.\textsuperscript{121} Such an opportunity availed by appointing one individual renders a harvest of employment privileges to close friends, party associates, relatives and lovers.

The logic behind this being that; (i) the larger share of the Zimbabwean economy is mainly that of a government worker—government payer, so government employment is indeed a major economic zone exploited by many for survival and prosperity; (ii) the Zimbabwean economy is populated with over-qualified jobless graduates coming from impoverished families engaged in a continuous fierce competition for the smallest vacancy opening, they are thus ready to do anything to get employed; (iii) ZANU-PF has followed faithfully its policy of sending security sector personnel to tertiary education institutions to acquire degrees so that they could effectively capture all good paying employment opportunities offered by government agencies, this has made employment of a qualified general citizen (unconnected) difficult; (iv) government appointments are accessible to qualified individuals but more accessible to those with a military link alongside qualifications and; (v) ZANU-PF connectedness usually comes with privileges and immunities from police harassment, long queues, accountability for actions, and other barriers economic interests available for grabbing; this therefore makes politically orchestrated employment a vital economic opportunity.\textsuperscript{122}

Access to all other two selected economic zones—mining and agriculture—depend on the acquisition or association to this economic zone—government appointment to a position of power and/or employment and distribution loops. Two main reasons for the "seek yea political freedom and the rest shall follow unto thee" mentality have been observed. Firstly, if one secures a political post, he/she can use it through exchange of favours to acquire land and/or mining claims from his fellow government officials responsible for administering those areas. Shared security sector histories among such people have made such mutually beneficial exchange of favours easier. Secondly, it is a known fact that government appointees are paid enough salaries to even purchase land, farming inputs and mining claims alongside other benefits such as access some state resources, fuel which is sold in black market, benefits such as allowances (housing, school fees), board allowances (i.e. PSMAS and other parastatals) and easy access to loans. Huge loans given to senior government officials by the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe are an example. Political appointment is therefore a necessary step to prosperity.

\textsuperscript{121} Interviews, July-August, 2017.

\textsuperscript{122} Interviews, July-August, 2017.
Most successful business persons have been beneficiaries of this patronage network especially those in the 18-30 years age group. ZANU-PF has been aware of this trend it created and has arrested it as a key strategy of maintaining its stay in power by scattering loyal security sector personnel across key decision making bodies, parastatals and state universities with powers to hire or fire a head of a household who votes ZANU-PF in or out respectively. The latter will mean firing even patronage networks employed as a result of the appointment of the member concerned and abolition of enjoyed immunities and privileges leading to possible introduction to litigations, trials and tribulations for sins committed while under ZANU-PF protection. The firing of former President Canaan Banana, Vice President Joice Mujuru in 2015 alongside her associates and the trials and tribulations they underwent are some of the instances.

In line with the above argument, there is a visible trend in major appointments made and assignments given by President Robert Mugabe and/or his ministers that clearly maintain preference of security sector persons at all costs. In cases where persons without military record or links have been appointed, appointees have been surrounded by a military board which overrides the appointee’s decisions. Thus, in any case, the liberation struggle legacy and/or patronage network prevails in recruitments to follow. Commenting on this phenomenon, a key respondent argued that:

This has maintained a crew of comrades by training or association in key state employment opportunities and it is through those direct connections to the liberation struggle or indirectly via serving politico-military parents, relatives, best-friends and lovers that economic opportunities, favours and profits are distributed across the national citizenry (...). Our political economy has become clustered around connections to the ZANU-PF patronage network-the military network.

A critical audit of Robert Mugabe’s appointees during his current term in office leaves no doubt on the point that, the security sector has been privileged as long standing recipients of economic pay-backs from ZANU-PF politics. In 2015, the following appointments of security sector personnel were done by the President: (i) Brigadier-General Thando Madzvamuse—principal director in the Ministry of Economic Planning and investment Promotion; (ii) Major General Richard Ruwondo, Brigadier General James Jotham Murozvi and Brigadier General Chancellor Dyie—all being principal directors in the Ministry of Welfare Services of War Veterans, War Collaborators, former Detainees and Restrictees; (iii) Air Commodore Ivan Gibson Dumba—principal director in the Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development; (iv) Brigadier General Godfrey Chanakira—principal director in the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development; (v) Brigadier General Evaristo Dzihwena—principal director in the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenization and Empowerment. Other appointments include (a) Brigadier General (retired) Asher Walter Tapfumaneyi—permanent secretary in the Ministry of Welfare Services of War Veterans, War Collaborators, former Detainees and Restrictees; (b) Brigadier General (retired) Dr Gerald Gwinji—permanent secretary in the Ministry of Health; (c) Retired Colonel Nelly Abu Basutu a wife of Air Vice-Marshal Titus Abu Masutu was at the helm of the then military controlled Minerals Marketing Corporation of Zimbabwe (MMCZ) in 2008 and presided over alleged loss of USD 15 billion worth of diamond revenue.

It can be seen from the appointments mentioned above that the military has been in control of most political and economically strategic positions that are very significant in the distribution of economic resources. However, what has been observed is that military appointees have never performed well in their appointed positions, corruption scandals and lack of accountability have been characteristic features of their management culture. Actually, it is partly due to this culture that ZANU-PF membership itself has come to be understood by many grassroots citizens as...
an economic one opportunity. This was captured in the words of one respondent who observed that:

... being a member of ZANU-PF makes it easy for our children to graduate and get employed in government, you get privileged access to scarce commodities such as farming inputs at cheap prices, acquiring stands in urban areas and plots and/or farms all those get easy...

Indeed, the spoils of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (possession and distribution of land previously owned by white minorities), Operation Garikai/Hlalani Khele (allocation of cheap government built houses in urban areas) and Command Agriculture (subsidized farming) have been enjoyed by ZANU-PF members and used to attract more supporters into party ranks. It is through these appointments and attendant benefits that the masses have failed to meaningfully integrate into the political economy of the nation-state. Thus, targeting this economic sector is very important in any politico-economic transition efforts and if not reformed, it will always stifle real development of the masses.

CAPTURE OF THE MINING INDUSTRY BY ZANU-PF/MILITARY INTERESTS

Personnel from the security sector have been engaged in the mining industry since 1980. Gold mining and panning have been connected with army generals and undercover intelligence bosses. Many army generals have mining claims across the country together with their ZANU-PF compatriots. The abrupt replacement of the board of MMCZ in 2008 was said to be as a result of the late General Mujuru’s military politicking to clear obstacles after the fired board members refused to purchase his diamond from River Ranch Mine. The ubiquitous role of the security sector in the mining sector has become visible with the discovery of diamonds and the subsequent military rash into the fields in Marange and Chiyadzwa since 2006.

Above 200 illegal miners were shot dead by the Air Force troops in the same area in October 2008 in what the regime called Operation Hakudzokwi (Never Return) which was followed by the entry of various sections of the security sector through organized corporations.

Main mining companies in the area were captured by military interests. For instance: (i) Mbada Diamonds Private Limited is chaired by former Vice Air Marshal Robert Mhlanga (he was Mugabe’s helicopter pilot for 20 years and allegedly owns 25% shares in the company) and his daughter Patience Khumalo served as the Chief Executive Officer throughout the diamond rush period; (ii) Canadile Miners’ director is Retired Captain Kurotwi and “several military officers are also listed as shareholders in both companies; (iii) Anjin Investments, with board member and director Retired Brigadier-General Munyaradzi Machacha is a joint venture between Chinese and Zimbabwean defence forces—Matt Bronze Enterprises whose ownership is claimed to be in the hands of the Defence Ministry and the Zimbabwe National Army through Glass Finish Investments (Pvt) Ltd (which is claimed to control 40% shares); (iv) Former army commander Solomon Mujuru and Adel Abdul Rahman al Aujan, a Saudi Arabian business man acquired the River Ranch Diamond Mine at Beitbridge using the police to evict the previous owners Adele and Michael Farqhar at gun point disregarding a court ruling. His Khuphukile Resources has 20% shares in this mine whilst a majority of shares are owned by his partner’s Rani Investments. Another player has been Kusena Diamonds, a Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO)-owned company, which had mining rights in Chidzwu though operating under cover until it folded into the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) in October 2015 (Global Witness cited in Zimbabwe Independent, 22/09/2017).

A key point is worth noting regarding this representation of the security sector in the diamond mining industry; that is,

134.See, Mugabe’s double standards on Mujuru death - The Zimbabwe Situation Aug
136.See, Zimbabwe Independent, 18/03/2016.
In line with this thinking is the deliberate firing of the MMCZ board members in 2008 accused of acting against former ZDF commander and the then strong man in the ZANU-PF Central Committee—Solomon Mujuru's interests (refusing to give Kimberly Process Certification to his diamonds from River Ranch Mine) and replacing them with a militarized board led by wife of Perence Shiri's. It is Perence Shiri's troopers who were pivotal in the shootings of civilian miners and it was him who was in charge of the Mgagao Training Camp in Tanzania that masterminded a 1975 intra-party coup that installed Robert Mugabe as leader of ZANU and subsequent President of Zimbabwe. Such linkages should not be given limited attention because they spell the source and centre of military capture of the political economy.

The Zimbabwean diamond mines have been among the most criticized worldwide due to spectacular evidences of military capture of the economy and the culture of corruption, lack of accountability and transparency related to military blood diamond dealings. President Robert Mugabe himself is and has been aware of this culture and responding to interviews by the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation on the occasion of his 92nd birthday in March 2016, he stated that,

> We have not received much from the diamond industry at all (…) I don't think we've exceeded US$2 billion or so, and yet we think that well over US$15 billion has been earned in that area. (…) There has been quite a lot of secrecy (…) and lots of swindling, smuggling (…). The companies that have been mining have virtually robbed us, I want to say, of our wealth (…). You cannot trust a private company in that area. None at all.

This resonates with the earlier findings of a 2013 Parliamentary Portfolio Committee enquiry which reported "serious discrepancies between what government receives from the sector and what the diamond mining companies claim to have remitted to Treasury." It will be politically naive to agree that the President was not aware of these findings or the reality about militarised smuggling of diamonds. When the parliamentary committee said it at a time ZANU-PF factionalism was not pronounced, the culprits were neither criticized in public nor forced to account. Now that there are two factions in the party, it is not coincidental that the president has opened up on the corruption scandals done by one faction. It is conspicuous to point that it is through such conduct that President Mugabe is said to be standing with G40 among the two competing successionist camps in his party and that those looting diamonds (security sector conduits) are definitely not in the camp of choice.

The nation-state economy is determined by political appointments and connectedness and political appointments are determined by military interests. The extent to which the security sector has been playing a major role in the mining sector indicates the extent to which it is involved in the political structure that controls economics of the state. The firing of MMCZ board members in connection with their refusal to give KPC to General Mujuru's diamonds and their replacement with a military dominated board led by Retired Colonel Nelly Abu Basutu shows the extent to which the security sector can go to preserve its vested interests. In addition, the deliberate placement of security sector conduits in the mining fields in the form of mining companies, maintaining military presence in the youth, indigenisation and empowerment board and ministry is inseparable from the well planned strategy of capturing all economically lucrative political spaces and opportunities for looting of funds. This explains why government has failed to account for the looted USD15 billion proceeds from diamonds as alleged by President Robert Mugabe or do a realistic investigation on the same.

The government decision in 2016 to stop mining done by diamond mining companies in Zimbabwe and giving monopoly of such activities to the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC) has been seen as a political ploy by G40 to sabotage the Mnangagwa faction. The assumption is that ZDF generals linked to "Lacoste" benefited from the profits of these companies and if this stands, a clear indication of the fact that G40 leader is none than President Robert Mugabe himself is shown.

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140. See note 126 above.
It is believed that closing such militarized mining activities will stifle access to funds that are used to fund Team Lacoste’s activities. The military’s support of Mnangagwa is also understood to be inseparable from its desire to keep loyal politicians in control of the state appointing and disappointing machinery—this will, as argued by respondents, necessitate their undisrupted return to the diamond fields.\textsuperscript{147} Factionalism has also dichotomized war veterans and those associated to VP Mnangagwa have been subjects of censure and ejection from the party. It is through such ejected war veterans led by former Minister Christopher Mutsangwa that disgruntled former security sector persons have publicly revoked the Mgagao declaration that saw them elevating Robert Mugabe as their chief conduit.\textsuperscript{147} These war veterans have been clear in their loyalty to VP Mnangagwa faction and their solidarity with the serving security sector leadership. Mutsangwa has been accused by President Robert Mugabe of being a conduit of the securocrats and Mnangagwa faction. For instance, Benard Manyadza an ex-Zanla commander (Parker Chipoyera), and his delegation of war veterans who include former top intelligence operative Retired Colonel Bastan Beta, Levy Gwarada and Ngoni Chitauro, among others, stressed that they no longer support President Mugabe’s candidature in 2018 and argued that;

\textit{It is us the war veterans who put Mugabe into power. We the war veterans who agreed to the authorship of the Mgagao document and append our signatures to it now withdraw the mandate we gave to Robert Mugabe to be the leader (...) A meeting between selected War Veterans and the president of Zimbabwe, who is also the patron of the Zimbabwe national Liberation War Veterans’ Association Robert Mugabe, which was held on 7 April was a mockery to the war veterans, the fallen heroes and the Zimbabwean nation at large (...) A process of screening ostensibly to weed out pseudo war veterans from attending was put in place and attendance was by invitation the true intention of the screening exercise is exclude those war veterans deemed to be openly opposed to Robert Mugabe’s continued mis-rule of our country...} \textsuperscript{149}

Will ejected war veterans and army generals orchestrate a second Mgagao intra-party coup d’état to install VP Mnangagwa or watch their political dominance escaping their fingers?

An equally mind boggling question is—is President Robert Mugabe trying to leave a liberated ZANU-PF from military capture when he dies (or leaves office) or is he just replacing old security sector friends with new ones within the Mgagao ZANU-PF capture framework? It should be noted that in many cases where political competitions of this nature (militarized) take an economic dimension or jeopardize economic benefits of military sections, armed confrontations occur. These points to the fact that ZANU-PF internal fighting is a matter of national peace and security and how it is handled will affect politico-economic transition efforts. Thus, any transition efforts in Zimbabwe should prioritise handling of these internal fights at the centre of proposed strategies.

**AGRICULTURE—A SECUROCRAT ECONOMIC ZONE**

Agriculture has been a foundation of economic development in today’s developed countries and thus a pivotal sector for take-off of developing countries like Zimbabwe. If comprehensive transition to development that leaves no one behind is to be achieved in Zimbabwe, integration of the general population into gainful production chains in the agricultural sector will be the first step. Thus, agriculture is a key economic sector in Zimbabwe and its management is cardinal to economic transition. Military interests have been aware of this fact and has been among key captured sectors where proceeds are personalized, pocketed and mismanaged.

The following is a summary of key voices from the security sector regarding agriculture and its capture by military interests. It explains how this capture cannot be understood from the liberation struggle goals and subsequent capture and use of ZANU-PF by the security sector leadership.

\textit{... access to land and its use was in the heart of the liberation struggle. We were amazed at how resolution of the land issue took a snail pace until we intervened...} \textsuperscript{149}
\textit{War veterans never used violence to repossess land, we were infiltrated by fake war veterans and youth gangs known for such violence. Thereafter, our programme was hijacked by political interests and it got rotted in that way.} \textsuperscript{150}

\textsuperscript{147} Interviews, July – August 2017. See also, 263Chat, 13/04/2016. War veterans revoke Mgagao declaration. Available at: 263chat.com/war-veterans-revoke-mgagao-declaration/.

\textsuperscript{149} Interviews, Masvingo, July 2017.
\textsuperscript{150} Interviews, Bulawayo, July 2017.
Yes we own land but not all of us own land equally. Some of us have taken too much and that ceases to reflect the spirit of our struggle—it has become greed-ridden...

Even in my area here, go around and count how many true war veterans you will find. These are not war veterans they are former spies and militia gangs that took that opportunity to violently capture state land...

I agree with you on that one, a general soldier has neither farm nor plot. Generals, retired or serving have large tracks of land whereas many war veterans reside in rural areas with no farms...

We as war veterans were able to get plots not farms, those of who are in positions of power got farms alongside our serving political leadership...

The Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) that began in year 2000 saw security sector generals, ZANU-PF top leadership, members of the captured legislature and judiciary, war veterans and chiefs personalizing about 4500 best commercial farms and real estates. Mandaza (2016) characterizes the problems of land capture, subsequent overpopulating it with security sector personnel and their networked conduits and consequent collapse of production wherein and industries dependant on agriculture as the patronage competences of a 'securocrat state.' We however argue that it should be well if the state itself is consequently described as a securocratic state given the fact that ZANU-PF which the author correctly identifies as inextricably conflated with the state was actually captured by the military long before getting to power. With a securocratic party/state conflation, it is correct to categories the Zimbabwean state as a securocratic state—the source of the country's economic misfortunes.

Scoones et al (2008) found that the land reform generally benefitted ordinary black citizens. Although this survey conducted in Masvingo (and heavily relied on ZANU-PF ministerial information) revealed that only 5% of the people on the land acquired during the FTLRP belong to the security sector network, it does not consider quality and quantity of land in the hands of that 5% population. It is a known fact that huge quantities and best qualities of land was grabbed by security sector bosses and their cronies.

One can only get along with these findings on two conditions: (i) that Masvingo is not among the most fertile lands in Zimbabwe, so proportions of security sector population in acquired land are bound to be low compared to most fertile areas and; (ii) the few people on acquired land possess huge quantities of land disproportional to their quantitative representation in the population.

President Robert Mugabe's family and that of the late retired General Solomon Mujuru's are among key beneficiaries of multiple farms, and that Grace continued to grab land even from newly resettled farmers. Key leaders in the security sector own farms not plots. For instance, in 2001 the late General Mujuru took over a farm from a white commercial farmer Guy Watson-Smith in Beatrice and latter on, he died painfully in the same farm. His wife Joice Mujuru was famous for using her position in political power to close out ordinary citizens from economic spaces. Her historical failed attempt to block ECONET tender and delaying it enough until the formation of Telcel, a mobile operator in which her family had interests was a case in point. So, these are some of the examples of a securocratic political economy.

Operation Taguta/Sisuthi or 'Operation Eat Well' of 2005 was an attempt at militarising the agriculture following the realisation that the Fast Track Land Reform had paralysed the sector. Thus on paper, the programme sought to help revive the sector. The then Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe Governor Gideon Gono who had effectively usurped the functions of all economic ministries stated that:

We applaud the Zimbabwe Defence Forces for taking up the challenge by strapping their guns on their backs and rolling up their sleeves to till the land under Operation Maguta. Under this programme, no doubt a huge food gap will be closed, effectively saving foreign exchange to go towards other priority sectors of the economy (GIDEON GONO, Reserve Bank Governor, February 2006).  

Studies during that time revealed that the result was a
defacto "hijack" of plots and maize harvests particularly
"in Matabeleland, leaving the smallholder-farmers with
no income or food." Since this period, uncertainties
have surrounded the sustainability of civilian activities in
the acquired land—people are not sure whether the
army will not one day command them out of
agriculture.

The Command Agriculture programme has come on
the limelight as another key state programme which has
been captured by military interests. The Minister of
Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology
and ZANU-PF politburo member Professor Jonathan
Moyo is the first whistle blower to expose the military
capture of this programme rejecting such tendencies as
"ugly culture" and its exaggerated success claims as
"Command lies." VP Mnangagwa has been a
government frontrunner in this programme and
accused of using it to redesign the seccratecrat party's
patronage network in a manner that nets-out those
opposed to his presidential ambitions. Security sector
generals have come out one after the other to tacitly
corroborate the fact that they are in the Mnangagwa
faction and confirm the capture of the programme. In
response to the exposure of politico-military
gamesmanship hidden behind Command Agriculture,
General Chiwenga released a press statement on state
media stating that:

So these people who are talking about Command
Agriculture linking it to unthinkable things; they are no
different from Sodom and Gomorrah; those homosexuals
where Lot's wife was turned into a heap of salt (…) we
have fought a bitter liberation struggle and we have never
seen it that what was discussed in the High Command
was leaked to the cadres.

He also dismissed government ministers criticizing the
programme as "vomiting nonsense" 'rebels' and threats
to national security whilst emphasizing that the security
sector has a legitimate right to be involved in agriculture
politics by virtue of Air Marshal Perence Shiri's deputy
Chairmanship in one of the key subcommittees of
Command Agriculture. What can be noted here is a
general who has gone to the extent of
unconstitutionality and gross misconduct to defend
military capture of the agriculture sector. The liberation
struggle hangover is brought forward to force a security
sector culture of commands, secrecy, un-
questionability and lack of accountability of public
policy. The reference to ministers as Sodom and
Gomorrah people is not limited to his tacit threat of
bringing the destruction they deserve—that of fire
suffered by the biblical Sodom and Gomorrah.

The Zimbabwe National Army commander,
Lieutenant-General Philip Valerio Sibanda also openly
declared his support and involvement in the operation
when he said he has deployed over a thousand officers
to run the project. In clear exposure of military political
participation, he said;

We are playing our part in two clusters of ZimAsset, the
one being food security and nutrition … in that regard the
army is playing an important role in the command
agriculture exercise. We have close to a thousand
members, who are at various levels playing an important
role there."

Five cardinal points in history reiterated in findings are
worth noting to corroborate the inseparability of
military capture of agriculture from the capture of
ZANU-PF and state apparatus. One man has featured
prominently in military campaigns where military
interests seem likely to be conquered by the peoples'
interests in Zimbabwe—General Air Marshal Perence
Shiri. He is: (i) the general who was commander in
charge of the Mgagao military camp that captured
ZANU-PF in 1975; (ii) former commander of the Fifth
Brigade army that carried out Gukurahundi in
Matebeleland and Midlands provinces (ii) commander
of the Air Force campaign code named Operation
Hakudzokwii that led a bloody terror campaign in the
diamond mines against illegal miners; (iv) the man
whose deputy's wife was abruptly made to chair the
MMCZ at a time when his conduits were looting diamonds and; (v) the same man who is deputy chair of a
subcommittee of the Command Agriculture. In
response to criticisms of his involvement in Command
Agriculture politics, Air Marshal Perrance Shiri, said;

One of the Air Force of Zimbabwe's legacies is the
military's subservience to political leadership since 1980.
We have co-existed with our politicians peacefully. We
have complimented each other…"

A key point reiterated by the three generals is that of
"complementarity" between the security sector and
ZANU-PF politicians since 1980. The utterances
confirm that ZANU-PF civilian content is expected to
act in a manner that supports military interests and the

161. See, NewsDay Zimbabwe, 19/06/2017. Moyo scoffs at
‘Command Ugly-Culture'. Available at:
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/06/moyo-scoffs-
command-ugly-culture/
162. The Chronicle, 27/06/2017. Chiwenga warns Prof
Moyo. Available at: www.chronicle.co.zw/chiwenga-
warns-prof-moyo/.
163. The Chronicle, 27/06/2017. Chiwenga warns Prof
Moyo. Available at: www.chronicle.co.zw/chiwenga-
warns-prof-moyo/.
164. See NewsDay Zimbabwe, 14/08/2017. Army confirms aiding
command agriculture. Available at:
https://www.newsday.co.zw/2017/08/army-confirms-aiding-
command-agriculture/.
security sector will reciprocate the act as has been the case since 1980. If their clear support of VP Mnangagwa is “complementing ZANU-PF” are they saying that G40 and President Mugabe who leads it are no more ZANU-PF? One equally wonders why the securocrats have taken to the state media to try and justify their refusal to march out of politics as advised by the President. Are generals trying to remind Robert Mugabe to remember the Mgagao declaration or telling him that their apparent refusal to complement G40 by choosing Mnangagwa faction is a clear declaration of the later as figure pointed to take the position given to Robert Mugabe at Mgagao? The complementarity is lost if they are openly opposing G40 which seems to be a Robert Mugabe project. In this regard, the security fears and transition possibilities tied to the militarization of politics and divisive effects thereof are not a farfetched speculation. Will President Robert Mugabe easily get rid of Mnangagwa the Joice Mujuru way without inviting a second Mgagao declaration? This is a Bermuda triangle intriguing ZANU-PF today and it must be taken into account when ever transition scenarios and strategies are developed in Zimbabwe.

This account reflects how intricately webbed is the securocrat patronage network in the political economy and the resultant underdevelopment and poor quality of governance. Therefore, any attempt to revive the political economy is bound to fail if it does not first disentangle this securocratic patronage network. If any civil war or armed confrontation is to be experienced in Zimbabwe, its roots will be traceable to the disruption of this network in a manner that leaves no counter balance and/or overwhelming balance of power. In short, Zimbabwe’s problem is its being a securocratic state—the kind of politicking discussed in this report.
SECTION 6: CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

"This study concludes that the politico-economic transition in Zimbabwe is under capture by the security sector. There exists an intricately webbed securocratic party patronage network that is ubiquitous and cannot coexist with transition forces and/or efforts. The source of the problem in Zimbabwe is, in short, its very existence as a securocratic state."

INTRODUCTION

This is the last and concluding section of the report. It therefore presents a summary of the conclusion of the study on each research question and/or objective, recommendations and implications for further study derived from the findings.

CONCLUSION

The study concludes that the role of the security sector in political and economic affairs of Zimbabwe is as pervasive as ZANU-PF is. This role is the same role that ZANU-PF serves. There is an intricate conflation of the security sector and ZANU-PF to the extent that the security sector is ZANU-PF and ZANU-PF is the security sector itself. This is not a new development, it can be traced to what we call a liberation struggle hangover—the party structure composed of securocrats who double as politicians. The study also concludes that the security sector has been and still is there to protect and pursue the interests of the securocrat party—ZANU-PF. Their role can be easily understood as maintaining state capture by military interests and this role has been at the centre stage in the deterioration of the economy, political institutions and values since 1980.

It also should be noted that ZANU-PF was captured long before independence in 1975 as evidenced by the Mgangao Declaration by soldiers who waged an intraparty coup d'état that installed Robert Mugabe. Since then, the security sector has been at the epicentre of government by operations that have maintained the quest to capture the state entirely and subdue all threats along the way. The liberation struggle has been used as the basis of securocratic state and patronage used to recruit and/or shut-out citizens in key economic and political participation zones.

The capture of: ZANU in 1975, the state craft in 1980, PF-ZAPU in 1987, the land in 2000, diamond fields in 2006 and MDCs in 2009 are among the most important examples of the securocratic political gamesmanship in Zimbabwe. It is this kind of securocrat gamesmanship that has been a major force used to defy the winds of change and capture politico-economic transition.

The nature of security sector capture and imposition of a securocratic state in Zimbabwe is tactfully hewed through effective capture of four basic state institutions—the state media, electoral processes, judiciary and the legislature; economy and ZANU-PF. The capture of the state craft by military interests has been reflected in the dominance of the security sector in key economic zones of the state. The securocratic patronage network has been very active in this area for political reasons. The three key economic zones of Zimbabwe—political appointments and/or employment, mining sector and agriculture—have been captured and used to make ZANU-PF membership a strategic economic opportunity. This has led to the long stay in power of ZANU-PF and the erosion of the economy due to corruption and bad management of resources by the securocratic state. It is through these captured institutions that securocratic rule has been made pervasive throughout the country and perpetual. The securocratic system has made sure that these institutions are directly controlled through security sector members being given leadership and decision making positions or indirectly through appointment of conduits of the security sector to those positions.

The division within ZANU-PF has also divided the securocratic state network thereby dividing the economy attached to it. The halting of business of diamond mining companies has been perceived as an economic coup d'état by G40 since those companies are dominated by Team Lacoste military bosses. This has been the case with agriculture; it has been used as an area of political gamesmanship and calculations at the expense of poor Zimbabweans who are generally food insecure and impoverished.

However, there is a complex but interesting twist in the political tweaking of the current security sector and this has a lot to tell about the future of the securocratic state. There is no common goal, perspective nor preference within the security sector concerning the continued military capture of the political economy and future transition of power in ZANU-PF. The sample generally (though particularly those form Matabeleland regions and metropolitan provinces) highlighted their dissatisfaction with the securocratic state. This was more pronounced in the 18 -50 years age group and hence need for reform as respondents cited serious economic mismanagement and bad governance related to this kind of state. The study also revealed that Mnangagwa is a preferable successor of Robert Mugabe because of his background. Putting aside those who opted none of the two presidential
RECOMMENDATIONS

- At the centre of the securocratic state challenge in Zimbabwe are deepening economic challenges owing to general uncertainties on what will happen in the post-Robert Mugabe era. The involvement of the security sector in the civilian affairs and the subsequent lack of homogeneity among the securocrats poses a serious threat to peace and does not inspire confidence in would-be investors to invest in Zimbabwe. The restoration of certainty and resolution to the infighting associated with the succession question within the ruling party will go a long way in mobilizing domestic and foreign investors.

- The Government of Zimbabwe must set up an Independent Complaint Mechanism in line with Section 210 of the Constitution in order to facilitate holding members of the security services to account.

- An unequivocal demilitarisation of all state institutions and professional conduct of the security services in line with the Constitution of Zimbabwe.

- Government should reform and/or transform national institutions (the judiciary, legislature, electoral system and the media) to get rid of the security sector component in public institutions that has caused intolerance, corruption, theft and violence, and loss of confidence in those institutions. This must ensure that they are populated with competent personnel who execute their mandate in a professional and impartial manner.

- The opposition should come up with a real and formidable alternative politico-economic appeal that can attract security sector loyalties and trust. This might help in breaking down the securocratic state network and moving forward the stark transition abandoned in 2013.

- The ZANU-PF government has, beyond reasonable doubt failed to manage the economy of Zimbabwe. The current cash shortages, high rate of informalisation of the economy, and inflation attest to this fact. It is the general citizenry that suffers the most. As such, there is need for the ZANU-PF government to abandon its costly securocratic state patronage network to enhance accountability, transparency and fight corruption. Reforming the indigenization and economic empowerment policy to mutually profitable gains between investors and the state is inexorable. Government's response to the growth of the informal sector must turn from...
the current ambivalence and confrontation to regularization and support.

- ZANU PF should address the succession battle to avert spillover to the security sector which might create instability, mutiny and armed confrontation and the negative effects of uncertainties on the national economy.

- The opposition should step-up its coalition process and finalize on its leadership stalemate before it's too late. This is the kind of political alternative needed to win security sector loyalties in the event of a breakdown in the current securocratic state.

- The opposition should take its coalition at the top to the grassroots on time to avoid confusions in the coming election.

- SADC and AU should put in place mechanisms of threat detection and pre-emptive measures through their early warning mechanism to respond to instability in Zimbabwe and putting in place mechanism to avert disaster and effects thereof.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY**

This study was a snap survey of the views of the security sector on its involvement in politico-economic affairs of Zimbabwe and preferred transition in the future given the uncertainties and competitions within ZANU-PF. It is a reflection of reality and a call for a broad based study into these dynamics and contradictions so that the future of transition in Zimbabwe is given better nesting.
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ABOUT THE ZIMBABWE DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE

The Zimbabwe Democracy Institute (ZDI) is a politically independent and not for profit public policy think-tank based in Zimbabwe. Founded and registered as a trust in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe in November 2012 (Deed of Trust Registration Number MA1223/2012), ZDI serves to generate and disseminate innovative ideas, cutting-edge research and policy analysis to advance democracy, development, good governance and human rights in Zimbabwe. The Institute also aims to promote open, informed and evidence-based debate by bringing together pro-democracy experts to platforms for debate. The idea is to offer new ideas to policy makers with a view to entrenching democratic practices in Zimbabwe. The ZDI researches, publishes and conducts national policy debates and conferences in democratization, good governance, public finance and economic governance, public policy, human rights and transitional justice, media and democracy relations, electoral politics and international affairs.

ZDI was born out of a realization that there is an absence of credible policy and research analysis by Zimbabwean organizations. A careful assessment of most publications on Zimbabwe’s political economy shows that a majority of them are generated from outside Zimbabwe. ZDI’s team of trustees includes eminent Zimbabwean scholars and experts. Earnest Mudzengi is the chair; Dr Innocent Chirisa, Ms Gladys Hlatwayo, Phillip Pasirayi, and Dr. Wilson Matamande are trustees. Leading the secretariat is general director Pedzisai Ruhanya, who is also an ex officio member of the board.

The vision, mission and Objectives of the organization are as listed below:

Vision
A democratic Zimbabwe in which citizens fully participate in all matters of governance, realize and assert social economic and political rights.

Mission
To promote cutting-edge research and public policy analysis institute for sustainable democracy
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Organizational Objectives
1. To strengthen policy formulation and implementation through public policy debate in Zimbabwe.
2. To inculcate a culture of critical debate on public affairs among Zimbabwean citizens. 3. To ensure that Zimbabwe’s development trajectory is shaped by locally generated information and knowledge.
3. To stimulate citizen participation by strengthening the capacity of state and non-state actors in undertaking research and analysis of public policy.
4. To ensure the direct participation of women in public policy formulation and implementation.
5. To ensure direct participation of youths in public policy formulation and implementation.